

Work In Progress

The Political Construction Of The OECD Programme Teaching And Learning International Survey

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ABSTRACT

The first decades of the 21st century have witnessed unprecedented political interest globally directed towards school teachers and their importance for quality education. Adopting a critical realist approach, the thesis provides a causal account of the mechanisms, contextual conditions and outcomes of the OECD programme Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS). TALIS is the most comprehensive international survey to date on teachers' work. The survey has been conducted twice, in 2008 and 2013, with 24 and 34 political entities taking part. Drawing on literature review, an empirical material of policy documents and theory-laden interviews, and a methodological framework of political discourse analysis, the analysis tests whether competitive comparison, soft legalisation, and teacher unions' maintenance of institutional power resources constitute mechanisms underlying TALIS, and whether the mechanisms are triggered under particular contextual conditions. A range of organisational and national contexts are considered in this respect, including the OECD, the European Union, the global federation of teacher unions Education International, Australia, England and Finland. The thesis argues that the mechanism of competitive comparison explains the outcomes of TALIS although the OECD's aspiration of generating insights into 'teacher effectiveness' was only realised to a limited extent in the first two rounds. Soft legalisation governance frameworks and the paradigm of knowledge-based economy were identified as necessary conditions, and teacher unions' institutional power resources as a contingent condition, for triggering competitive comparison. In advancing this argument, the thesis shows that the impact and uses of TALIS results depend on contextual conditions. In educational contexts already shaped by competitive comparison, such as Australia and England, TALIS has raised little attention. In Finland, the codification of knowledge involved in TALIS has challenged established notions about schools and teachers. The OECD and the European Union are much more active in using and disseminating TALIS results, indicating their efforts to 'scale up' competitive comparison.

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED:

DATE:

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACER	Australian Council for Educational Research
AEU	Australian Education Union
AITSL	Australian Institute for Teaching and School Leadership
BERA	British Educational Research Association
BIAC	Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD
COAG	Council of Australian Governments
CoEU	Education Council of the European Union
CCPEE	Critical cultural political economy of education
DfE	Department for Education, England
DfET	Department for Education and Training, Australian Government
DG EAC	Directorate-General for Education and Culture, European Commission
DG EMP	Directorate-General for Employment, European Commission
EACEA	Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, European Commission
EC	European Commission
EDPC	Education Policy Committee (OECD body)
EI	Education International
ET 2010	Education and Training Work Programme 2010 (European Union)
ET 2020	Education and Training Work Programme 2020 (European Union)
ETUCE	European Trade Union Committee for Education
EU	European Union
IEA	International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOE	Institute of Education, UCL
INES	Indicators of Educational Systems (OECD body)
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
JAF	Joint Assessment Framework (European Union)
NAPLAN	National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (Australia)
NASUWT	National Association of Schoolmasters/Union of Women Teachers (England)
NCEE	National Commission on Excellence in Education (US)
NPC	National Project Centre of TALIS
NUT	National Union of Teachers (England)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OAJ	Trade Union of Education (Finland)
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment
PQ	Principal Questionnaire (in TALIS)
TALIS	Teaching and Learning International Survey
TALIS BPC	TALIS Board of Participating Countries (OECD body)
TEMAG	Teacher Education Ministerial Advisory Group (Australia)
TQ	Teacher Questionnaire (in TALIS)
TUAC	Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

PART I

CHAPTER 1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1.0. Introduction

In the wake of the launch of results from the second round of the OECD programme Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS), a live webinar was hosted by edu-tech firm Promethean Planet to discuss the new results. Apart from OECD Director of Education and Skills Andreas Schleicher, the event was dominated by US- and UK-based based consultancies and foundations, though a representative from the US Department of Education, a few renowned academics, UNESCO, and a teacher union representative were also present. These participants, labelled ‘global education experts’, debated the quality of teaching, teachers and schools as one shared and global issue to be fixed (Education Fast Forward 2014).

According to my notes on this event, the debate covered a lot of ground: resilience, ICT, Shakespeare, the end of schools, Uber, teacher self-efficacy, and fear as an incentive. How to explain this gathering of people and profusion of ideas thrown into one basket? I was intrigued, amused and provoked.

1.1. The Knowledge Interest

During the latest decade, the teaching profession has become a focus for global policy debate (Connell 2009; Robertson 2012a). Historically, teachers’ work has been the domain of publicly-funded state and sub-state organisations. While the teaching profession has been recognized as a crucial factor for improving education for decades, the attention directed towards teachers as key actors in ‘knowledge economies’ during the latest decade has been unprecedented. Especially the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, see Appendix A for members and partners), the World Bank with its project SABER-Teachers, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, see UNESCO 2014) have emerged as major transnational players keen to launch a global conversation on teachers and teaching.

The OECD has since the 1960s acknowledged the importance of teachers in educational reform (Papadopoulos 1994). Yet, since 2000 the OECD activities in the area have increased

markedly, with the TALIS programme being the pinnacle so far (Robertson 2012a). 24 countries or regions participated in the first round, TALIS 2008 and 34 countries or regions took part in the second round TALIS 2013 (OECD 2014a). TALIS is promoted by the OECD as an “extension” to the influential OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) (OECD 2012a, p.3), while pushing the challenge of equipping “*all teachers, and not just some, for effective learning in the 21st century*” (OECD 2011, p.3) to the fore of the political agenda.

As a survey, TALIS basically consists of two questionnaires, to be filled in by lower secondary schools teachers and principals. In 2008, the focus areas for the survey were school leadership; appraisal of and feedback to teachers; teaching practices, beliefs and attitudes; and professional development of teachers. Similar areas were chosen for TALIS 2013. In addition to the primary target group of lower secondary school teachers and principals (ISCED level 2 according to the UNESCO 1997 revision of the International Standard Classification of Education, ISCED 97), participating countries are given the option to include primary and upper secondary school teachers and principals in the survey.

Focusing on what might be called the ‘political construction’ of TALIS, my project analyses the causes, mechanisms and outcomes of the increasing interest in teachers’ labour in the global educational policy field. The TALIS programme is perceived of as a social phenomenon which gives rise to a series of events whose underlying mechanisms can be identified and explained.

Specifically, the project analyses the practical argumentation of the main political actors involved in TALIS, including the OECD, the European Union, and in particular its executive arm the European Commission, the global federation of teacher unions Education International, state education authorities, research and higher education institutions, national teacher unions, and private companies directly engaged in TALIS. In this respect, three comparative cases, Australia, England and Finland, are also included. The main study of teachers working in ISCED level 2 schools in Australia means Year 7 – 10, in England Key Stage 3, and Grades 7-9 in Finland (OECD 2014e, p.139).

The focus on the practical argumentation of the main policy actors enables me to capture and explain their goals, representations of reality, and their claims as to what needs to be done with the 'problem' of teachers. The thesis thus adopts a pluri-scalar perspective, paying attention to the relationships between organisations, institutions and companies with various horizons of action. The period covered is from the mid-2000s to 2015 during which education policy and teachers' work have become increasingly debated on an international level.

The project relies on an 'intensive research design' capturing how processes work in a limited number of cases, exploring the particular causal mechanisms involved in producing changes. The research project involves an empirical inquiry of the major organisations involved in OECD's TALIS programme, focusing on the international level and Australia, England and Finland. Drawing on the qualitative analysis of semi-structured research interviews and policy documents, the project explains the mechanisms underlying TALIS, the relations between organisations, and how the context is structured and the agents under study interact with it. Rather than generating 'representative' or generalisable findings, the findings of the project serve to confirm and qualify existing theories and inform further research (Sayer 2010, pp.241-248).

The research project is concerned with the political implications of global educational governance. As a preferred tool in education policy-making, international surveys are underpinned by ideas of what individuals and societies should do. In this way, international surveys like TALIS constitute manifestations of the authoritative allocation of values through policy (Easton 1953, pp.129-130; Prunty 1984, p.42; Robertson 2013). This characteristic begs the questions: Who has a say in those processes? How does it happen? How did it come to this in the first place?

1.2. The PhD project and The Thesis

This thesis is the result of a four years research project, initiated in January 2013 upon embarking on the PhD programme at the Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol. Throughout this period, the broad knowledge interest has remained the same: How

best to understand the changing nature of the global education policy field and the place of teacher policy in the field?

During the process, research outcomes have been communicated in a number of publications. Having the opportunity to take stock at various points and explore a range of perspectives has been beneficial to the project overall in terms of theoretical, methodological and content knowledge, and the gradual shaping of arguments on the basis of empirical data. This thesis draws on the work that provided the basis for earlier publications and presentations (see Appendix C). Yet, it is fundamentally different in structure and substance, with more detailed consideration of theoretical and methodological issues, analysis and discussion. In other words, I regard previous outputs as work-in-progress, and this piece of work as the definitive attempt to communicate the research that I have been undertaking since 2013.

1.3. Research Objectives and Questions

The objective of this thesis is to identify and explain outcomes and mechanisms related to contemporary global education governance with a particular focus on teachers' work. The thesis provides a contribution to comparative education research, adopting a position that is distinctively critical, processual and relational (Robertson 2012b). At the most general level, the project can be classified as a piece of empirical social science research involving the collection of data about people and their social contexts and relations. However, consistent with the adoption of critical realism as a guiding meta-theory, the project is also concerned with theoretical development. The project is explicitly comparative and seeks to illuminate 'constants and contexts' by contextualising empirical documentation related to selected cases in the light of the research literature and theoretical frameworks (Broadfoot 1999, p.24).

The thesis contributes to the literature in a highly topical area, considering the current world-wide policy and academic focus on teachers' work. In addition to the academic community, the findings will be of interest to education professionals, policy actors and the public. The very size of the teaching profession helps to make this project relevant for a broad audience.

The research questions (see Table 1) have not changed substantially throughout the project though they have needed revision as the project proceeded. The research questions served as orientation points so as to guide the empirical inquiry and maintain focus in times of issue overload. The composition, concepts and wording of the research questions indicate a particular research orientation. The chapters in Part One will account for this research orientation and the meaning of the concepts included in the research questions. However, already at this point, it should be indicated that the research project and the thesis have drawn on critical realism as a meta-theoretical framework. This means that the entry point for the research questions is that, given the objective of explaining the outcome patterns of the OECD TALIS programme, we need to identify the mechanisms that generate those outcome patterns, including the structural resources and the reasoning surrounding TALIS that in turn helps to constitute that mechanism. The workings of the mechanism are held to be contingent and conditional, and in the formulation of hypotheses we therefore need to consider which contextual conditions are conducive to the triggering of the mechanism (see Pawson 2000, p.298).

- 1. Explaining the outcome patterns of the OECD TALIS programme: What objects, structures and mechanisms made TALIS possible and made it what it is - internationally, and in Australia, England and Finland?**
 - a. What is the practical argumentation of the main organisations constituting the TALIS ensemble for engaging with the programme?
 - b. How are the main organisations constituting the TALIS ensemble internally related?
- 2. The workings of the mechanism: What does TALIS do – internationally, and in Australia, England and Finland?**
 - a. What is the practical argumentation with regard to the construction of TALIS questionnaires and national adaptations in Australia, England and Finland?
 - b. What is the practical argumentation of the main organisations in the TALIS ensemble with regard to the uses of TALIS results?
 - c. What conditions are conducive to triggering the mechanisms underlying TALIS?
- 3. What does TALIS mean theoretically?**
 - a. What do the outcome patterns of TALIS tell about power in the global field of education policy?
 - b. What does TALIS mean for education and teachers' work?

Table 1. Research questions

We see in Table 1 that the research questions are structured according to three steps: i) What made TALIS possible and made it what it is?; ii) What does TALIS do?; and iii) What does TALIS mean?

The first step is concerned with *explaining* the OECD TALIS programme with a focus on TALIS as a particular outcome of global education governance, and the mechanisms generating these outcomes. The notion of a 'TALIS ensemble' draws on critical cultural political economy of education (Robertson and Dale 2015) and refers to the cluster of organisations, with different mandates, structural resources and discursive framings, that make TALIS happen through their engagement with the programme. The reference to 'practical argumentation' indicates that this particular way of conceiving of political discourses are deemed central in this research project for explaining outcomes and the nature of mechanisms in the political field. Chapter 4 will make a case for this choice, drawing in particular on the seminal work of Fairclough and Fairclough (2012).

The second step focuses on 'what TALIS does' in institutional and geographical contexts, to address whether certain contexts are more conducive to the action of the mechanisms underlying TALIS. Again, the practical argumentation of organisations in the TALIS ensemble concerning the construction of the TALIS teacher questionnaire and the uses of findings from the survey are deemed central in understanding how the workings of the mechanisms play out in particular contexts.

Finally, the third step is related to the theoretical meanings of the TALIS programme. Consistent with the stratified ontology of critical realism, such theoretical abstractions are not any less 'real'; they enable us to be more specific about the robustness of our explanations regarding the nature of mechanisms, and their workings in the 'domain of the real'.

In addressing the research questions, diachronic accounts of the processes surrounding the development of the TALIS programme from its early stages in the mid-2000s to 2015 as well as synchronic accounts of TALIS 2013 in Australia, England and Finland will be provided. The

synchronic accounts focus on TALIS 2013 because this cycle was the first that England and Finland took part in.

1.4. Comparative Cases

Three comparative cases are included in this research project: Australia, England and Finland. The three cases are selected with the purpose of addressing the main knowledge interest of the study concerning the explanation of the causes, mechanisms and outcomes of this newer form of international cooperation aimed at governing the teaching profession.

Why *three* cases? Practically, more than three would not be feasible within this PhD project. On the other hand, three cases invite more dynamic analysis and potentially offer more nuanced findings than two. It is worth considering Alexander's (2000, p.44) argument regarding the risk of constructing an object of study that is conducive to a polarizing mindset.

The thesis situates teacher policies of the three cases in national and global political economies. The comparison of the substantial internal relations of these political entities to the OECD and the global educational policy field in general are of particular interest. The two cases of Finland and England also provide the opportunity to address the issue of regionalism with regard to the European Union, and the role of this scale of governing in education policy more generally, and teacher policies in particular. The analysis of relations provides the basis for the comparative discussion of the theoretical and political meaning of TALIS in terms of teacher policy governance and the potential for tendencies toward denationalisation.

Why *these* three cases? First, the three countries all took part in TALIS 2013. Second, the cases differ in terms of the nature of their education system trajectories and teachers' labour (OECD 2005; Rinne and Ozga 2013; Webb *et al.* 2004); PISA rankings and responses (see Appendix L; Lawn and Grek 2012; Simola 2005); their alignment with OECD recommendations (Sahlberg 2011); and the institutional arrangements of national political economies (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Schneider and Paunescu 2011). Third, each of the

three cases exhibits a range of intriguing characteristics which make them particularly relevant for this project.

1.5. The Contribution of This Study

This thesis constitutes a piece of comparative education research about comparative education research. Hence, the project illustrates some of the breadth of this particular field of social science (Crossley 2009; Dale 2005). The field has been characterised by tensions which can be traced back to its intellectual foundations in the 19th Century. On the one hand, more positivistic forms of comparative research, often closely affiliated with political demands for the classification and analysis of individuals and populations, have attempted to deduce true principles about the efficiency of education systems and establish generalised laws and ideal models for international policy transfer (Anderson 2006; Green 2013). On the other hand, more hermeneutic and interpretive approaches have emphasised the need for contextualisation, based on the argument that education policy and practice are embedded in social relations and profoundly shaped by the cultural and economic structures they are part of. Applications to policy are here subsidiary to the aim of improving the understanding of educational issues (Alexander 2000, pp.28-29; Crossley 2009, 2014; Dale and Robertson 2012; Sadler 1979).

These tensions remain visible today. International survey programmes like PISA, TIMSS, and TALIS, which since the 1960s have changed the landscape of education policy-making globally, can be inscribed in the modernist 'policy-directed educational comparison' tradition dating back to Jullien's seminal 'plan' for comparative education from 1817. Such surveys attract continuous critique from the rivalling branch of more context-sensitive researchers who argue that the methodologies underpinning such programmes cannot support the truth claims made (Alexander 2000, pp.28-29; Crossley 1984, 2014; Vulliamy 2004).

This PhD thesis is a contribution to this ongoing conversation in comparative education research by investigating the multiplicity of aims and actors involved in TALIS, their organisational and social contexts, and the underlying mechanisms which explain why the programme exists in the first place. The more interpretive and critical research position is

adopted for this project, acknowledging that education and policy are contested fields shot through by normative and moral issues (Connell 1995; Somekh *et al.* 2011). The project is thus *about* policy, and the *critique* of it, rather than research *for* policy and thus *servicing* it. Policies are here conceived as defining a problem, their categories and logics in strategic ways. In other words, policy is about problem-setting as much as problem-solving. Policy research should therefore not take policy at face value but rather investigate the problem-setting, definitions generated, and how it fits into the agendas of various policy actors (Blackmore and Lauder 2011, pp.190-193). Moreover, questions of *authority*, as well as *whose* values are represented, *how*, *where*, *when*, and the relationships between competing sites of power, provide important entry points into understanding education policy (Robertson 2012b).

The thesis considers the critique of 'methodological nationalism' and the associated pitfalls of an exaggerated focus on states, state territories, and policy actors with national horizons of action (Bray and Thomas 1995; Bray *et al.* 2007; Dale and Robertson 2009; Robertson and Dale 2008; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Multi-level analysis is thus required in order to investigate how various levels or scales of policy-making affect each other. This both concerns national/local relations within nations (Broadfoot *et al.* 1993, 2000; Crossley 1984, 2010; Osborn *et al.* 2003) and the 'pluri-scalar' division of the labour of educational governance associated with the emergent imbrications between national policy fields and the global policy field (Carney 2009; Crossley and Watson 2003; Dale 2005; Lingard and Rawolle 2011; Novoa and Yariv-Mashal 2003; Robertson 2012b). The selection of the national cases Australia, England and Finland in this project should be understood against this background, based on the argument that national territories and state authorities continue to provide meaningful case studies for social scientific enquiry as long as their relations to other scales and structures are considered.

Finally, in trying to make sense of the interplay between policy actors engaged in policy formation, this project shares some similarities with the seminal works of Herbert Kliebard (1987) and Stephen Ball (1990) who presented the forging of curricular reforms in the US and England, respectively, as the outcome of a struggle between a range of social groupings with distinctive and different yet sometimes complementary priorities. In the same manner,

this project seeks to provide an account of the main ideas, strategies and relations between policy actors involved in the OECD TALIS programme. And though a very different political initiative encompassing different scales of governance, and at a different point of time, the central element of a struggle of ideas pursued by a range of policy actors situated in time and space remains similar.

The thesis consists of three parts. Part One includes this introduction, a chapter outlining the research design, including theoretical framework and methodology, and two conceptual chapters. Part Two includes the analysis and discussion, and Part Three contains conclusions and reflections on the research project. In addition, the appendices present a range of more descriptive information referred to in the body of the thesis.

CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH DESIGN

2.0. Introduction

This thesis sets out to explore and explain what drives the global education policy field by focusing on the political discourses, and in particular, the practical argumentation of the main actors in that field. This means that *ideas*, and the ideas of particular *actors*, are assigned a central role in explaining *change taking place in social reality*. This focus raises several challenges considering that individual and collective actors neither in politics nor in other domains of social life are free to do what they want. They are constrained and enabled by the surrounding environment as well as their own capacities, though not *evenly* constrained and enabled; actors might also constrain or enable another actor's actions in dynamic relationships that are bound to change over time.

This chapter will explain the research design of the project. In the process, I will be elaborating on the meta-theoretical choices that I have made. Chapter 3 and 4 follow up on these choices and add more substantive theories and methods to be applied and discussed in Part 2 of the thesis.

With this structure follows the point that theory and method are intertwined; the tools we choose to make sense of reality cannot help but be informed by our view of that reality. The interpretation of phenomena is thus always perspectival; seeing is inseparable from the perspective (see Appendix K on researcher positionality). So-called facts are always theory-laden. Hence, methodological considerations should be accompanied by reflections on theory and philosophy of science, with regard to ontology, epistemology, and axiology (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009, pp.3-6; Somekh *et al.* 2011, pp.2-7).

Recognising that theory and method are mutually implicated makes it all the more important to distinguish between ontology and epistemology, that is, our view of being in the world, and the sort of knowledge and truth claims that we seek to formulate about being and the world, respectively.

2.1. The Philosophy of Science and Social Reality

The role of philosophy in social science is concerned with the principles regulating the acquisition of knowledge about social reality (Delanty and Strydom 2003, p.3). According to Searle (2010) the fundamental question of contemporary philosophy is:

“How if at all, can we reconcile a certain conception of the world as described by physics, chemistry and the other basic sciences with what we know, or think we know, or ourselves as human beings? How is it possible in a universe consisting entirely of physical particles in fields of force that there can be such things as consciousness, intentionality, free will, language, society, ethics, aesthetics, and political obligations? ... How do we get from electrons to elections?” (Searle 2010, p.3)

With this entry point, Searle states that two conditions of adequacy apply when providing scientific accounts:

1. The task is to give an account of how human reality fits into one single reality, without postulating further realities and distinguishing between (mental/physical/social, etc) ontological realms.
2. The account must be consistent with the basic facts of the structure of the universe given by physics and chemistry, evolutionary biology, and other natural sciences, and show how the non-basic facts are dependent on and derived from these facts (Searle 2010, pp.ix-x, 3-4).

We should note that the very aspiration of Searle; to create an adequate account of one-worldness, and one single reality, is hard to reconcile with the most radical forms of constructivism and postmodernism which stipulate that each of us construct the reality in which we live. In my reading, Searle’s challenges align with critical realism (see also Lawson 2009; see Appendix J on incommensurability). Critical realism (see for example, Bhaskar 1975, 1979; Danermark *et al.* 2002; Sayer 2000, 2010) provides the meta-theory for this project. The chapter will later go into more detail with the orientation.

The term “ontology” derives from Greek, with “onto” meaning “being”, and “logos” usually interpreted as “science”. Ontology is thus traditionally understood as the science or study of

being. Given that the word being has two senses, ontology encompasses both the study of what is, or what exists, and the study of what it is to be, or to exist (Lawson 2004, p.1). The ontology of critical realism holds that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it. In this sense, there is one world and one reality, characterised by openness, necessity, contingency, and emergence, that is, objects and (social) structures might have emergent powers which cannot be reduced to those of their constituents. Moreover, reality is stratified, with patterned events generated by underlying mechanisms which might be of a physical, material or discursive nature. This implies a component of 'thin constructivism' in critical realism. The idea that ideas, paradigms, and arguments can cause events and produce change corresponds well with Searle's (2010) theory of speech acts and intentionality.

Five points will be helpful to clarify the ontological position that reality is an open system. First, it should be emphasized that both Searle (2010) in particular and critical realists more generally endorse the notion of scientific progress and knowledge accumulation. While humanity will never reach a full understanding of the world we inhabit, science will continue to change our understanding of the world. However, due to the emphasis on reality as an open system, the notion differs from the one in positivism. Thus, the epistemological stance of critical realists entails that science is a social practice, resulting in fallible, practically-adequate beliefs about the world which can be assessed through tests of corroboration, not by replication as advocated in positivism (Sayer 2000, 2010).

Second, natural and social sciences have much to gain from thinking across disciplinary boundaries, as is evident in, for example, Roy Bhaskar and Tony Lawson's work. Searle also argues that, like in the case of other social animals, human social behavior can also be understood in biological and evolutionary terms. Our mental life and capacity for consciousness are the result of long periods of biological evolution, and collective mental phenomena are dependent on and derived from the mental phenomena of individuals, some of them conscious, others unconscious, in part caused by neurobiological processes in the brain and neuronal processes which are dependent on molecular, atomic, and subatomic processes (Searle 2010, pp.3-4). In complexity theory, Ilya Prigogine (1987, 2000) also seeks to reconcile two "visions of the world", the one emerging out of scientific

experience, and the other we get from introspection, dynamics and thermodynamics, “humanistic philosophy” and “science philosophy” – which is related to the war of the “two cultures” (see Snow 1998). Moreover, chemist and social scientist Michael Polanyi (1967) suggested the notion of emergence to explain the hierarchical, layered relationship between biological being and consciousness, the associated parallel development of capabilities and liabilities in living things, and the circumstance that social science goes beyond the objective observation of what “is” because it is shot through with a moral dimension of “ought”.

Third, social sciences differs from natural sciences in terms of the relative scope of people’s ability to learn from previous experiences. In some areas of “macro-natural science” the ontology’s constancy is so dominating that it is possible to establish analytical “subsystems” approximately comparable to closed deductive systems. On the basis of Newton’s work, solar eclipses can thus be very precisely predicted and explained, something subsequent theories have changed little. However, human behaviour is to some extent adaptive, individually and collectively, through cognitive processes, which by themselves make it impossible – contrary to laboratory trials – to repeat experiments in an unchanged form. Social learning is thus both a result of uncertainty and a driver for it. Therefore, social scientists need to consider the dimension of self-awareness and social learning (Prigogine 1987; Sayer 2010; Searle 2010).

Fourth, with the recognition that the ontology of the natural and social world is complex, it then follows that it does not merely concern *being*, but also *becoming*. Accordingly, the research programme becomes one of studying the *mechanisms of becoming*. In a classical science perspective of Newton and Galileo, the research task would be one of identifying deterministic and eternal, time-reversible, laws of nature. However, the complexity of the universe cannot be explained by a single formula, and rationality can no longer be identified with certainty (Prigogine 2000; Sayer 2010).

Fifth, critical realism and complexity theory both reject an anthropocentric epistemology. Prigogine (2000, p.828) thus states that “[W]e are without any serious objection the children of evolution: we are not creating evolution.” The ‘arrow of time’ that we observe in the real world is not a construct of humans. Likewise, in critical realist literature, the notion of

'epistemic fallacy' is often mentioned. Lawson (2003, p.111) defines it as "*the view that questions about being can always be reduced to questions about our knowledge (of being), that matters of ontology can always be translated into epistemological terms*". The epistemic fallacy is associated with the anthropocentric reduction of the question 'what is?' to 'what can we know?' In critical realism, being is perceived as irreducible to human knowledge or experience. Therefore, ontology and epistemology need to be de-coupled.

To recapitulate, the ontological entry point for the thesis is that social reality is open-ended and complex. Human capacities for reflexivity, learning and self-change modify the configuration of systems, producing regularities that are only approximate and spatially and temporally restricted. Therefore, social phenomena rarely have the durability of many of the objects studied by some of the natural sciences, and social science findings cannot be expected to remain stable or uncontested across temporal orders and spaces. This stance has implications in terms of epistemology and methodology, and hence the research design.

2.2. An Intensive Research Design

The project is an 'intensive' research design guided by a critical realist philosophy of science. The choice of critical realism as meta-theory has implications for the research design and the kinds of questions being asked. Furthermore, the meta-theory of critical realism is complemented by a multi-disciplinary theoretical framework developed in Chapters 3 and 4 on the basis of the initial theorisation of the field and of a particular mode of inference called abduction.

The paradigmatic categories of intensive and extensive research are helpful ways of thinking about different approaches to conducting social science research. Extensive and intensive designs ask different sorts of questions, use different methods, define their objects and boundaries differently, and therefore lead to different accounts (see Table 2, modified from Sayer 2000, p.21). This project's objectives and research questions correspond with the aspiration of intensive research to inquire into how processes work in a limited number of cases, and from there, begin the task of identifying and explaining the particular mechanisms that generate changes in social reality.

	Intensive research	Extensive research
Research question	How does a process work in a particular case or small number of cases? What produces a certain change? What did the agents actually do?	What are the regularities, common patterns, and distinguishing features of a population? How widely are certain characteristics or processes distributed or represented?
Social relations	Substantial relations of connection	Formal relations of similarity
Groups studied	Causal groups	Taxonomic groups
Research account	Causal explanation of the production of certain objects or events - though not necessarily representative or general ones	Descriptive representative generalisations
Typical methods	Study of agents in their causal contexts, interactive interviews, ethnography, qualitative analysis	Formal surveys of representative sample, standardized interviews, statistical analysis
Limitations	Actual patterns and relations are unlikely to be representative or generalisable. However, identified underlying mechanisms should be generalisable to other contexts.	Limited explanatory power
Appropriate tests of validity	Corroboration	Replication
Ontology	Stratified	Flat

Table 2. Intensive and extensive research designs

Drawing on qualitative analysis, intensive research designs result in accounts of causal explanation. Relations between ‘causal groups’ - as opposed to ‘taxonomic groups’ - are examined. The identification of mechanisms thus takes into account the conditions in which actors are situated, rather than being based on formal similarity to individuals or collective entities in their taxonomic group. The focus on substantial relations in causal groups is meant to enable the explanation of how contextual conditions are simultaneously structured and structuring for the relevant causal group.

Concerning research outcomes, intensive research findings qualify existing theories and might therefore feed into further research. Unlike within the extensive research paradigm, the notion of validity in intensive research is associated with robustness and tests of corroboration, rather than with generalisation across time periods and locations. Within the intensive research paradigm, attempts at universal generalisation equal a de-historisation of objects and mechanisms. However, the discussion of extrapolation is an important stage in intensive research, bound up with the consideration of *which* findings might apply to other social contexts (Alasuutari 1995, pp.156-157; Pawson and Tilley 1997; Sayer 2000, pp.19-23; Sayer 2010, pp.241-248).

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As indicated in Table 2, Sayer (2000, 2010) distinguishes between actual concrete patterns and contingent substantial relations, which are unlikely to be generalisable due to their embedding in particular social contexts, and underlying mechanisms for social change which we should be able to also identify in other contexts. This is an important distinction directly related to the reliance on a stratified ontology in intensive research, rather than a flat ontology as in extensive research. It means that in the case of the OECD programme TALIS we need to distinguish between more descriptive findings about the relations between involved organisations and how they develop and, analytic findings on mechanisms *explaining* the interaction between organisations and the outcomes. The former (concerning *how?*) are discrete to time and place, the latter (concerning *why?*) are subject to discussions of generalisation in terms of extrapolation.

2.3. A Seven Stages Research Model

Lawson (1997, 2004) sets up a logical sequence for the undertaking of research on the basis of his methodological reflections on ontology, epistemology and causal relationships (see Figure 1, based on Lawson, 1997, 2004). The three steps apply to research concerned with a methodology of theory-construction formed on the basis of hypothesis-testing about causal mechanisms in the domain of the real that explain events and tendencies in the domain of the actual. In practice, this means identifying the most robust empirical relationships.




Figure 1. Three-step logical sequence in research

The research model (see Table 3) for my project addresses the questions posed in the three-steps sequence. Critical realists have proposed various models for empirical research (see Bhaskar 1975, 1986, p.68; Collier 1994, pp.163-167; Steinmetz 1998, p.183). The model builds on a modified version of the one proposed by Danermark *et al.* (2002, pp.109-111) and moves through three phases: i) the construction of the object of study (stages 1-4); ii) analysis (stages 4-5); and iii) discussion (stages 6-7). The first phase is essentially associated with describing and theorising the social ontology of the target field on the basis of literature reviews and exploratory interviews. In the second and third phases, the model moves from theory-laden empirical inquiry towards the identification of generative mechanisms and an associated discussion comparing the explanatory powers of theories. Two distinctive modes of inference, abduction and retrodution, are instrumental in this movement.

The following sections will present the main features of the research model in more detail. First, it should be noted that literature review is a vital component of the study. The engagement with literatures serves the following objectives (Kamler and Thomson 2011, p.16):

1. Mapping the fields relevant to the inquiry
2. Creating a warrant for the research by identifying gaps in the existing literatures
3. Situating the project and its contribution in the academic field

The pursuit of these three objectives is not straightforward. While some topics (e.g. the OECD PISA programme) have certainly been the subject of more research than others (e.g. unions as actors in education governance), the notion of gap should here not be understood in a positivist manner implying that the objective is to fill an academic field with knowledge equivalent to a corresponding field of lived reality. Rather, the warrant for the research is created by positioning it among the literatures while taking into account that positions in the academic field cannot be taken for granted and objectively located and established. We also need to distinguish between 'area' and 'theoretical' literatures. This crude distinction is helpful in highlighting that the entry point for the reviews in this thesis is the 'area' literature associated with global education governance. This choice reflects the primary knowledge interest in theory-laden empirical inquiry of particular areas of social reality. The area literature on global education governance includes contributions based on a wide range of philosophical positions. In this respect, considering the breadth of literature is instrumental for positioning the project in the area literature (see Danermark *et al.* 2002; Sayer 2000; 2010).

In critical realism, the requirement for congruence between ontology, epistemology and methodology reinforces the point that literature reviews should be integrated into the theoretical framework of the project. Hence, the three generic objectives presented above are also processual in nature. The critical review of the existing literature serve to describe the social ontology of the target field (research stages 1-4) which forms the basis for theory-laden empirical inquiry and theoretical discussion (stage 5-7).

Research stage	Purpose	Main thought operation	Methods	Thesis chapter
<i>The construction of the object of study</i>				
1. Choice of meta-theory	Establishing ontological and epistemological assumptions	Consider subject and themes of research and appropriate entry points	Literature review	2
2. Description; initial theorisation	Overview of field	Identification of substantially internally related objects and imaginable causal components	Literature review and exploratory interviews	3
3. Analytical resolution	Narrowing the study	Dissolving the complex issue by distinguishing various components, aspects or dimensions	Literature review and exploratory interviews	3
4. Abduction; theoretical re-description	Develop new understandings	Abduction: A particular phenomenon or event is interpreted from a set of more general conceptual frameworks	Literature review and exploratory interviews	4
<i>Analysis</i>				
5. Retroduction	Identify generative mechanisms	Retroduction: Advancing from empirical observation of events to a conceptualization of transfactual conditions	Political discourse analysis on the basis of documents and realist interviews	5,6,7
<i>Discussion</i>				
6. Comparison of theories	Elaboration and estimation of relative explanatory power of mechanisms	Discussion of the identified generative mechanisms in the light of theories; one theory might describe the necessary conditions for what is to be explained, and therefore has greater explanatory power. Theories might also be complementary, focusing on partly different but nevertheless necessary conditions.		5,6,7
7. Concretisations and contextualisations	Interpretation of the meanings of these mechanisms as they come into view in a certain context.	Discussion of how different structures and mechanisms manifest themselves in concrete situations		5,6,7

Table 3. Research model for PhD project

2.4. Critical Realism as Meta-Theory

This section introduces critical realism as the meta-theory of the project, "*... affecting the questions put to reality, and the manner in which this is done*" (Bhaskar and Lawson 1998, p.7). Critical realism is based on a particular philosophical account of science and should be complemented by 'substantive' theories addressing specific types of entities and processes (Bhaskar 1986, p.36; Bhaskar 1989, p.182). The section focuses on causal analysis, generative mechanisms, and abduction and retroduction as modes of inference.

Critical realism is not monolithic though there are general features that critical realists would subscribe to (see Table 4 for main propositions, based on Bhaskar 1975; Archer 1995, Danermark *et al.* 2002; Sayer 2010). Besides the pioneering work of Roy Bhaskar (1975, 1979) I particularly draw on contributions to critical realist scholarship by Danermark *et al.* (2002), Hay (2002), Pawson (2000, 2002b) and Sayer (2000, 2010). These scholars elaborate on Bhaskar's ideas and make them more applicable to empirical research. Critical realism considers objective reality as well as semiosis and hence provides a balanced alternative to the empiricism of positivism and various post-modernist and constructivist positions where it is argued that too much becomes reduced to social constructions (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, p.269; Sayer 2000, p.79; Steinmetz 1998, pp.170-171).

Critical realists insist that there is a non-discursive material dimension to social reality. Yet, as noted in Chapter 1, the orientation adheres to a relatively 'thin' social constructivism. Material settings place constraints on the scope of meaning-making. The constructivist element presupposes that social phenomena are perceived to be intrinsically meaningful; that is to say that meaning is not only externally descriptive but constitutive of social phenomena. Therefore, meanings created by actors in the form of ideas, beliefs and reasons can also be causes of events whether they are practically-adequate or not (Hay 2002, pp.206-208; Sayer 2000, pp.17-26; Sayer 2010, p.111). The subject of this thesis should be understood against this background. The TALIS programme constitutes a humanly fabricated construction which is intentionally created yet not controllable in all aspects. The fact that TALIS is a societal phenomenon, socially defined and shaped by multiple

discourses, does not make the construction of it any less real as an event and as a subject for strategy by an array of policy actors.

<p>Ontology – nature of reality and being</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The world exists independently of our knowledge of it. • The social world constitutes an open system. • There is necessity in the natural and social world. Natural and social objects necessarily have particular causal powers and ways of acting. • The stratified ontology distinguishes between the real, actual and empirical domains. • Objects, structures and mechanisms have powers capable of generating events, yet they might not be exercised. • The world is characterized by emergence; objects and structures might have emergent powers which cannot be reduced to those of their constituents. In the social world, causal groups might have powers irreducible to those of the individuals constituting them, even though the structures exist only where people reproduce them. • All causes do not have to be physical; ideas and beliefs can cause events and produce change.
<p>Epistemology – nature of knowledge</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The research task is to identify mechanisms which generate events and empirical phenomena. • Science and knowledge production is a social practice influenced by the conditions and social relations surrounding it. • Social life is concept-dependent. The world can only be understood in terms of available conceptual resources; we are thus entrapped within our conceptual systems, but these do not determine the structure of the world itself. • The accumulation of knowledge requires the movement between particular empirical cases and theory. Theory and empirical investigation presuppose each other. • ‘Laws’ in social science cannot be generalised but should be regarded as tendential in the sense of being approximate and spatially and temporally restricted. • Our knowledge of the world is fallible, but all knowledge is not equally fallible. ‘Truth’ is neither absolute nor purely relative. Hence, the concept of truth should be replaced with that of ‘practical adequacy’; knowledge is useful where it is practically-adequate, generating expectations about the world and the outcomes of our actions.
<p>Methodology – rules of gaining and testing knowledge</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theory and conceptualisation is central in critical realism. Realist research is neither theory-neutral nor theory-determined, but theory-laden. • The ideational and material must be related: We need to know about the main strategies of actors, their relations and contexts. • Statistical data, representing material realities, as well as the discourses of the main political actors should be taken into account when relevant. • Explanation of individual actions requires not merely a micro regress to their inner constitution but a macro regress to the social structures in which they are located, and the status of the individual within the social structure. • Practically-adequate beliefs are to be assessed through tests of corroboration to see that the results really do apply to the object under study. • Realism is inherently critical in the sense that it involves the critical evaluation of its object.

Table 4. Main propositions of critical realism

2.4.1. Values and social science: Explanatory critique as an objective

Critical realism holds that social reality is value-impregnated. Thereby, the orientation acknowledges the axiological and evaluational component of social science (cf. Polanyi 1967) and rejects the fact-value divide reflected in ‘Hume’s law’ which asserts that the transition from factual to evaluative statements is logically incoherent. Drawing on critical realism, the notion of ‘explanatory critique’ is meant to open up a space for theoretically and empirically informed social critique with the objective of highlighting inconsistencies or contradictions in beliefs which guide social action, evaluating the effects of these ideas on the structures they are part of, and suggesting alternatives without being partisan or dogmatic (Bhaskar 1989, p.63; Bhaskar 1998; Bhaskar and Collier 1998, p.387-388; McLennan 2009; Sayer 2010, p.253-257; Sayer 2011, p.220-223).

More specifically, explanatory critique refers to a particular form of critique based upon causal analysis through the identification of generative mechanisms, contextual conditions and contingent outcomes. Without suggesting absolute truth claims, explanatory critique provides for a strong form of critique which is oriented toward the reduction of illusion in society through the critical evaluation of influential beliefs, concepts and accounts, in turn showing the extent to which they are false or at least inconsistent by ignoring something significant. Moreover, explanatory critique seeks to explain *why* such false or inconsistent beliefs are held and expose their potentially self-confirming character – intended or not – whereby they help to maintain circumstances that are favourable to dominant groups (Sayer 2009, pp.769-770; Sayer 2010, pp.253-257).

2.4.2. A stratified ‘fat’ ontology

A basic proposition of critical realism is that nature and the social world is characterised by ontological depth and stratification. The stratified ontology distinguishes between the real, actual and empirical domains (see Figure 2, modified from Jespersen 2009, p.31):

- The domain of the real corresponds to the realm of objects, structures and generative mechanisms that create, reproduce or transform, patterns of events. The real is whatever exists, regardless of whether it is an empirical object for us, and whether we happen to have an adequate understanding of its nature.

- The actual refers to events and tendencies, where we see that there is a detectable pattern in our observations as represented by empirical data. This domain concerns what happens if and when the powers of objects and structures are activated, reflects upon what they do, and what eventuates when they do.
- The empirical domain concerns experience, observations and perceptions. This domain is the surface of the landscape. We cannot take observations as being more than empirical representations of the landscape's appearance. They are estimates, bound to have a certain amount of uncertainty. Further, the powers of objects and structures are likely not be directly observable in the empirical domain (Bhaskar 1975, pp.19, 33; Danermark *et al.* 2002; Jespersen 2009; Sayer 2000, pp.11-12; Sayer 2010).




Figure 2. Stratified ontology in critical realism

Critical realism thus provides us with what might be called a 'fat' as opposed to a 'flat' ontology consisting of either the actual or the empirical domain, or a conflation of the two (Alvesson and Sköldbberg 2009, p.40; Bhaskar 1989, p.181; Bhaskar 1998, p.xii-xvi; Danermark *et al.* 2002, p.5; Steinmetz 1998, pp.175-176).

The stratified ontology reflects the attempt to overcome the anthropocentric ‘epistemic fallacy’. In critical realism, it is imperative to differentiate between the target field’s ontology and the knowledge that it is possible to obtain about it. In other words, the nature of the target field determines the type of knowledge that can be acquired. More precisely, epistemology is limited by the target field’s ‘being’, which thus determines which questions can be meaningfully answered. Congruence between ‘what is’ and the ‘knowledge of what is’ is established by adapting the epistemology to the ontology (Lawson 1997, p.33).

A stratified ontology has decisive implications theoretically for understanding TALIS in this study. From its inception, TALIS can be understood as a patterned series of events in the domain of the actual, enacted in numerous locations whilst also cutting across scales. TALIS is hence empirically observable; as material practice and object of semiosis, that is, as something you ‘do’ by physically making it happen as well as through meaning-making. Some of the sites of enactment include schools where the survey is implemented, the OECD headquarters in Paris where the most important meetings about TALIS take place; the offices of the global federation of teacher unions Education International in Brussels, where officials discussed how to engage with TALIS; news media rooms reporting on the results; and innumerable other locations - most of which it is impossible to track down. Yet, theory-laden empirical inquiry enables you to identify some of the patterns and tendencies surrounding TALIS in the domain of the actual. The underlying causal or generative mechanisms, in the domain of the real and which made the events of TALIS possible and what it is, are much harder to pin down. According to a critical realist research agenda, it is these mechanisms we must obtain knowledge about in order to explain this social phenomena. For this purpose, the project employs causal analysis.

2.4.3. Causal analysis

In explaining social phenomena, critical realism conducts causal analyses to identify the generative mechanisms of social reality (Danermark *et al.* 2002, p.2). In critical realism, causality concerns not a relationship between discrete events in causal chains of cause and effects but instead the generative mechanisms of objects and the structures they form (see Figure 3, adopted from Sayer 2000, pp.14-15).

Causal analysis involves the explanation of why what happens actually does happen in a particular case, or in a small number of cases. Events are perceived to arise from the workings of mechanisms within specific contexts. A causal claim is about what an object is like and what it can do due to its generative mechanisms. Often the causal powers inhere not simply in single objects or individuals but in social relations or structures, and in relevant parts of the context. 'Structure' here suggests a set of internally-related elements whose causal powers, when combined, are emergent from those of their constituents. The objects have the powers they have by virtue of their structure, and mechanisms exist and are what they are because of this structure. Critical realism therefore distinguishes between various types of relations. Due to the ontological claim that objects are what they are by virtue of the relations they enter into with other objects, the particular structures that critical realists seek to explore are substantial (with real and not merely formal connections between the objects) and internal (one or both objects cause the existence of the other as a result of the relation existing between them) (Danermark *et al.* 2002, pp.45-47).




Figure 3. Views of causation

Processes of change usually involve several causal mechanisms which may be only contingently related. A plausible case for the existence of (unobservable) mechanisms and

structures can be put forward by referring to observable effects in the empirical domain which in turn can only be explained as the products of such mechanisms and structures. Depending upon the conditions, the operation of the same mechanism can produce different results. We might, for example, ask whether globalising pressures prompt teacher unions to become engaged in education policy on an international scale or whether they would reject this kind of involvement. Moreover, different mechanisms may produce the same empirical result (teacher unions might become involved in international education policy for a variety of reasons). A central task in causal analysis is to narrow down the list of mechanisms to those with relevant powers, and to discuss whether mechanisms are contingently, necessarily, or 'sufficiently', related to each other. While many mechanisms are ordinary and fairly well understood, also by the actors involved, there can be a range of interacting structures and mechanisms which are less understood (Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1975, pp.45-50; Danermark *et al.* 2002, p. 52-57; Sayer 2000, pp.12-28; Sayer 2010, pp.100-119).

In summary, explanation depends on identifying causal mechanisms, the nature of the structure or object which possesses that mechanism or power, how the mechanisms work, and discovering if they have been activated and under what conditions (Bhaskar 1998, p.xvii; Danermark *et al.* 2002, pp.96-106; Sayer 2010, pp.104-108).

2.4.4. Mechanisms

Dale (2013) argues that the language of mechanisms, or 'logics of intervention', could help us in explaining the relationship between social ontologies, discursive framings, events and processes. Tracing out the pluri-scalar relationships between institutions provides us with an entry point for the inquiry into causal mechanisms that recognises a wider range of facets of governance than is possible with a problem-solving approach whose theory is confined to searching for 'effects' of the 'higher' level 'on' the 'lower' level.

Mechanisms have been defined in so many ways that the use of the term needs to be accounted for (Mayntz 2004). In their argument for theorizing mechanisms and causality in the social sciences, Dale (2013), Mayntz (2004), and also Pawson (2000), advocate for causal reconstruction of processes that account for macro-phenomena. They suggest the

identification of generative mechanisms as a distinctive alternative to the quantitative research tradition of correlational or multivariate analysis. The aim should be “*to step away from the description of regularities to their explanation*” (Pawson 2000, p.288) and to look for the causal relationships *underlying* statistical correlations (Mayntz 2004, pp.237-238). The very term *underlying* captures the idea that the surface appearance of observable events can be explained by hypothesizing about the workings of social reality which might be ‘hidden’ and not empirically observable (Pawson 2000, p.295). Pawson (2000, pp.293-294) argues for an explanatory apparatus of mechanisms, contexts and outcomes. A mechanism is only identified when the process linking an outcome and specific initial conditions is spelled out (Mayntz 2004, p.241). Moreover, whether the mechanism is triggered depends on its contexts. The relationship between generative mechanisms and outcomes is not fixed but is contingent upon those contextual conditions, shaped by culture, rules, norms, and power (Pawson 2000, pp.296-297). Pawson paraphrases the explanatory apparatus:

“Explanations focus on interesting, puzzling, socially significant outcome patterns (O). Explanation takes the form of positing some underlying mechanism (M) that generates the outcome, which will consist of propositions about how structural resources and agent's reasoning have constituted the regularity. The workings of such mechanisms are always contingent and conditional, and hypotheses will also be constructed in respect of which local, institutional and historical contexts (C) are conducive to the action of the mechanism.” (Pawson 2000, p.298)

Mayntz (2004) underlines that causal propositions about mechanisms are likely to be complex formulations. Indeed, with the emphasis on contingency we can recognise an overlap between this particular take on critical realism and the relative importance given in complexity theory to irreversibility, non-equilibrium systems, and an ontology of *becoming* rather than *being* (Prigogine 1987, 2000). In other words, the ‘arrow of time’ matters; causal mechanisms operate over long periods of time in the unfolding adaptation and change of institutions or indeed whole societies (Streeck 2014, pp.xii).

The notion of emergence means that mechanisms cannot be analytically deduced as micro-behaviour on a grand scale; mechanisms are aggregate items to which no specific

aggregated micro activity is associated. Hence, mechanisms tend to be driven by a myriad of individual and interrelated activities. However, a few mechanisms stand out as dominated by individual, directly observable, actions; for example, the decision of a Central Bank to change the discount rate. However, we also need in this case to ask what lies behind the Central Bank's decision (Jespersen 2009).

The search for mechanisms starts with the identification of an *explanandum* (Mayntz, 2004, p.244). The relationship between *explanans* and *explanandum* can be put in the following way (Pawson 2000, p.297):

mechanism + context → outcome

Dale (2013) suggests that this reads as “*outcomes are the result of mechanisms in contexts*”. With regard to TALIS, the patterned outcomes of the programme would thus reflect the working of the mechanisms under specific conditions, some of them necessary, some of them contingent, with the presence or absence of necessary conditions determining whether the mechanism is triggered. In this respect, the empirical inquiry in the three comparative cases of Australia, England and Finland serve to provide contrast and nuances which help us to identify necessary conditions for the mechanism to be triggered, thereby qualifying the separation of necessary conditions from contingent circumstances.

In line with Pawson's (2000, p.298) paraphrase, Dale (2013) elaborates that a mechanism involves a rationale for a political strategy designed to bring about particular ends. In this respect, he distinguishes between the 'logic of intervention' driving a mechanism and the 'programme ontology' through which it is delivered. At the heart of any mechanism are theories about how it will bring about the intended changes, and this is the programme ontology. Pawson (2002b) distinguishes between a programme/intervention/policy which is introduced with specific objectives, and the 'programme ontology' which as the 'theory' of the programme accounts for how it actually works:

“... it is not 'programmes' that work; rather it is the underlying reasons or resources that they offer subjects that generate change. Causation is also reckoned to be contingent. Whether the choices or capacities on offer in an

initiative are acted upon depends on the nature of their subjects and the circumstances of the initiative. The vital ingredients of the programme ontology are thus its 'generative mechanisms' and its 'contiguous context' (Pawson 2002b, p. 342; emphasis in original).

The notion of programme ontology corresponds with Peters' argument that effective policy design requires a 'model of causation', that is, a clear conception of socio-economic dynamics that are producing the problem to be solved (Peters 2015, p.5). This distinction is an important one, as the analysis will show.

2.4.5. Abduction and retroduction

In this thesis, two distinctive modes of inference are applied in causal analysis: Abduction and retroduction (see Table 3, stage 4 and 5). Together, they enable the identification of connections, as well as structures and generative mechanisms that are not directly apparent in the empirical domain, thereby representing a movement from concrete empirical phenomena towards the identification of generative mechanisms (Danermark *et al.* 2002, p.113). According to Danermark *et al.* (2002, p.79), scientific methods mainly revolve around different modes of inferences:

"The concept of inference or thought operation refers to different ways of arguing and drawing conclusions – moving from something and arriving at something else – having in common that we thereby link observations of individual phenomena to general concepts. Inference is a way of reasoning towards an answer to questions such as: What does this mean? What follows from this? What must exist for this to be possible?"

Danermark *et al.* (2002) distinguish between four different modes of inference: deduction, induction, abduction, and retroduction (see Table 5, modified from Danermark *et al.* 2002, pp.80-81, with examples added). These are complementary and together constitute the foundation of different scientific working procedures. Induction and deduction draw on formal logic and are the most well-known modes of inference. Induction is generally acknowledged as ensuring correspondence with "the reality of life", whereas deduction serves to maintain a logical consistency in the development of theory.

	Deduction	Induction	Abduction	Retroduction
Thought operation	To derive logically valid conclusions from given premises. To derive knowledge of individual phenomena from universal laws.	From a number of observations to draw universally valid conclusions about a whole population. To see similarities in a number of observations and draw the conclusion that these similarities also apply to non-studied cases. From observed co-variants to draw conclusions about law-like relations.	To interpret and recontextualize individual phenomena within a conceptual framework or set of ideas. To be able to understand something in a new way by observing and interpreting this something in a new conceptual framework.	From a description and analysis of concrete phenomena to reconstruct the basic condition for these phenomena to be what they are. By way of thought operations and counterfactual thinking to argue towards transfactual conditions
Formal logic	Yes	Yes	Yes and no	No
Strict logical inference	Yes	No	No	No
The central issue	What are the logical conclusions of the premises?	What is the element common for a number of observed entities and is it true also of a larger population?	What meaning is given to something interpreted within a particular conceptual framework?	What makes X possible? What properties must exist for X to exist and to be what X is?
Strength	Provides rules and guidance for logical derivations and investigations of the logical validity in all argument.	Provides guidance in connection with empirical generalizations, and possibilities to calculate, in part, the precision of such generalizations.	Provides guidance for the interpretative processes by which we ascribe meaning to events in relation to a larger context.	Provides knowledge of transfactual conditions, structures and mechanisms that cannot be directly observed in the domain of the empirical.
Limitations	Deduction does not say anything new about reality beyond what is already in the premises. It is strictly analytical.	Inductive inference can never be either analytically or empirically certain = the internal limitations of induction. Induction is restricted to conclusions at the empirical level = the external limitations of induction.	There are no fixed criteria from which it would be possible to assess in a definite way the validity of an abductive conclusion.	There are no fixed criteria from which it would be possible to assess in a definite way the validity of a retroductive conclusion
Important quality of researcher	Logical reasoning ability	Ability to master statistical ability	Creativity and imagination	Ability to abstract
Example	If teachers are paid on the basis of their performance, standards will improve in schools.	TALIS 2013 shows that teachers in Finland are more satisfied with their job than teachers in England	With the TALIS programme, OECD attempts to create 'world events' (Stichweh 2008) on teacher policy as means to establish a 'global reflex system' modelling one global reality of teacher professionalism (Sobe 2013)	The generative mechanism for the denationalisation of the institutional arrangements of teachers' labour in Finland is the high unionisation rate.

Table 5. Four modes of inference

However, Danermark *et al.* (2002) argue for the use of abduction and retroduction. In their view, scientific inference is not only about applying formal logic; scientific inference cannot be reduced to either strictly logical inference (deduction) or to empirically-based generalisation (induction). Social research in particular should involve the ability to reasoning, abstract and create theories that allow for contingency and uncertainty in order to clarify the powers of objects, structures and mechanisms in a stratified, open-ended reality. Together, abduction and retroduction thus serve to identify and explain connections and structures not directly observable in empirical reality. Accordingly, there are no fixed criteria from which it would be possible to assess in a definitive way the validity of abductive and retroductive conclusions, cf. the notion of 'practically-adequate beliefs' (Danermark *et al.* 2002, p.113).

In this project, abduction is adopted for the specific purpose of *generating* hypotheses on the basis of the existing evidence. The formulation of hypotheses is theory-laden since it involves the assumption that the social ontology of the object of study is interpreted from a set of more general conceptual frameworks (Danermark *et al.* 2002, pp.88-95). In a sense, abduction 'opens up' the object of study by theoretical re-imagination. Abduction is often called 'inference to the best explanation' in that it enables us to infer that one candidate explanation or hypothesis is closer to the truth because it explains the available evidence better than rival explanations (Douven 2011).

Whereas abduction in this project serves to *generate* hypotheses based on existing evidence, retroduction is adopted for *testing* and *discussing* these hypotheses on the basis of theory-laden empirical inquiry. Retroduction is hence the theoretically driven mode of inference in which events are explained by identifying mechanisms which are capable of producing them. In this project, retroduction is carried out on the basis of document analysis and realist theory-laden interviews. Since social phenomena are what they are by virtue of the internal relations they have to other phenomena, retroduction becomes a matter of attaining knowledge about what internal relations make X what it is. There are no universal methods for distinguishing the necessary conditions for X (its constituent properties) and the more contingent circumstances affecting the particular case under study. Instead, retroduction applies transfactual or transcendental argument, or

‘retroductive questions’, in order to identify generative mechanisms beyond what is immediately given in the empirical domain. The purpose of retroductive questions is to clarify the limits of validity and develop our understanding of causal mechanisms in open systems by addressing the links between the domains of the real, the actual, and the empirical (see Table 6, based on Danermark *et al.* 2002; Jespersen 2009; Lawton 1997, 2003).

Through the retroductive process, knowledge of what properties are required for a phenomenon to exist is identified, and necessary conditions are separated from contingent circumstances. In this respect, case studies serve to provide contrast and nuances which can qualify the identification of mechanisms and their contextual conditions (Danermark *et al.* 2002, pp.96-106).

What makes the TALIS programme possible? What underlying mechanisms could explain the patterned outcomes of the TALIS programme?

What are the necessary conditions for the TALIS programme? What would the world have to be like for this to be the case? Can the TALIS programme exist without condition Y?

Are there reasons to believe that the TALIS programme has been caused by a mechanism mainly depending on the conditions Y,...,Z?

Are there reasons to believe that the tendency behind the mechanism dependent on conditions (Y,...,Z) also will be valid in the future?

Table 6. Retroductive questions

Abduction and retroduction complement each other and only makes sense together in terms of a scientific working procedure. In fact, Lawton (1997, 2003) and Jespersen (2009) integrates abduction as a component of retroduction. In doing so they understand retroduction as a scientific method of ‘educated guess’, combining the main elements of induction, through observations and apparent regularities, with hypothetical deduction through the theoretical foundation reflecting the social ontology of the target field. In this

manner, the initial operation of the retroductive process is an ‘ontological reflection’ which involves mapping of the target field and the object of study. In this thesis, ‘ontological reflection’ is understood as involving abduction as a distinctive mode of inference. Subsequently, retroduction involves that the formulated hypotheses concerning mechanisms, including their contingent, necessary and/or sufficient relations, along the powers of objects and structures in the domain of the real, are confronted with reality through a constructive falsification test. This step of retroductive ‘reality-check’ involves empirical inquiry.

2.5. Empirical Inquiry

In general, critical realism is compatible with theoretically-informed empirical inquiry using a wide range of methods. The choices of method should depend on the research objectives and the nature of the object of study. Consistent with the intensive research design, the empirical component of this project employ qualitative methods (Danermark *et al.* 2002, p.70; Pawson 2013, p.5; Pawson and Tilley 1997; Sayer 2000, pp.12-19; Sayer 2010) to address the research questions. The empirical inquiry should enable the mapping of the substantial internal relations between the organisations making up the TALIS ensemble and the identification of mechanisms that make TALIS what it is, in order to explain how the programme developed, what it does, and what the programme means, theoretically. For this purpose, the empirical material consists of two complementary data sets:

- Documents: Official policy documents, reports and the TALIS teacher questionnaires (see Appendix D), selected through the construction of chronologies, cross-references, and on the basis of the second data set.
- 31 semi-structured qualitative research interviews (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). 30 interviews were conducted with individuals, and one involved two participants (see Appendix E for a list of the 32 interviewees and the codes used for reference to the interviews in the analysis). Around two-thirds of the interviews were face-to-face; and one third via telephone. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and one hour, with extremes ranging from 30 minutes to 2 hours.

The nature of the empirical material needs explication. With regard to the policy documents, it should be noted that most materials from meetings in OECD fora were confidential. This include materials from the TALIS Board of Participating Countries - the main OECD body for work on TALIS. Access to these meeting materials would have been beneficial, and it is a limitation of this project that such materials are not available, or indeed that observations of meetings were not possible. However, with the focus on practical argumentation of policy actors, the project assumes that it is possible to reconstruct critical features of political discourses and outcomes, as well as how they were shaped by mechanisms, on the basis of publicly available statements in reports, policy papers, and regulations, complemented by interviews.

The interviews have been invaluable for the project. The 31 interviews were conducted between autumn 2014 – autumn 2015. The approach was ontologically realist and theory-laden, and the entry point for each interview was to test my hypotheses with the interviewees, focusing on the TALIS programme. This set of semi-structured interviews has added an empirical richness that would not have been possible to achieve otherwise. I found the realist theory-laden approach (Pawson 1996) engaging because the approach allowed me to be explicit about my assumptions. This helped to turn the interviews into more dialogical conversations as the subject matter of the semi-structured interviews were provided by my hypotheses, based upon literature and previous interviews. These hypotheses were shared with the interviewee in the form of an interview-guide before the interview took place. For the interview, he or she was asked to discuss and refine the hypotheses. The interviewees all did this in great detail.

In addition to the realist interviews, I also conducted six ‘exploratory’ interviews in spring – summer 2014 (see Appendix F). Along with literature reviews, they informed stages 2-4 of the research model and served the objective of building background knowledge and sharpening the research focus. The criterion for selection of participants was that they had specific expertise in teacher policy, the TALIS programme or global education governance, without necessarily being directly engaged in TALIS. The knowledge-generating purpose of

the exploratory interviews is reflected in the selection of participants, that included five university-based scholars, and a former teacher union senior executive.

2.5.1. Selection of participants for realist interviews

The main selection criterium for participants taking part in the realist interviews was that the individual had first-hand engagement with the TALIS programme through current or recent work in one of the organisations involved in the programme. Potential interviewees were identified on the basis of desk research, news and literature on TALIS, supervisors' knowledge, and snow-balling, that is, recommendations from other interviewees. I first established the identities of around ten individuals, based on their positions in organisations engaged in TALIS, and approached them directly. The 'hands-on' selection criterium meant that all interviewees worked, or had recently worked, in one of four types of organisations: i) government bodies; ii) teacher unions; iii) public-private partnerships or private enterprises; or iv) universities or research centres. Some of the interviewees had experience from more than one type of organisation during their career, and a few had positions in both government bodies and universities at the time of interview. In Table 7, the 32 interview participants are only counted in the context that sparked their relevance for being included as participants in this project.

Type of organisation	Occupation	Interviewees
Government bodies	Senior executive, manager, civil servant, policy officer, senior analyst, analyst	14
Teacher unions	Senior executive, coordinator, officer	8
Public-private partnerships or private enterprises	Project manager	3
Universities and research centres	Professor, research manager, research fellow	7

Table 7. Organisations and occupations of participants in realist interviews

I employed purposive sampling to reduce randomness as much as possible (Silverman 2010, pp.141-142; Tansey 2007). To reduce bias in the selection of interviewees, the variety of organisations directly involved in the TALIS programme were considered before

approaching potential interviewees. Moreover, the sampling was carried out to enable the investigation of how a particular policy actor relates to other organisations involved in TALIS (Barbour and Schostak 2011). In this way, the overall project clearly benefitted from some participants being selected as the understanding of the TALIS programme was built up (Sayer 2010, p.244).

Positional and subsequently reputational criteria were adopted for the purposive sampling of interviewees in order to obtain as much relevant information as possible. The application of positional criteria constituted a 'theoretical sampling' in terms of being guided by the theoretical assumptions developed in research stages 2-4 (Mason 2002, p.138). In terms of reputational criteria, I found snowball sampling to be appropriate to identify policy actors (Babbie 2001, p.180). I asked interviewees selected on the basis of positional criteria to suggest other potential interviewees. This was important as they tended to also give me contact details. Snowballing might result in selection bias but by focusing on the range of policy actors most directly engaged in the TALIS programme, I believe that the sample has not become excessively skewed in a particular direction (Tansey 2007).

For each interview, I prepared an interviewguide, tailored to the position of the participant with regard to the TALIS programme (see Appendix G for excerpts). Therefore, the interviews varied in terms of the topics they addressed and the emphasis on more descriptive information (How many meetings? When did they take place? Who took part?) versus argument and discussion (How much influence do national government authorities have on the direction of the TALIS programme? Which countries have been very active in OECD TALIS fora? Which strategies did they adopt and why?).

The course of interviews in this project proved consistent with Tansey's (2007) suggestion; that high-ranking elite actors, such as senior executives, can be critical sources of information about political processes at the highest level of government. In this sense, 'elite interviewing' has been critical in uncovering the causal processes and mechanisms that are central to explanation. Tansey (2007) points to four uses of elite interviews: i) corroborate what has been established from written sources; ii) reconstruct sets of events; iii) establish

what a set of people think; and iv) make inferences about a larger population's characteristics and decisions. All 32 interview participants in this project, regardless their position, have been able to engage with these four points. However, I agree with Tansey (2007) insofar as that high-ranking officials have tended to put more emphasis on the broader (political) landscape and the position of their organisation in it, and hence relations *between* organisations, while policy officers and civil servants placed more emphasis on the specifics of their organisation and the course of events – though these varying emphases to some extent might have been prompted by the specific interview guides.

Another issue related to the selection of interviewees concerns the sense of agency the interviewees attach to their organisation and themselves. I registered differences in responses from 'elite' senior executives compared with those of policy officers. The former tended to express themselves more boldly with respect to the scope of agency and influence of the organisation, while lower-ranking officers were more cautious during interviews. In short, the realist interviews overall indicated that the higher the position, the more sense of agency.

Finally, it should be noted that there are advantages as well as disadvantages related to my approach of selecting interviewees with direct experience concerning TALIS. The purposive sampling was adopted to reduce bias *in* the sampling of interviewees as much as possible. Yet, a pertinent issue concerns the possibility of 'bias' *as a result of* the selection of interviewees. In this respect, it would have been relevant to include organisations, not least state authorities, who so far have chosen *not* to engage with TALIS, such as the relevant organisations from Germany (cf. the often mentioned 'PISA shock'), or organisations who by all accounts appear not to have been *directly* involved, such as Pearson, the International Labour Organization, or the World Bank. Including such 'outsider' or 'peripheral' organisations in the sample would arguably have deepened the understanding of the mechanisms underlying TALIS and put the programme in perspective. In this way, the interview sample and the empirical material overall contains a bias towards organisations engaging with and supporting TALIS, at the expense of those who did not have access or interest in becoming engaged. However, due to my knowledge interest in what has made

TALIS possible and what the programme does, I deliberately opted for giving priority to sampling those with 'hands-on' engagement with TALIS presupposing that 'insider' perspectives would provide more valid data.

2.6. Research Ethics

Ethical issues in this project were related to interviewing as the policy documents were publicly available. First of all, the inclusion of interviews in the project, with the implied contribution by interview participants, is justified from a research perspective. The interviews have formed an indispensable part of the research outcomes. A 'formal approach', inspired by Prince (2009), were adopted for both exploratory and realist interviews for the building of trust and enhancing access to interviewees by addressing ethical issues in a transparent manner. The success rate has been high as all the individuals that I contacted agreed to contribute, except in three cases.

During the project, I have drawn on the ethical guidelines of the British Educational Research Association (BERA 2011). Due to their emphasis on reflection, I find these more helpful than the checklist enclosed in the University of Bristol's "*Ethics of Research Policy and Procedure 2011*" (University of Bristol 2011). Such 'procedural ethics' proved insufficient when unanticipated 'ethically important moments' (Guillemin and Gillam 2004; Piper and Simons 2011) occurred during the project, for example when I needed to consider carefully whether and how to contact interview participants who were ill at the time when I would like them to approve interview transcriptions. In BERA terminology, the most pertinent ethical issues for this research project involve voluntary informed consent; right to withdraw; detriment arising from participation in research; and privacy. The former two together equals 'process consent' (Piper and Simons 2011; Silverman 2010, p.159).

I contacted potential interviewees by email and attached a 5 pages personal letter, with the University of Bristol letterhead. The letter contained the following key information (see Appendices H and I)

- Description of PhD project and short CV
- Contact details of my PhD supervisors
- Points on how the study would benefit from the interview with the individual

- Duration of interview
- A more detailed interview guide with themes and assumptions was to be sent to the participant if he or she agreed to take part.
- The interview was to be recorded and data stored on devices secured by personal passwords.
- Interview transcriptions was to be sent to participants for approval.
- The participant could withdraw from the project at any stage without providing reasons. This would involve the withdrawal of all data provided by the participants.
- Pre-publication access, stating that participants could comment upon the parts of the final draft thesis that draw on the interviews conducted with them.
- Privacy was to be respected through confidentiality in the research process and the highest possible level of anonymisation of participants in reporting.
- Participants was to be sent an electronic copy of the completed PhD thesis if they wished.
- A form for registering voluntary informed consent that had to be signed, or agreed upon in writing (via email) in case the individual confirmed participation.

This approach was followed in all instances. It was also used where initial access had already been secured and interview participation confirmed. I found this to be the most appropriate solution to ensure transparency about the research process, outcomes, and participant rights.

If the individual agreed to participate, an interview guide was provided before the interview took place. After the interview, a transcription was sent for approval. All interviewees thus had the opportunity to comment and suggest edits before approving the final version of transcription for use in research. Interviewees tended to suggest minor edits concerning wording (often to ensure alignment with the 'official' discourse of their organisation) and more neutral assessments of other organisations. In all cases, I accepted these edits without further comment due to their very limited impact on the substance of the interviews.

With regard to the issues of confidentiality and anonymity, these have been treated as absolute as possible. Only the researcher and the two supervisors know of interview participants' identities. Anonymity has been maintained in the best possible way through general references when quoting or referring to statements. In this respect, I have considered the analytical value of mentioning the nature of interviewees' workplaces. However, some of the interviewees will be identifiable due to their central roles; for example, 'insiders' working in the same environment, and researchers with similar interests, even with anonymisation and disguising workplaces as much as possible without sacrificing analytical points. Snowballing has further undermined confidentiality and anonymity, with interviewees linking to other participants whom they already know. For example, the OECD TALIS Secretariat, a key department to consider in this study, employs only a limited number of people. The same is the case with most of the other organisations in the 'TALIS ensemble'.

This chapter set out the intensive research design of the study, drawing on critical realism as meta-theory and a seven stages research model. In addition, I have presented the main characteristics of the empirical material, and the principles guiding the selection and interaction with interview participants. On this basis, the next Chapter moves to research stage 2 and examines the social ontology of TALIS.

CHAPTER 3. THE SOCIAL ONTOLOGY OF THE OECD TALIS PROGRAMME

3.0. Introduction

This chapter is broadly concerned with the social ontology of the TALIS programme. This involves asking “what are we looking at?” to tentatively identify the nature of what we are interested in. Lawson (1997) argues that understanding the object’s ontology is imperative before selecting the mode of analysis and thinking tools that enable us to acquire practically-adequate knowledge about the object in question.

Accordingly, this chapter asks “what is the social ontology of the OECD TALIS programme?”, and more precisely, what does existing research evidence tell us about TALIS and the social field it is part of? This provides the groundwork for the formulation of hypotheses on the basis of abduction in Chapter 4. The chapter moves through two distinctive steps, both guided by the research questions. Hence, Chapter 3 seeks to provide a review of what existing evidence tells us concerning: i) what makes TALIS possible and has made it what it is?; ii) what does TALIS do?; and iii) what does TALIS mean?

The first step includes a description and initial theorisation which in turn provide an overview of the field through the identification of substantially internally related objects and imaginable causal components. As noted in Chapter 2, this account is based upon area literatures. Since the academic literature on the TALIS programme is not large, the chapter considers the more expansive literature on global education governance. In addition, the OECD reports on the TALIS programme are an important resource. For reasons of sequence, the first step includes moving from the descriptive towards the theoretical issues. The chapter starts with an account of what TALIS does, before moving on to what might have made the programme possible, and what it might mean.

The second step involves an analytical resolution that seeks to distinguish components or aspects that stands out for the purpose of narrowing and clarifying the study. The final section of the chapter is dedicated to this resolution and serves as a tentative conclusion, on the basis of existing evidence, to the question “what are we looking at?”

3.1. What Does TALIS Do?

This section provides a description of the OECD TALIS programme and asks what the existing evidence tells us about what the programme does, internationally, and in the three countries Australia, England and Finland. ‘Description’ is a contentious term in critical realism where facts are understood to be theory-laden. Hence, this section aspires to provide an overview of the TALIS programme *outputs*, programme *objectives*, the TALIS *research design*, policy themes, *who* takes part, and *main developments* in the programme, including the so-called ‘international options’ being offered by the OECD to participating political entities. Moreover, a subsection outlines the main features of Australia, England and Finland in terms of their participation in TALIS, the main agencies or actors involved in the programme, and the OECD’s account of how results are to be interpreted. In this sense, the section is dedicated to the outcome patterns of TALIS in the domain of the actual. This comprehensive introduction of the TALIS programme at the level of the actual is consciously uncritical at this point in not diving too quickly to the level of the real by asking questions about interests and the relations between policy actors involved in the programme.

3.1.1. OECD TALIS knowledge outputs

The OECD website offers a wealth of information on the TALIS programme (OECD, 2016a). TALIS publications and documents are divided into: i) ‘Publications’, with fifteen titles issued by the OECD. Some of them are titulated to individual authors, and others to the OECD; ii) ‘Teaching in Focus’ briefs accompanied by blogs; iii) Country notes, country profiles and national reports; the latter longer reports prepared by researchers based in participating countries; and iv) TALIS Working papers with individual researchers stated as authors (see Table 8).

Among the OECD publications (see Table 9), the two main OECD reports presenting results from the two rounds of the TALIS survey (OECD 2009a, 2014a) stand out. Each of these are accompanied by voluminous ‘technical reports’ (OECD 2010, 2014b). In addition, there is a shorter “*Teachers’ Guide*” (OECD 2014c), a “*TALIS User Guide*” prepared by IEA researchers and Statistics Canada (OECD 2014e), the “*TALIS 2013 Conceptual Framework*” (OECD 2013), and a complementary report with TALIS results from primary and upper secondary education (OECD 2014d).

	Number	Publication	Stated authors
Publications	15	2009 - 2016	OECD, individual researchers
Teaching in Focus	15	2012 - 2016	OECD
Country notes, country profiles and national reports	Mix of notes, profiles and national reports from 34 countries, and European Union	2014	OECD (country notes and country profiles) Individual researchers from participating countries (national reports)
Working papers	9	2012 - 2016	Individual researchers

Table 8. Various TALIS outputs

TALIS 2008		TALIS 2013	
Title	Pages	Title	Pages
<i>Creating Effective Teaching and Learning Environments: First Results from TALIS</i> (2009)	310	<i>Teaching and Learning International Survey: Conceptual Framework</i> (2013)	60
<i>TALIS 2008 Technical Report</i> (2010)	278	<i>TALIS 2013 Results: An International Perspective on Teaching and Learning</i> (2014)	442
		<i>TALIS 2013 Technical Report</i> (2014)	464
		<i>A Teachers' Guide to TALIS 2013: Teaching and Learning International Survey</i> (2014)	32
		<i>New Insights from TALIS 2013. Teaching and Learning in Primary and Upper Secondary Education</i> (2014)	332

Table 9. Main TALIS outputs issued by OECD

Finally, a number of other reports are included yet these are characterised by having more narrow thematic foci. Rather than the OECD, the reports are designated individual authors (for example, Jensen *et al.* 2012; Vieluf *et al.* 2012). One of these is a background report for the 2016 International Summit on the Teaching Profession, with OECD Director of Education Andreas Schleicher as designated author (Schleicher 2016).

3.1.2. TALIS objectives and research design

The TALIS programme was developed as part of the OECD's Indicators of Education Systems (INES) Project, the main product of which is the OECD flagship annual publication, *"Education at a Glance"*. Over the past 20 years, the INES project has developed a set of indicators meant to *"provide a reliable basis for the quantitative comparison of the functioning and performance of education systems in OECD and partner countries"* (OECD, 2009a, p.19). Moreover, a major OECD review of teacher policy in 25 countries *"Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective Teachers"* (2002-2004) provided the immediate background for TALIS and fed into its conceptual framework and selection of policy themes (OECD 2009a, p.19).

The structure and wording of Chapter 1 in the two reports is similar (OECD 2009a, 2014a). The objective of TALIS is stated in the following way:

"The overall objective of TALIS is to provide robust international indicators and policy-relevant analysis on teachers and teaching in a timely and cost-effective manner. These indicators help countries review and develop policies in their efforts to promote conditions for high-quality teaching and learning. Cross-country analyses provide the opportunity to compare countries facing similar challenges to learn about different policy approaches and their impact on the learning environment in schools." (OECD 2014a, p.27; compare with OECD 2009a, p.19)

Likewise, the guiding principles underlying the survey strategy are formulated in the same way in the two main reports:

- *"Policy relevance. Clarity about key policy issues and a focus on the questions that are most relevant for participating countries are both essential."*
- *Value added. International comparisons should be a significant source of the study's benefits."*
- *Indicator-oriented. The results should yield information that can be used to develop indicators."*
- *Validity, reliability, comparability and rigor. Based on a rigorous review of the knowledge base, the survey should yield information that is valid, reliable and comparable across participating countries."*

- Interpretability. *Participating countries should be able to interpret the results in a meaningful way.*
- Efficiency and cost-effectiveness. *The work should be carried out in a timely and cost-effective way.*” (OECD 2009a, p.19; 2014a, p.27)

International target population	Lower secondary education (ISCED 2) teachers and leaders of mainstream schools
Target sample size	200 schools per country; 20 teachers and 1 school leader in each school
School samples	Representative samples of schools and teachers within schools
Target response rates	75% of sampled schools, together with a 75% response rate from all sampled teachers in the country. A school is considered to have responded if 50% of sampled teachers respond.
Questionnaires	Separate questionnaires for teachers and school leaders, requiring 45 - 60 minutes to complete
Mode of data collection	Questionnaires filled in on paper or on line
Survey window	
TALIS 2008	Oct – Dec 2007 for Southern Hemisphere countries March-May 2008 for Northern Hemisphere countries
TALIS 2013	Sep - Dec 2012 for Southern Hemisphere countries Feb -June 2013 for Northern Hemisphere countries

Table 10. The TALIS research design

The survey instruments of TALIS are standardised questionnaires for teachers and school leaders requiring between 45 to 60 minutes to fill in (see Table 10, based on OECD 2009a, p.20; OECD 2014a, p.27). The target population consists of lower secondary education teachers and school leaders in mainstream schools. The target population are teachers *“whose primary or major activity in the school is student instruction, involving the delivery of lessons to students”*. This does not include pedagogical and social support staff, substitute or occasional teachers. In TALIS 2013, teachers instructing students with special needs in mainstream schools were included (OECD 2014a, p.28; compare with OECD 2009a, p.20).

The processes surrounding each round of TALIS take approximately three years. For both rounds, it started with a pilot study (2006 third quarter/2011 second quarter) followed by stages of field trial, main study, analysis, and release of the International Report (second quarter 2009/2014) (OECD, 2010, p.21; OECD 2014b, p.29).

3.1.3. The policy themes

The policy themes and indicators to be covered in TALIS are selected on the basis of a ‘priority-rating exercise’ amongst participating countries (OECD 2009a, pp.20-21; OECD 2014a, p.28; see Table 11), with the choice and development of themes and indicators guided by conceptual frameworks. Reflecting the continuity in policy themes, the structure of the main reports are also similar, centred on the themes though in a different order. In addition, the main report for TALIS 2013 included a 3-pages executive summary (see Table 12, based on OECD 2009a, 2014a; excluding appendices).

TALIS 2008	TALIS 2013
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • School leadership • Appraisal of and feedback to teachers • Teaching practices, beliefs and attitudes <p>+ Professional development of teachers as “an important theme” due to “synergies with the three main themes” and European Union interest</p> <p>+ Aspects of other themes: School climate, division of working time, and job satisfaction</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • School leadership, including new indicators on distributed/team leadership • Appraisal of and feedback to teachers • Teachers’ pedagogical beliefs, attitudes and teaching practices, including new indicators on the profile of student assessment practices • Teacher training, including professional development and new indicators on initial teacher education • Teachers’ reported feelings of self-efficacy, their job satisfaction and the climate in the schools and classrooms in which they work

Table 11. Policy themes of TALIS

TALIS 2008	TALIS 2013
Foreword (including acknowledgements)	Foreword
	Acknowledgements
	Executive summary
Chapter 1. Introduction	Chapter 1. Overview of TALIS
Chapter 2. A profile of the teacher population and the schools in which they work	Chapter 2. Teachers and their schools
Chapter 3. The professional development of teachers.	Chapter 3. The importance of school leadership
Chapter 4. Teaching practices, teachers' beliefs and attitudes	Chapter 4. Developing and supporting teachers
Chapter 5. School evaluation, teacher appraisal and feedback and the impact on schools and teachers	Chapter 5. Improving teaching using appraisal and feedback
Chapter 6. Leading to learn: School leadership and management styles	Chapter 6. Examining teacher practices and classroom environment
Chapter 7. Key factors in developing effective learning environments: Classroom disciplinary climate and teachers' self-efficacy	Chapter 7. Teacher self-efficacy and job satisfaction: Why they matter

Table 12. Structure of main TALIS reports

3.1.4. Who took part?

24 countries or sub-national entities took part in TALIS 2008, whilst 34 took part in TALIS 2013. The European Union is well-represented, with 16 and 19 member states or regions taking part in the two rounds, respectively (Table 13, based on OECD, 2009a, p.18; OECD 2014a, p.26). OECD members from outside the European Union who have taken part in one or both rounds include Canada (Alberta), Chile, Israel, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Turkey, and the US. TALIS has also succeeded in attracting non-OECD members or partner countries. Ten non-OECD members thus took part in TALIS 2013. In two instances did participating countries not meet the required response rates, the Netherlands in 2008, and the US in 2013. Therefore, results from these countries were not featured in the relevant international reports.

Country or region	TALIS 2008	TALIS 2013	Country or region	TALIS 2008	TALIS 2013
OECD members			OECD partner countries/non-members		
Australia	X	X	Brazil	X	X
Austria	X		Bulgaria	X	X
Belgium	X		Croatia		X
Belgium (Flanders)		X	Cyprus		X
Canada (Alberta)		X	Estonia **	X	
Chile		X	Latvia **		X
Czech Republic		X	Lithuania	X	
Denmark	X	X	Malta	X	
Estonia **		X	Malaysia	X	X
Finland		X	Romania		X
France		X	Serbia		X
Hungary	X		Singapore		X
Iceland	X	X	Slovenia **	X	
Ireland	X		UAE (Abu Dhabi)		X
Israel		X	Total	7	10
Italy	X	X			
Japan		X	EU Member states	16	19
Republic of Korea	X	X			
Mexico	X	X			
Netherlands	X *	X			
Norway	X	X			
Poland	X	X			
Portugal	X	X			
Slovak Republic	X	X			
Spain	X	X			
Sweden		X			
Turkey	X				
UK (England)		X			
USA		X *			
Total	17	24			

Table 13. Country participation in TALIS

*Survey response rate fell short of the requirement (75%). Country results were not featured in the international reports. **Estonia and Slovenia became OECD member states in 2010, Latvia in 2016

3.1.5. International options

From the first round, TALIS has included three ‘international options’. The first and second option included a representative sample of teachers and school leaders in primary and upper secondary education respectively (ISCED levels 1 and 3). The third option, the TALIS-PISA link, concerned surveying a representative sample of teachers of 15-year-olds in schools that took part in PISA 2006 (for TALIS 2008) or PISA 2012 (for TALIS 2013). These were effectively not taken up in TALIS 2008, with only Iceland selecting the ISCED Level 1 option. In the second round, the options proved more popular amongst participating countries (see Table 14, based on OECD 2009a, p.20; OECD 2014a, p.27; OECD, 2014b, pp.32-33).

	TALIS 2008		TALIS 2013	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Countries</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Countries</i>
Primary education (ISCED 1) teachers and school leaders	1	Iceland	6	Denmark, Finland, Belgium (Flanders), Mexico, Norway, Poland
Upper secondary education (ISCED 3) teachers and school leaders	0	-	10	UAE (Abu Dhabi), Australia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Singapore
TALIS – PISA link	0	-	8	Australia, Finland, Latvia, Mexico, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Spain

Table 14. TALIS international options

3.1.6. Australia, England, Finland and TALIS

Australia has taken part in both rounds and selected two options in TALIS 2013. England and Finland have only taken part in the second round. Finland opted for ‘the full package’, and England selected the most popular international option. All three cases took part in the major OECD teacher policy review *Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective Teachers* (see Table 15).

	Australia	England	Finland
OECD review 2002-2004	Yes	Yes	Yes
TALIS 2008	Yes	No	No
TALIS 2013	Yes	Yes	Yes
TALIS 2013 International options	ISCED 3 TALIS-PISA link	ISCED 3	ISCED 1 ISCED 3 TALIS – PISA link

Table 15. The participation of Australia, England and Finland in TALIS

3.1.7. Who are the main policy actors involved in TALIS?

In both reports, the development of TALIS was presented as the result of ‘productive co-operation’ between participating countries. A range of organisations, bodies and roles were involved in developing and administering TALIS:

- *TALIS Board of Participating Countries* (BPC), with representatives from all jurisdictions taking part in TALIS. The TALIS BPC set out the policy objectives for the survey and established the standards for data collection and reporting.
- The *OECD TALIS Secretariat* had overall responsibility for managing the programme, monitoring implementation and serving as the secretariat of TALIS BPC.
- The *European Commission* (EC) as a key partner in both cycles of TALIS. The EC provided support for EU member states taking part and further analyses of the TALIS data.
- The *Trade Union Advisory Committee* (TUAC) at the OECD was engaged in the development and implementation of TALIS.
- An *Instrument Development Expert Group* (IDEG) translated policy priorities into questionnaires.
- *International Consortium*: An appointed contractor managed the implementation of TALIS internationally, developed the sampling plan and advised participating countries on its application. For both rounds, the appointed contractor was the Data Processing Centre of the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), with Statistics Canada as sub-contractor.
- In participating countries, *National Project Managers* (NPMs) and *National Data Managers* (NDMs) implemented TALIS, “*subject to rigorous technical and operational procedures*” provided by the OECD. NPMs secured the co-operation of schools, validated questionnaires and managed the national data collection. NDMs had a more technical role in coordinating data processing (OECD 2014a, p.29; compare OECD 2009a, pp.21-22).

The TALIS BPC is the key OECD body in terms of the representation of participating countries. It was first created 1 January 2007. Concerning membership, “[T]he Board shall be composed of representatives of Members participating in the survey and non-Member

Full Participants”, and these “*Members and non-Members should wherever possible appoint experts in teacher, teaching and learning policy and practice as their representatives to the Board.*” Furthermore, UNESCO has the status of observer in BPC, and other OECD Members may attend BPC meetings. The TALIS BPC “*may consult with non-governmental bodies as and when necessary*” and is meant to have “*close working relationships with other relevant bodies*” of the OECD (OECD 2012b, pp.392-393). Of the 21 OECD bodies within the area of education, four appear to be relevant in this respect:

- *Working Party on Indicators of Educational Systems* (INES) coordinate statistical work and indicators development to meet the priorities of the Education Policy Committee.
- The *INES Network for the collection and adjudication of system-level descriptive information on educational structures, policies and practices* (NESLI) is a subgroup of INES and is meant to maintain relationships with the TALIS BPC.
- The *INES Advisory Group* who advises the Education Policy Committee on work on OECD data and indicators.
- The *OECD Education Policy Committee* (EDPC) due to its overall strategic importance for OECD work in the field of education (OECD 2012b, pp.388-401).

Considering the recognition of TUAC - the social partner representing labour - in the OECD TALIS reports (2009a, 2014a) we might ask why the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC; see Appendix O) is not mentioned, especially because BIAC was acknowledged as a cooperation partner, along with TUAC, in the major OECD review of teacher policy 2002-2005 (OECD 2005, pp.3, 224).

3.1.8. Interpretation of results

The objective of TALIS is to inform policy on the basis of comparison. With regard to how results are to be interpreted, the two international TALIS reports point out that - due to the nature of programme - the survey data are ‘subjective’ as opposed to more objectively collected data:

“TALIS results are based on self-reports from teachers and school leaders and therefore represent their opinions, perceptions, beliefs and accounts of their activities. This is powerful information because it provides insight into how teachers perceive the learning environments in which they work, what motivates teachers and how policies that are put in place are carried out in practice. But, as with any self-reported data, this information is subjective and therefore differs from objectively collected data.” (OECD 2014a, p.29; compare with OECD 2009a, p.22)

The reports point out that TALIS, as a cross-sectional survey, cannot measure causality. So, TALIS cannot establish whether a positive school climate depends on good teacher co-operation or whether good teacher co-operation depends upon a positive school climate. Hence, the choice of variables is based on theoretical considerations as laid out in the analytical framework:

“When a reference is made to “effects”, the reference should be understood in a statistical sense – i.e. an effect is a statistical parameter that describes the linear relationship between a predicted variable (e.g. job satisfaction) and a predictor variable (e.g. participation in professional development activities) – taking effects of individual and school background as well as other independent variables into account. Thus, the effects reported are statistical net effects even if they do not imply causality.” (OECD 2014a, p.29; compare OECD, 2009a, p.22).

Another issue related to the interpretation of results concerns their cross-cultural validity. The technical reports have dedicated sections to the related procedures with regard to the scales and indices, and the analysis indicates the extent to which the scales can be compared amongst countries (OECD 2014a, p.29; compare OECD 2009a, p.22; OECD 2010, pp.139-143; OECD 2014b, pp.150-154).

Finally, and specifically on the TALIS-PISA link, the stated purpose is *“to use school-level data from PISA to contextualise teachers’ responses in TALIS”*. The intention is thus *“not to measure the effects of teaching on student outcomes”* because *“[N]either the design of PISA nor the design of TALIS is amenable to analyses of teacher and teaching effectiveness”* (OECD, 2014a, p.29).

3.2. What Has Made TALIS Possible?

This section provides a review of what the existing evidence tell us about the objects, structures and mechanisms that might have made TALIS possible and made it what it is, internationally, and in Australia, England and Finland. The main sources are substantive area literatures about the TALIS programme, with a particular focus on the *relations* between the organisations engaged in TALIS, the *objectives and ideas* guiding these organisations, and *mechanisms* underlying the TALIS programme.

One strand of literature on TALIS belongs to the ‘school effectiveness’ tradition. This strand is focused on survey results and not on the programme as a construction. The OECD working papers on TALIS, for instance, form part of that strand. Another strand of literature draws on education, sociology, political science, and political economy, and is more interpretive, qualitative and critical. Most of the literature reviewed below was published when only one cycle of TALIS had been completed.

The section is divided into addressing: i) the substantial internal relations in TALIS that go beyond the ‘official’ OECD account; ii) features of the teaching profession; iii) the comparative cases of Australia, England and Finland; iv) the rise of the OECD in global educational governance; and v) soft law and comparative research as mechanisms constituting the global education policy field.

3.2.1. The substantial internal relations of the TALIS programme

The description above shows that the TALIS programme include substantial internal relations between a range of organisations, groups and bodies (see Figure 4).



Figure 4. The cluster of organisations engaged in TALIS

This description is limited in terms of understanding the relations between those agencies. The character of substantially and internally related objects was briefly noted in Chapter 2. Two distinctions still need to be made; the first is between formal and substantial relations, and the second between external and internal relations (see Figure 5, modified from Danermark *et al.* 2002, pp.45-47). These distinctions are central for this research, as they are concerned with Sayer's (2000, 2010) distinction between intensive and extensive research designs. Causal groups are to be studied by way of the substantial and internal relations between them, where one *or* both objects *cause* the existence of the other as a result of the internal relations existing between them, and those relations are deemed relevant for the phenomenon under study. We might also note that the term 'causal' takes on two distinctive meanings, the first associated with the internal relations between objects, and the other related to the centrality given to causal groups in identifying generative mechanisms and explaining events and tendencies in social reality. In order to address the research questions, this project must thus put forward truth claims on the substantial internal relations existing in the causal group and how they help explain the mechanisms underlying the TALIS programme.




Figure 5. Formal as distinct from substantial social relations

Robertson (2012a, 2013) locates TALIS in the broader recalibration of the global educational policy field during the 2000s. In line with other scholars (Connell 2009; Tatto 2007), she points out that this period was characterised by several large-scale projects addressing the role of teachers for economic competitiveness. She points out that TALIS entails a shift in the distribution of power concerning teacher policy as the ‘field of symbolic control’ (cf. Bernstein 1990) is increasingly opened up to intergovernmental organisations like the OECD and the World Bank, as well as private businesses, like Pearson Education and McKinsey & Co., and corporate philanthropists, such as the Gates Foundation, who all operate beyond national spaces of representation and democratic accountability. Robertson analyses the relations between the OECD and Education International, the global federation of teacher unions. Education International (EI) is the world’s largest federation of unions, with around 396 associations and unions in 171 countries and territories. Representing some 32.5 million educators, EI characterises itself as the voice of teachers across the globe. Robertson (2012a) points out that the recognition of teachers implied with TALIS means that the programme might be understood as a departure from the neo-liberal policies during the

1980s and 1990s where teachers were a de-skilled and derided profession who faced attempts to reduce the role of teacher unions. Yet, the engagement of EI in TALIS might also signal that those representing teachers are adopting the dominant mindset in the global educational policy field. Drawing on Bernstein's (1990) terms, powerful parts of the 'pedagogic recontextualising field' are hence being colonized by the 'official' and an emerging 'commercial recontextualising field' while the large majority of teachers remains invisible in the 'field of symbolic control'.

Hammershøi's (2011) research is based on empirical material; all documents from nine TALIS 2008 BPC meetings and an interview with a TUAC representative taking part in BPC meetings. This is unique material because materials from OECD meetings tend to be confidential. Drawing on discursive institutionalism, she traces the development of TALIS as a social-discursive construction. Whilst noting that TALIS 2008 did not manage to create a lot of attention in participating countries, Hammershøi's account of the early developments of TALIS complements the OECD's account (2009a, 2010). In particular, she points out that the first draft to TALIS was prepared by the OECD in spring 2005. Hammershøi's analysis provides evidence concerning the relations between the main organisations engaged in TALIS. First, the EC saw TALIS as a means to support their 2006 Key Competences of Lifelong Learning. Around 2006 they sought to become a close partner to the OECD on TALIS. Part of this included that the European Commission (EC) from its 2006 budget contributed 600,000 Euros to the international costs of TALIS that altogether amounted to approximately 1,5 million Euros. Second, TUAC was represented in TALIS BPC with officers from EI and the European Trade Union Committee for Education (ETUCE). While there were conflicts between TUAC and OECD concerning their competing views of teaching and learning and whether and how performance-based pay should be addressed in TALIS, TUAC nevertheless deemed the cooperation with OECD to be constructive overall.

In summary, Robertson (2012a, 2013) emphasises that the analysis of TALIS in terms of substantial internal relations needs to address the role of private sector interests - a type of organisations not mentioned in the OECD account although BIAC was acknowledged as cooperation partner in the OECD's *"Teachers Matter"* report (2005) - and the implications

for teacher unions and the teaching profession of cooperating with the OECD. Hammershøi (2011) highlights the need to know more about the reasons for the EC's engagement in TALIS and the division of labour between EI and ETUCE in the context of TUAC (see Appendices M and N on trade unions). Yet, many questions remain. The potential engagement of BIAC in TALIS remains an open question. We also saw that UNESCO enjoys status of observer in the TALIS BPC. This is intriguing since OECD and UNESCO have competed and cooperated in the area of educational statistics for decades (Cusso and D'Amico 2005, Papadopoulos 1994, p.18). In particular, we know little about the relations between country representatives in the TALIS BPC, and their relations to the other organisations. The relations between Australia, England and Finland and other policy actors in TALIS have not been the subject of research. Our initial theorisation must therefore consider the broader literature concerning the three comparative cases and their relations with the OECD. However, first we should consider the object of the TALIS programme, the teaching profession.

3.2.2. Teaching as a profession and object of policy

As argued in Chapter 1, international political attention directed towards teachers is nothing new. Main international organisations of the post-World War 2 order like the OECD, the United Nations agencies United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and International Labour Organization (ILO) have engaged with teachers for 50 years (UNESCO 1966; ILO and UNESCO 2015). Yet, in the past decade there has been a new emphasis on teachers as the key workforce for driving quality education systems and effective learning. In this respect, a range of international projects have been launched:

- The UNESCO Education For All goals and strategies have sought to enhance the status, morale and professionalism of teachers, and for teachers to become directly linked to quality education (UNESCO 2000, pp.20-21; UNESCO 2015a, pp. 187-217). The subsequent Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) reinforce the emphasis on learning outcomes for which teachers are seen as instrumental (UN 2015; UNESCO 2014). Accordingly, the *eAtlas* series developed new survey instruments and data collections on teachers (UNESCO, 2015b).

- Teachers also feature prominently in current World Bank strategies for education and the associated initiative *Systems Approach for Better Education Results* (SABER) (World Bank 2011, 2013).
- The EU has conducted extensive work on the teaching profession since the 2000s, driven by the EC (Caena 2014; Caena and Margiotta 2010; Stéger 2014).
- Business and foundations have emerged in the global educational policy field emphasizing the key role of teachers for the quality and effectiveness of education systems (Alexander 2011; Ball 2012; Coffield 2012; Junemann and Ball 2015; Robertson 2012a; Robertson *et al.* 2012). Prominent examples include reports from McKinsey & Company (Barber and Mourshed 2007; Mourshed *et al.* 2010), the Learning Curve Project (Pearson 2012, 2014), and the Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) project (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 2013).

The TALIS programme arguably represents the peak in so far as representing a concerted effort to put teachers at and in the centre of an ongoing global conversation (Robertson 2012a). Hence, the notion of ‘global education policy field’ is pertinent for the objectives of this study:

“Thus, to do effective policy analysis in education today, we need to take account of the pluri-scalar character of educational governance, the tiered nature of political authority in addition to that located nationally. This includes new forms of educational multilateralism, restructured national policy processes, enhanced policy borrowing and transfer, and new regionalisms. Our argument, though, suggests that in addition to these there is the emergence of an as yet inchoate global education policy field, which needs to be added to the conceptual toolbox for doing education policy analysis” (Lingard and Rawolle 2011, p.499)

The flurry of teacher policy activities in the global education policy field is a remarkable development given that the teaching profession traditionally has been constructed as a specialist workforce in service of the nation. The mass provision of education that gained momentum during the 19th century was thus not least motivated by nation-building. With state and sub-national public policy bodies as the main policy actors, mass education has been instrumental to the structuration of the Westphalian world order by its perpetual

efforts to socialize individuals into loyal citizens of modern nation states (Anderson 2006; Green 1990, 1997, 2013; Marshall 1950; Meyer *et al.* 1997; Tröhler *et al.* 2011). Connell (1995) argues that for the bulk of twentieth century, except for some periods characterised by relative activism, the teaching workforce could be seen as being engaged in ‘territorializing practices’ sustaining social, cultural and economic reproduction. In this respect, teachers have tended to constitute a predictable conservative force on behalf of a class power not their own, but of the upper classes and their cultural capital.

School teachers are part of what continues to be a growing education sector in most countries. The education sector is part of the labour market sphere of reproduction, *“engaged with the maintenance of the physical and social infrastructure necessary to support the further development of capital accumulation and to guarantee the next generation of labour”* (Doogan 2009, p.98). The teaching profession constitutes a considerable part of the labour force. For example, in the European Union, primary and secondary teachers make up around two percent of the labour force (Eurydice 2013, p.89). Globally, the education sector currently accounts for 4.4% of total employment, and the sector is projected to continue its creation of jobs with around 1.8% over 2015-2020 (ILO 2013, p.55; ILO 2015b). Teacher salaries are the main post on education budgets. For OECD countries on average, teacher salaries currently account for around 62% of expenditure by educational institutions (OECD 2012a). Moreover, the stakes in the politics of education and teacher policy are high in a long-term perspective because the social production of capacities for labour has implications for labour markets and hence the workings of economies and societies (Connell 1995; Doogan 2009; Robertson 2000).

The teaching profession is thus at the crux of the sociology and political economy of education. There is consensus that ground-breaking education reforms since the 1980s have swept across most OECD countries and beyond with profound implications also for teachers. These reforms reflected the shift towards neo-liberal marketisation and new public management in the wake of the global recession in the 1970s. Across public policy sectors, the shift entailed that results-driven accountability replaced previous accountability systems relying on compliance with regulations and adherence to professional norms. Regulations

and professional norms hence became subordinated to the higher purpose of standards-based performance. Reforms instituted markets in education through standard-setting, assessment, monitoring and publication of performance and consumer choice between schools. Accordingly, outcomes-based evaluation and the identification and dissemination of 'best practices' came to be key governance instruments (Anderson 2005; Carney 2009; Gustafsson 2008; Hood 1995; Hood and Margetts 2007; Mudge 2008; Rizvi and Lingard 2010, pp.117-118; Scheerens *et al.* 2003, p.5).

Specifically with regard to the teaching profession, the reforms, with their calls for 'personalised learning' and 'inclusion', have involved revisions of earlier 'progressive' ideals of teacher professionalism which emerged during the 1960s, such as the 'reflexive practitioner' and the 'critical pedagogue'. In many countries, the individual teacher was hence re-conceived as a 'facilitator' of student learning while simultaneously being framed in her or his work by prescribed performance standards and objectives often presented as related to national competitiveness in the global economy. On school level, teachers were as individuals and team players meant to enhance the school's competitiveness in a decentralised educational marketplace where privatization and corporate management ideas are promoted as a means of innovation. Finally, the focus on performance and the publication of results, e.g. from national tests and PISA, mean that the work of teachers is increasingly the subject of political and public debate (Ball 2012; Connell 1995; Connell 2009; Robertson 2000; Robertson 2012a; Seddon *et al.* 2013). This has not least been reinforced by the oft-cited finding (e.g. OECD 2005) that the 'quality of teaching' constitutes the most important 'in-school factor' for student learning outcomes. This feeds into the argument that teaching is *the* issue in education, because it is more open to influence than the more important factors of social background and abilities of students. Connell (2009, p.225, original emphasis) argues that this is an "*extraordinarily blinkered perspective. Social background and student abilities are open to change, and can be changed on a very large scale. It is a question of how a society's resources are deployed – what collective decisions are made about social steering.*"

It is important to point out that education is one of the most labour-intensive sectors, and it seems that it will continue to be so also for the foreseeable future. Overall, there will be a hollowing out of jobs needing medium levels of skill for routine tasks that can be automated. However, human-to-human interaction requiring social intelligence and judgment remains in demand in production and labour markets, while routine tasks are not. There are hence not any strong indications that teaching in schools is about to be automated. However, the nature of teachers' work is likely to change due to technological developments as improved user interfaces and algorithms building upon big data are transforming the education sector (Frey and Osborne 2013; ILO 2015a).

3.2.3. Australia, England and Finland: OECD relations and general system features

First of all, we should note that all three countries are long time members of the OECD. England, as part of UK, was a founding member in 1961. Finland joined in 1969, and Australia in 1971. However, their relations with the OECD have followed different trajectories and had various impact in the countries.

Australia

In Australia, relations with OECD are shaped by the federal political structure of the country. The Australian Constitution establishes that responsibility for the primary and secondary education sectors are devolved to the eight states and territories. However, during the last decades, the federal level has engaged increasingly with education (COAG 2008; Lingard 2010). Australia is a liberal market economy (Hall and Soskice 2001; Schneider and Paunescu 2011; Swank 2005). Historically, education reform has been influenced by developments in United Kingdom (especially England), and the current accountability agenda have been borrowed from the USA. In recent years, there has been a drive towards 'looking East' toward East Asia for new reference societies such as Shanghai (Lingard 2010; Sellar and Lingard 2013b).

Australia took part in both TALIS 2008 and TALIS 2013, in a context where the quality of teaching was a major focus across the country. During the 2000s, there were calls for a 'competent teacher' model centred on check-lists of competencies, and national professional standards and performance frameworks were introduced from 2011 onwards,

prepared by the Australian Institute for Teaching and School Leadership (AITSL). AITSL was launched in 2005 by the Australian Government (AITSL 2011; AITSL 2012; Connell 2009). Since becoming an OECD member in 1971, Australian state authorities have been engaged in maintaining strong relations with the OECD (Henry *et al.* 2001; Duke 2003). Participation in PISA has contributed to the strong focus on student performance, standards and accountability. The recently introduced testing framework of The National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN), later accompanied by a ‘My School’ website, are some of the manifestations of the strengthened presence of the federal level in education policy. The My School website lists test results for all Australian schools and additional comparative data. Teacher unions and educators have been opposed to the publication of school performance data due to the potential for ‘naming’ and ‘shaming’ schools and likely negative effects for curricula and pedagogy. The NAPLAN tests have effectively become high-stakes due to the attention given to performance by the media, policy-makers and the public (Lingard 2010).

England

England represents another liberal market economy. The school system stands out in Europe as one of the most liberalised, marketised and competition-oriented school systems, with relatively high levels of private sector participation in education. Domestic education policy reform has had a global impact from the 1980s, with marketisation and new public management as the main elements (Ball 1990, 2007). Political debate has been dominated by a focus on raising attainment, and from the 2000s on the use of ‘sound evidence’ in policy formation (Clegg 2005). These priorities correspond with the OECD’s work, and comparison with other major economies is understood as imperative. In this respect, the OECD is the preferred agency due to its technical competence and expertise in delivering comparative research with a high degree of commensurability. The OECD’s ability to brand programmes such as PISA that create high levels of media attention also adds to their appeal (Grek 2012; Thomas *et al.* 2016).

However, the use of international comparative research in education policy has been criticised for being selective, opportunistic and ideological (Alexander 2011; Ball 2008; Goldstein 2008; Mansell 2007). On the same grounds and for the persistently high levels of

inequality, the English school system has attracted critique from the OECD Director for Education (Schleicher 2012). Working conditions for teachers in England have also been the subject of critique. The emphasis on evaluation and competition has resulted in loss of professional autonomy, erosion of trust, and has affected teachers' job satisfaction negatively. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the teaching profession has been required to comply with a high level of formal standardisation in a performative work environment fuelled by high-stakes testing frameworks, league tables, and external accountability measures that are set by the national inspection agency Ofsted. Moreover, performance standards for teachers at various career stages were introduced in 2007 (Alexander 2011; Ball 2006; Ball 2008; Mansell 2007; Stevenson and Wood 2009). In addition, the number of teaching assistants in England has virtually exploded since the 2000s. This is exceptional in a European context (Blatchford *et al.* 2012; Micklewright *et al.* 2014, p.44). While teacher unions in England (the main ones being NUT and NASUWT) appear strong in terms of the rate of unionisation among teachers, industrial relations with government have not been stable for the past decades. The fact that teacher unions remain divided arguably complicates the development of such relations (Stevenson and Carter 2009). With the strong drive towards data-driven teaching and learning and a shift towards private provision with the Academies movement, the contemporary English school system appears system-less by design; it is fragmented, uneven and excluding compared with the post-war period. Its main feature is an opaque complexity, and in the eyes of some commentators, might best be conceived as a system only held together by the management and flow of data (Lawn 2013; Ozga 2009).

Finland

In a major anthology about education and knowledge-based economies, Finland was presented in the following way: *"Finland has been at or near the top of several international competitiveness ratings for several years and is an exemplary case of a small, open KBE. Terhi Nokkala's chapter explores the background to this economic miracle, based on a transition from an extractive economy to a competitive KBE ..."* (Jessop 2008, p.7). Finland has since 2000 enjoyed a status as global 'reference society' due to high PISA scores in literacies performance as well as equality measures (Aúren and Joshi 2016). This is a paradox because Finland is one of the OECD members that to the least extent follows the

OECD's policy recommendations in school policy (Sahlberg 2011; Simola 2005). In the area of higher education, Finland has been much more 'eager to comply' with the recommendations of the OECD and the EU (Kallo 2009; Rinne *et al.* 2004; Rinne 2008). The Finnish school system is embedded in a equality-oriented Nordic welfare regime (Arnesen and Lundahl 2006; Henriksson *et al.* 2006; Kettunen 2001; Telhaug *et al.* 2006). From the 2000s, there has been a tension between the national-level pursuit of international acceptance in the OECD and the EU, and deep-rooted path-dependence on traditional social-democratic and agrarian egalitarianism in education practices and local management. New public management and neoliberal reform discourses are thus present in official government rhetoric, yet locally there is strong resistance against national testing frameworks and publication of school results (Rinne *et al.* 2002; Varjo *et al.* 2013).

Finland's participation in TALIS 2013 is interesting because teachers and teacher education in Finland are globally recognised. The profession enjoys a high status in society and high levels of professional autonomy and trust in a school system with little inter-school competition, no external accountability measures or inspection agency, and only national exams at the end of compulsory education (Silander and Välijärvi 2013; Simola 2005; Varjo *et al.* 2013). Moreover, while the collective organisation of workers took place relatively late in Finland compared to the other Nordic countries (Kettunen 2001; Telhaug *et al.* 2006), the national teacher union OAJ, the Trade Union of Education, is exceptionally strong with over 95 percent of teachers being members. In parallel to the tension between official political rhetoric on the national level and school practices, the current debate on teacher education also reflects a diversity of views. There are two competing discourses: i) an accommodation culture that rejects radical reform and emphasizes the importance of school subject studies and contact lessons; and ii) a reform culture which seeks a conscious break with tradition and emphasizes the ideas of research-based knowledge (Säntti *et al.* 2014).

3.2.4. The rise of the OECD and the knowledge-based economy

In the initial theorisation of what has made the TALIS programme possible, the literature points to two interrelated factors that stand out: i) the rise of the OECD in global educational governance has made TALIS possible and made it what it is; and ii) the idea of a

'knowledge-based economy' has during the past 20 years underpinned OECD work on education and teachers.

OECD was founded in 1960 with 20 countries signing the OECD Convention (OECD 1960; see Appendix B). The organisation was from the beginning engaged in education, and as its name suggests, the OECD activities in education have always had a primary focus on the economic aspects of education (Halsey 1961; Henry *et al.* 2001; Lawn and Grek 2012; Papadopoulos 1994; Rizvi and Lingard 2010; Valiente 2014). Papadopoulos (1994, p.33) points out that since the 1960s, the OECD has endorsed the educational philosophy that economic growth and social progress complement each other and one cannot be achieved without the other; *"... increased manpower needs of the economy translated into the right of all individuals to have access to education, and the issue of social objectives of education, the role of education as the major culture-forming instrument of society, and for individual development"*. This twin concern with education brought out the potential conflict between the social and economic objectives of education.

In the 1960s and 1970s, work by Becker (1964), Schultz (1961), and Denison (1967) centred around "human capital", "manpower", "residual factor", and "education planning" were prevalent in OECD education work. These notions have since proved hugely influential since they expanded the economic interest in education from merely compulsory education to the human capital generated by whole education systems and societies. Moreover, education became transformed into an investment for the state and was therefore given more attention by politicians, civil servants, and scholars.

With regard to teachers, OECD has since the 1960s acknowledged their importance in educational reform (Papadopoulos 1994). Initially, the interest was centred on science and 'new mathematics' curricula and teaching; the recruitment and training of teachers; and encouraging use of television, radio and films in teaching. With regard to the latter, Papadopoulos (1994, p.30) notes that the OECD was not successful in communicating that message, *"... with the result that for many years to come teachers, and their organisations,*

remained in the majority suspicious that the objective was to replace them rather than provide enrichment to their tasks”.

Together with UNESCO, the OECD was during the 1960s and 1970s at the forefront in disseminating and applying what Resnik (2006) labels the ‘education-economic growth black box’ (see for example OECD 1965a). Accordingly, UNESCO and OECD recommended that their member states create permanent educational planning bodies to reorient education so as to encompass economic motives. In the 1960s, all 22 OECD member states participated in educational planning projects. Thereby, UNESCO and the OECD contributed to increasing the scientific relevance and credibility of the neoclassical and econometric economics of education which, due to its methodology, was an uncertain and controversial subdiscipline in the academic field of economics (Lawn and Grek 2012; Resnik 2006).

During this period, international cooperation on education and other policy areas were influenced by the bipolar global politics and inter-imperialist rivalries of the Cold War period, with state socialism in the Soviet bloc opposed to a capitalist liberal democracy bloc dominated by the US. There was thus a strategic interest and scientific contest attached to the policy area of education, as epitomised by the Sputnik shock in 1957 and the response to prioritise science education (Henry *et al.* 2001; Lawn and Grek 2012; Martens 2007; Papadopoulos 1994; Rizvi and Lingard 2010; Tröhler 2013). This provided the background for the pioneering work in cross-national testing and comparison undertaken by the IEA during the 1960s (Papadopoulos 1994).

Mundy (2007) points out that there were two key arenas in the field, educational development and multilateral standard-setting. First, educational development focused on supporting the expansion of educational systems in newly independent states of the south, based on the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the call for a universal right to education. OECD countries were committed to universal and public provision of education as the alternative to the direct redistribution promised by the socialist ‘Other’. Much of this work took place through bilateral aid organizations, yet the UN and the World Bank played a crucial role in promoting a normative understanding modelled on the western world among

bilateral donor governments as well as recipient governments of what educational development should be like in terms of levels, inputs, processes and results. The second arena was associated with standard-setting multilateralism which was mandated to UNESCO. This entailed the sharing of information across UN member states, based on the liberal internationalist ideal of creating equality of opportunity through enhanced provision of education. UNESCO remained the main agency for international education statistics until the end of the 1980s, and UN organisations played a central role in both educational development and multilateral standard-setting until the 1990s.

However, the OECD model of multilateral standardsetting had already from the mid-1970s spread rapidly through the construction of mechanisms within emergent regional intergovernmental organisations, and from the mid-1990s the OECD has become one of the most influential policy actors in global educational governance. Much of the OECD's success has relied on its capacity to coin and solidify concepts such as the 'knowledge-based economy' and turn them into buzzwords through the publication of analyses and reports based on empirical data. In this way, the OECD has created a global meta-policy consensus centred on the economistic framing of education policy (Dale and Robertson 2002; Godin 2006; Lingard and Rawolle 2011; Papadopoulos 1994; Sellar and Lingard 2013a). Drawing on 'new growth theory', *The Knowledge-based Economy* (OECD 1996, p.3) posited that "*OECD economies are increasingly based on knowledge and information*", and that the "*term 'knowledge-based economy' stems from the fuller recognition of the place of knowledge and technology in modern OECD economies*". The identification of 'best practices' for the knowledge-based economy is stated as a focal point of OECD work associated with science, technology and industry. In this respect, knowledge-based economies rely on the growing codification and transmission of knowledge.

A body of critical literature discusses what we might call the colonisation of social sciences, including education research, by economics (Dore 1976; Fourcade *et al.* 2014; Robertson 2009; Wolf 2002, 2004). The discipline of economics has evolved over time; 'mainstream economics' has embraced different paradigms. Thus, attempts in the 1960s by Denison and others to connect education directly to Gross National Product (GNP) proved too

speculative. It was only when 'new growth theory' emerged in the 1990s that the debate on the relation between education, innovation and economic growth was renewed. New growth theory entailed a broader vision of education's contribution to growth, not merely in terms of worker productivity, but also through a variety of mechanisms and externalities, such as innovation and knowledge. However, empirically this orientation has also proven extremely difficult to model in mathematical terms. For example, there is no agreement on how to measure the stock or flow of human capital in a country, though there are efforts to represent innovation through a range of proxies, such as publications, patents, and PISA scores. Nevertheless the results of the empirical research estimating impacts of education on GNP tends to be idiosyncratic, unstable, and inconsistent (Klees 2016).

There were two dimensions to the rise of the OECD in global educational governance, one internal to the organisation, and one concerning the position of the organisation in the wider policy space. First, education was not a central area of interest for the OECD until the 1990s. However, along with the organisation's promotion of the notion of the knowledge-based economy, new growth theory was useful both in articulating an economic discourse in education while defending high levels of spending on education for economic development and innovation (Robertson 2009).

This proved an effective strategy for profiling the OECD externally as well as positioning education internally at the centre of the organisation's policy agenda. PISA was launched in 2000, and a separate Directorate for Education and Skills was established in 2002. The continued predominance of the renovated human capital approach, renewed by new growth theory, in the work of the OECD Directorate for Education and Skills might hence said to be strategically as well as ideologically motivated (Henry *et al.* 2001; Valiente 2014). Yet, it would be misleading to present the OECD as monolithic; that is, as a completely unified and streamlined organisation, and, even worse, as operating wholly as a supranational organisation. Formally, the OECD continues to be piloted by its member states, and technically, national governments are the gatekeepers of the issues that enter the organisation. They also finance the activities, and in meetings their representatives far outnumber those of the OECD (Carroll and Kellow 2011; Woodward 2009, pp.60-61).

Second, some larger states from the 1990 – by the end of the Cold War - appeared to prioritise other fora such as the G7 over the OECD. Hence, the OECD has had to cultivate new projects to attract the commitment and funding of member countries and beyond (Carroll and Kellow 2011; Tröhler 2013; Woodward 2009, pp.60-61). OECD pursued this by developing indicators targeting the comparability of education outputs, or student learning outcomes, and the effects of underlying political decisions. While this form of quantification is less robust from a methodological point of view, the shift enabled OECD to overtake UNESCO - which throughout the 1990s continued to focus its activities on access and the development of mass education – as the main agency for indicators and statistics in education (Cussó and D’Amico 2005; Gustafsson 2008; Heyneman 1999; Mundy 2007; Rutkowski 2007).

This ‘learning shift’ required the development of indicators and performance criteria to be applied in external assessments, with the OECD PISA programme being the most obvious manifestation. The performance mode of comparability supports more normative assessments of education systems and policy recommendations of ‘best practices’. The ‘learning shift’ has proved hugely influential globally, with constitutive effects reconstructing the social realities of education towards the emphasis on standardised measures of student learning outcomes. Hence, there is a global alignment politically that education first of all serves to sustain economic growth and competitiveness in the global marketplace (Cussó and D’Amico 2005; Smith 2016; Volante 2016).

A putative ‘global learning crisis’ (UNESCO 2014) further legitimates the diffusion of this orientation towards quantification to developing countries, epitomised by the recent shift from ‘access’ towards ‘learning outcomes’ and ‘quality education’ in the SDG (Languille 2014). This has allowed OECD to begin targeting middle- and low income non-member countries with the programme PISA for Development and a global Skills Strategy based on one-size-fits-all productivist models of development (OECD 2015b; Valiente 2014).

Desrosières (2010) argues that shifts in modes of quantifying the social order tend to take place during a socio-economic crisis. Crises are thus both represented by statistical

indicators as well as the source of major changes in indicators and systems of observation. The crisis underpinning the ‘learning shift’ in the OECD’s orientation toward quantification can be traced to the US and the National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE 1983) which stressed the need to develop international comparisons of students’ learning achievement and of the efficiency of education systems in order to assess the position of the US internationally, and as a basis for reform of the curriculum, assessment frameworks, and teacher policy (Cusso and D’Amico 2005). Subsequently, the OECD launched an initiative in the area after pressure from the US Department of Education which made a financial contribution to help get it started. Considering that the US is a main funder of the OECD, and that the organisation itself can be traced to the US-financed Marshall Plan for post-World War II Europe, the influence of developments in the US on the OECD agenda is hardly surprising. After all, the US has had a leading role in the major economic, social and cultural developments after World War II (Gindin and Panitch 2012; Henry *et al.* 2001; Martens 2007; Mundy 2007; Papadopoulos 1994, p.209; Streeck 2014, p.xii).

3.2.5. Imaginable mechanisms: Soft law and comparative research as policy tool

The literature points to two overlapping mechanisms that shape global educational governance. These are soft law and the use of comparative research in policy formation. Both are addressed in Rutkowski’s (2007; see also Morgan and Shahjahan 2014) argument concerning how intergovernmental organisations influence education policy towards global ‘soft convergence’ through four ‘constructions’:

1. A multilateral space for ‘soft laws’ to be formed, ratified, and to some extent enforced
2. The means to implement policy through loans and grants
3. A multilateral space to create and exchange policy knowledge
4. The concept of being experts in measuring and evaluating educational policy

In the context of the TALIS programme, the construct of loans and grants does not appear relevant as a mechanism, though the EC financial support taking part in TALIS needs to be held in mind. The two latter constructs are merged in the section below on comparative research as policy instrument, because if the multilateral space is to be effective in allowing

the intergovernmental organisation to be influential, the space needs to include staff from that organisation with the status of 'expert'.

Concerning soft law, Rutkowski (2007) points out that intergovernmental organisations were originally constructed to provide nations with a forum to work multilaterally, and they continue to be obliged to do so. In addition, intergovernmental organisations work at influencing policy agendas so that the local, national, and global converge into the acceptance of a similar policy. In this respect, 'soft law' is a powerful tool to influence global, national, and local agendas. In a context where it is difficult to find common ground amongst a variety of nations with often opposing agendas, intergovernmental organisations tend not to be given a mandate to create 'hard law'. In most international law, and especially in education, enforcement is not achieved by overt force but comes from the peer pressure that states put upon one another.

Dale (2013) elaborates that mechanisms, or logics of intervention, in contemporary global educational governance tend to set conditions for change through soft law. In the EU, the principle of subsidiarity puts constraints on the sort of interventions that can be launched by the executive arm – the European Commission. In education, policy development has to be undertaken under the Open Method of Coordination, without formal legal obligations for member states to comply with recommendations (Caena 2014).

Likewise, the OECD operates through an open method of coordination. The intergovernmental structure of the OECD has been a significant factor in the organisation's capacity to exert soft power in member countries and beyond (Carroll and Kellow 2011; McGaw 2008; Woodward 2009). Specifically, Sellar and Lingard (2013a) argue, building on Woodward's (2009) typology of OECD governance modes, that 'infrastructural governance' is key to the OECD exercise of agency, enabled by the international networks and systems the OECD has established to collect and compare statistical data in education. Another important mode is 'epistemological governance' which concerns the OECD's capacity to shape the views of key actors in education across scales through peer reviews, comparative research, and recommendations.

Concerning comparative research as policy instrument, national governments today look to international agencies for comparative data as means for a 'global eye' on education systems to complement a 'national eye' based on domestic databases. The emphasis on 'competitive comparison' of performance as established by external assessments and the ongoing search for 'best practices' mean that a new normativity and strategic role has become attached to education (Martens 2007; Novoa and Yariv-Mashal 2003; Robertson 2012).

Indicators ...

1. ... make general comments
2. ... an indicator's value expresses a quantity
3. ... can only be classified by statistics when there is a standard or criterion against which the indicator can be judged
4. ... describe conditions that can be improved
5. ... indicators' values are time-specific
6. ... are often understood as a basic unit in theory development
7. ... are constructed for a specific purpose
8. ... encompass underlying assumptions
9. ... are simply one source of understanding a larger issue
10. ... are often based on estimates, which contain error

Table 16. What are indicators and what do they do?

Rutkowski (2007) argues that the construction of a multilateral space to create and exchange policy knowledge enables intergovernmental organisations to influence policy. In this space, the organisation is placed as a nodal point in the flow of information and its own knowledge products can therefore be circulated widely. The power inherent in creating such knowledge is enormous considering that such knowledge feeds into policy formation. In recent decades, such policy knowledge have increasingly become based on statistics and indicators. Rutkowski notes that a 'structured oligopoly' controls the production, reproduction, and distribution of policy knowledge in the form of educational indicators. Only three organizations are thus tasked with collecting and distributing all national comparable educational indicators. The OECD collects for OECD countries, EUROSTAT for non-OECD EU countries, and UNESCO for the remainder. While the three organisations tend not to deny access to their indicators, the amount of information is overwhelming and their

use requires specialized skills. Rutkowski (2008, p.471) outlines ten helpful points for understanding the nature, or *social ontology*, of indicators (see Table 16).

OECD's conceptual framing of policy issues has been accompanied by empirical, 'objective', content in the form of statistics and indicators partly generated through the OECD's own programmes. In education, we can thus identify an integration in terms of standard-setting since the 1990s with the rise of the OECD as the main force in indicators development, the collection of international education statistics, as well as international large-scale assessments (Henry *et al.* 2001; Lawn and Grek 2012; Martens 2007; Rizvi and Lingard 2010). International education statistics and large-scale assessment programmes have thus increasingly become two sides of the same coin. Combined, they establish conditionalities for the exchange of education policy ideas, and as such, they have globalising effects. In particular, the emphasis on student learning outcomes acts as a mechanism for the incremental patterning of the global educational policy field centred round competitive comparison (Cusso and D'Amico 2005). A crucial element here is the identification of important 'reference societies' or 'comparator nations' highlighted for their exceptional performance. Thereby, exchange with historically-based reference societies might be challenged (Lingard and Rawolle 2011).

The creation of a cognate 'epistemic community' with recognised expertise continues to grant legitimacy to OECD work (Carroll and Kellow 2011; Haas 1992; Kallo 2009; Lingard and Rawolle 2011; Rutkowski 2007). Morgan and Shahjahan (2014) argue that the early stages of test production are significant sites in which the global governance of education is legitimated and enacted. Once intergovernmental organisations are conceptualized as 'knowledge mediators', they are actually engaged in a process of 'brokering' meanings. The ability to broker meanings is what provides organisations like the OECD legitimacy in creating and exchanging policy knowledge (Henry *et al.* 2001, p.57). Kallo (2009) suggests that the OECD works as a *de facto* transnational policy actor due to its central role in creating epistemic communities that work across global and national scales, including researchers as well as government officials. Rutkowski (2007) points out that as PISA grows in popularity, for example, so does the reputation of the OECD as an expert in international

evaluation - regardless of the legitimacy, or validity, of the evaluation. Hence, the very construction of being *acknowledged* as an expert is more important to the OECD's shaping of global educational policy than the quality of the research. Certainly, OECD programmes such as PISA have attracted critique for methodological flaws, exaggerated truth claims, and implicit political agendas (Goldstein 2004; Goldstein 2008; Gustafsson 2008; Hopmann *et al.* 2007; Klees 2016; Nardi 2008; Prais 2003; Rutkowski and Delandshere 2016; Torrance 2009).

Specifically about TALIS and the concept of teacher professionalisation promoted by the OECD, Fraser and Smith (forthcoming) argue that the scientific validation of the organisation's recommendations on teacher policy, deeply engrained in notions of human capital development, is sustained by country reviews and the invitation to participate in PISA and TALIS. Likewise, Rinne and Ozga (2013) argue that TALIS is yet another expression of the drive towards competitive comparison in global educational governance. Like PISA, TALIS acts as a "Knowledge-Based Regulation Tool", based on codification of knowledge through indicators development and standard-setting, that the OECD has developed to extend a particular governing logic which seeks to appear objective, natural and self-evident, and thus appealing to those state governments on whose support the OECD relies. However, in terms of research design, TALIS the survey is very different from PISA the assessment. Rinne and Ozga are skeptical whether TALIS will prove as influential in setting the political agenda globally. TALIS, as a Knowledge-Based Regulation Tool, is vague and hard to control because it cannot offer strong conclusions on the relation between what teachers and school leaders report and system performance as measured by student learning outcomes. More generally, Rinne and Ozga argue that the complexity of results are hard to reconcile with knowledge codification and standard-setting as a basis for identifying 'best practices' and policy recommendations. In this way, Rinne and Ozga (2013) highlight that the relation between the OECD PISA and TALIS programmes needs to be clarified, including what the international option of the TALIS-PISA link represents in that respect.

Sobe (2013) argues that OECD through TALIS aspires to construct 'one-world-ness' and an alleged 'global reality of teacher professionalism' largely decoupled from the actual practices of teaching in very different social, cultural and material contexts. Still, TALIS might

have wide-ranging political implications in terms of the nature of teachers' working conditions, organisation, knowledge-base, and pedagogical practices because the programme might act as a 'scopic system' (Knorr Cetina 2006, 2008). This means that it brings together a vast array of activities, interests and events on-to one shared surface and thus forms a sort of projected reality. In the perspective of this thesis, the key issue is whether, or the degree to which, TALIS succeeds in generating a global reflex system that participants become oriented towards and respond to.

In summary, there is consensus that TALIS forms part of a tendency characterised by three features: i) The scope and number of activities in the field of global educational governance are intensifying, and teachers are high on the agenda; ii) the interest in teachers is driven by economic motives, centred round the notions of human capital and knowledge-based economies; and iii) soft law and comparative research based on statistics and indicators are two mechanisms constituting the global education policy field.

3.3. Analytical Resolution

This section conducts an analytical resolution of the chapter's literature reviews by dissolving the complex issue of 'what are we looking at?' by distinguishing various components and aspects to be taken further in the subsequent stage of abduction. In terms of what TALIS does, the chapter showed that i) TALIS is an ongoing programme conceived and promoted by the OECD to member countries and increasingly beyond; and ii) the research design, objectives, and policy themes of TALIS are characterised by a strong sense of continuity since its initial conception in the mid-2000s in the wake of the major OECD teacher policy review. The features of the programme prompt several questions as to the reasons for engagement, strategies, and uses of TALIS results on the side of national governments, TUAC, the EC, and the OECD. In particular, the international option of the TALIS-PISA link raises several questions concerning whether TALIS is (becoming) framed by PISA, the methodological issues involved, and the reasons, strategies, and uses of results by those engaging with the link. The description also showed that Australia, England and Finland have chosen their own ways in engaging with the programme.




Figure 6. Substantial and internal relations in the OECD TALIS programme

These questions were deepened by the reviews concerning what has made TALIS possible, and made it what it is. There is only little critical literature on the programme, yet the existing evidence highlights the need to contextualise TALIS in global educational governance. The initial theorisation of the substantial internal relations of the programme showed that the engagement of the private sector in the TALIS programme needs to be addressed in the empirical inquiry, with BIAC being the most obvious actor to consider. We also learnt that EI and ETUCE were engaged in TALIS through TUAC. Moreover, the EC stand out as a cooperation partner for the OECD in funding large parts of the programme and incentivising EU member states to take part. However, we overall know little about the reasons amongst actors engaged in TALIS, their strategies and uses of results. This also

applies to national governments, including those in Australia, England and Finland, and how the substantial internal relations of TALIS were extended to include actors in those particular countries. In preparing for abduction, we might redraw the model of substantial internal relations of the TALIS programme (Figure 4). Tentatively, I distinguish between centre and periphery (see Figure 6). The centre consists of organisations and bodies that according to the OECD are involved in the conception, design and implementation of TALIS (OECD 2009a, pp.303-305; OECD 2014a, pp.434-436; OECD 2012b). In the periphery, we find other organisations identified in the literature to be active in the policy area. These include official OECD partners the World Bank, and the International Labour Organization, as well as the major private sector policy actors, Pearson Education, McKinsey & Company, the Gates Foundation, and BIAC. Finally, the affiliate members of EI are placed in the periphery.

This tentative conception of the causal group engaged in TALIS is important groundwork for explaining the outcome patterns of TALIS and the objects, structures and mechanisms that have made the programme possible and made it what it is. Yet, the figure has very little explanatory power and our knowledge of the nature of the relations between the involved policy actors remains limited. For example, concerning the OECD as an intergovernmental organisation and its relation to state governments, we know that the US country has historically influenced the orientation of the OECD, relative to other countries. However, there is neither evidence in the OECD TALIS reports or in the academic literature about US influence in TALIS. The US did not participate in TALIS 2008 and did not meet the required response rates in TALIS 2013. Rather, it is the partnership between OECD and the EC that stands out.

With regard to the main ideas and arguments underpinning teacher policy internationally, the chapter pointed out that the strong political interest in the teaching profession on an international scale is driven by economic motives, centred around notions of human capital and knowledge-based economies. While the notion of knowledge-based economy has evolved into a paradigm prevalent in the global educational policy field, the existing evidence does not show how this is reflected and contested in the ways that TALIS results

are used in pluri-scalar governance, including in countries such as Australia, England and Finland.

Concerning mechanisms that might have generated the TALIS programme, the chapter focused on soft law and indicators-based comparative research as two imaginable mechanisms. The existing evidence pointed to the issue that TALIS leads to results that are difficult to translate into straightforward 'policy knowledge'. Moreover, we need to clarify the relation between soft law and comparative research, that is, to what extent and in which ways does TALIS act as soft law? In terms of our research agenda, this translates into whether we are able to establish in the domains of the empirical and actual whether the adoption of soft law, and/or comparative research as policy instruments constitute underlying mechanisms that generate particular outcome patterns of the TALIS programme, and in this case whether the mechanisms are triggered, and which contextual conditions are conducive to triggering the mechanisms.

CHAPTER 4. ABDUCTION

4.0. Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the stage of abduction, based on the description and initial theorisation of the TALIS programme in the previous chapter. Abduction, or ‘inference to the best explanation’, serves the purpose of generating theory-laden hypotheses. This chapter hence provides the ‘substantive’ theoretical orientation points for subsequent analysis in Part II. The chapter draws on the research agenda of critical cultural political economy of education (Robertson and Dale 2015) to provide a lever for breaking open the ‘TALIS ensemble’ as a specific manifestation of current globalising processes in educational policy. Methodologically, political discourse analysis focused on practical argumentation (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012) is adopted. I proceed first by introducing CCPEE and political discourse analysis before discussing theoretical interpretations of the TALIS programme. The hypotheses presented at the end of this chapter are the outcome of this theoretical discussion.

4.1. Critical Cultural Political Economy of Education

In recent years, considerable critique (e.g. Carney *et al.* 2012) have been directed at the functionalist and deterministic view of educational governance embraced by the neoinstitutionalists and their influential ‘world polity’, or ‘world culture’, theory (Meyer 1977; Meyer *et al.* 1997). One of the first attempts to outline the basic propositions for a research agenda that moves beyond the dominance of world culture theory on the one hand, and the limits of a political economy approach that ignores the cultural, on the other, is what is referred to as critical cultural political economy of education (CCPEE) (Robertson and Dale 2015).

CCPEE conceives education and social change broadly, based on a critical realist stratified ontology and compatible with an ontology of complex and irreversible becoming. Robertson and Dale (2015) point out that the relationships between globalisation and education are not exclusively associated with political economy or the expansion of capitalism.

Developments in education have and continue to be driven also by cultural and political projects such as nation-building and the human rights movement. In its commitment to understanding that the form and scope of contemporary education provision is mediated by the problems facing capitalist states (Dale 1989), CCPEE builds on Dale's work on the 'globally structured agenda for education' (Dale 2000).

Specifically, Dale argues that the 'core problems of capitalism' frame the agenda of the state, and all its component parts, including education. These problems include supporting the regime of accumulation, ensuring a societal context that does not inhibit its continuing expansion, and providing a basis of legitimation for the system as a whole. It is assumed that these core problems cannot be solved together; rather the solutions to them tend to be contradictory, and these contradictions are what provide the dynamic of educational systems. Moreover, the forms and the relative priorities of the core problems change over time. The ontology of the globally-structured agenda of education hence assumes capitalism – with the expansion of capitalist relations and the search for profit - to be the main causal force in social reality (Dale 2000, p.438). In this respect, the current regime of neo-liberal accumulation contains imperatives for all areas of social life, with education being powerfully affected due its multiple roles in supporting accumulation, maintaining social order, and legitimating the system as a whole (Dale 2005, p.123).

The emergence of the global educational policy field might thus be understood as a 'spatial fix', involving soft power policy instruments, to help resolve the contradictions of capitalism. It is in this context that the 'education ensemble' becomes central as the topic of enquiry; conceived as "*a unity of multiple determinations*", the education ensemble is conceived as emerging from and framing global economic, political and cultural processes, and constituted by elements and internal relations with causal powers emergent from, and irreducible to, its parts (Robertson and Dale 2015, p.150). Accordingly, this thesis conceives as the central topic of enquiry the education ensemble of the OECD TALIS programme, or in short, 'the TALIS ensemble'. The groundwork provided in Chapter 3 presented the main organisations in this ensemble (see Figure 6). According to Robertson and Dale (2015), the central task is to 'break open' the ensemble through analysing what goes on inside of it and

explaining what has made it possible and made it what it is (Robertson and Dale 2015, p.150).

We should here note a particular twin notion of learning associated with the TALIS ensemble. First, as a comparative research programme, TALIS focuses on education, teaching and learning (cf. the policy themes of TALIS). Second, TALIS is meant to generate ‘policy-relevant’ learning processes in participating countries and beyond. In other words, TALIS concerns (policy) ‘learning from comparing’ about education, teaching and learning. As a unity of multiple determinations, the outcomes of these dimensions of learning at any one point in time are bound to vary in the TALIS ensemble, contingent on cultural, political, and economic factors in distinctive contexts and with particular temporalities. Robertson and Dale (2015) point out that contradictions are generated within the education ensemble due to the logics, interests, and forms of authority of involved policy actors. Hence, we might expect that learning is contested in a double sense in the TALIS ensemble, reflecting various approaches to navigating and negotiating the core problems of accumulation, social order and legitimation (Dale 2000, p.437). We can take this train of thought further with Connell (1995):

“At the core of education is the creation of a network of workers and practices that sustains this second order learning capacity for both the individual members and for the collectivity. I emphasise ‘for the collectivity’ since educators talk mainly locates ‘learning how to learn’ in the development of the individual. But this means nothing if it is not sustained also as a collective property of the social world that the individual is entering. (Connell 1995, pp.97–98)

This pinpoints the important quality of education as a collective property of the social world. In this sense, the TALIS ensemble represents education as a “*complex collective construction of the social world*” (Robertson and Dale 2015, p.155, original emphasis), concerned with formal education, teaching and learning in schools, as well as policy learning from comparing. Both are collective properties of the social world, and the TALIS ensemble is part of their collective construction, prone also to the core problems of capitalism and their inherent contradictions. The next sub-section goes further into this issue by making the case for drawing on political discourse analysis in pursuing the CCPEE research agenda.

4.2. Political Discourse and Practical Argumentation

The analysis of political discourse as practical argumentation provides a fruitful entry point for breaking open education ensembles. This might especially be the case with regard to TALIS and other ‘persuasive’ policy instruments which form part of the soft law regime in global education governance. In a context without hard legislation, we might hypothesise that practical argumentation becomes all the more important. The introduction of the analysis of political discourse as practical argumentation also allows for the discussion of the ontology of the political field and various conceptions of power, the notion at the heart of political analysis.

The field of discourse studies emerged in the 1960s as various forms of discourse analysis were developed and applied within the social sciences. ‘Discourse analysis’ might be defined very broadly as an umbrella term for denoting an interdisciplinary set of qualitative approaches used to study talk and text in social life (Lester *et al.* 2016). This thesis adopts the approach to critical discourse analysis advocated by Isabela and Norman Fairclough (2012, see also Fairclough and Fairclough, 2013, 2015; Isabela Fairclough 2014, 2015; Norman Fairclough 2013; Ietcu 2006) to analyse the discourses of the TALIS ensemble. This approach is explicitly focused on the political field and the analysis of *political* discourse. Drawing on van Dijk (1997) and Fairclough (2003), Fairclough and Fairclough (2012, p.17, original emphasis) define political discourse analysis as *“the analysis of political discourse from a critical perspective that focuses on the reproduction and contestation of political power through political discourse”*. Their entry point is that political activity necessarily has a *“semiotic moment”* (Fairclough 2013, p.194).

On this basis, they have developed an approach to policy analysis that considers linguistics, politics and policy-making as a specific field. In particular, the approach seeks to incorporate the ‘argumentative turn’ in the social sciences (Fischer and Gottweis 2012). Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) build on Hay’s (2002, pp.163-167) point that ideas have a crucial mediating role in the dialectical relationship between strategic agents and their structured contexts, and hence in the causation of political outcomes. Fairclough (2013) sets out the agenda:

“The starting point [...] is the empirical linguistic observation that the primary genre of political discourse is argumentative, specifically practical argumentation. What social actors engaged in political activity and in policy making and debate above all do discursively is argue practically, and, if one is concerned [...] to analyze political, political-economic and policy-making processes in a way that includes the contribution of the agency of social actors to shaping the character and outcomes of these processes, one must surely find ways of analyzing their practical argumentation.” (Fairclough 2013, pp.193-194)

Political analysis can be defined as the analysis of the nature, exercise and distribution of power (Hay 2002, p.168). In their conception of the political field, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) draw on Hay’s (2007, pp.61-78) argument that politics arise in social situations where there is the capacity for agency and choice, and also the capacity for deliberation. The latter concept is emphasised by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) who argue that deliberation is the central genre in the political field because politics *primarily* is about arriving cooperatively at decisions for action on matters of common concern. This normative ideal has been the subject of critique (see Hay 2013), yet it is important to note that Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) stress that political decisions still take the form of an argument even when people and organisations use their power to dominate political processes, and when enhancing or holding onto power is the main reason for action. In other words, they view political decisions as outcomes of deliberation, though not all decisions are reasonable or democratic. This implies that it would be wholly misleading to reduce democratic politics to a search for consensus; deliberation *is* and *ought* to be part of democratic policy formation, but politics takes place in the context of disagreement, conflict of interests and values, incomplete information, power inequalities, unequal access to resources, urgency, and uncertainty with regard to the right course of action and the outcomes (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, pp.14-21, 235-243). This ontology of the political field resembles the “*complex and densely structured institutional environments*” suggested by Colin Hay (2002, p.57). With the thickening of the global educational policy field, centred on the use of soft law and peer pressure, this complexity is deepened.

In this thesis, I do not focus on the processes of deliberation in the TALIS ensemble, as an exchange of political discourses and argumentation, and whether these live up to normative ideals of 'communicative rationality' (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, pp.81-92) or 'deliberative democracy' (Habermas 1984, 1996; Rawls 1971). It would be very interesting to trace such processes of deliberation related to a soft law policy instrument such as TALIS. However, the empirical material underpinning this thesis does not allow insight into such deliberative processes of political action, taking place in and outside of meetings at the OECD and elsewhere. Moreover, meeting materials from the TALIS BPC tend to be confidential, as mentioned earlier. For my objectives, the analysis of political discourse serves the distinctive objective of capturing in a structured manner the practical argumentation of the main actors engaged in the TALIS ensemble, and tracing their variations and similarities over time and across institutional and geographical contexts. This allows for analysing and discussing the meaning-making underpinning TALIS. In this sense, one of the most appealing features of Fairclough and Fairclough's (2012) approach is its capacity to identify and structure the main components going into policy actors' practical argumentation. A crucial point in this respect is that Fairclough and Fairclough (2012, pp.112-115, 237) - elaborating on the concepts of power offered by Lukes (2005) and Searle (2010) - view power as a reason for action in agents' practical reasoning rather than a *substitute* for reasoning. Deliberation and argumentation are hence not opposed to the exercise of power; power may be exercised without 'due deliberation', yet deliberation remains part of decision-making. I find this argument very persuasive, and particularly so in the context of soft law instruments such as TALIS.

Specifically on the ontology of power, Searle (2010) and Lukes (2005) offer valuable insights which appear able to make sense of the internal relations in the TALIS ensemble. First, Searle (2010, pp.145-152) argues that power concerns *capacity* or an *ability*, not actual events; while power is manifest in its exercise, power might exist between human beings or organisations without ever being exercised (through for example the performance of speech acts). This is a pertinent point with regard to soft legalisation which formally tends to be 'consensus-based'. Lukes' (2005) three-dimensional concept of power is related to this idea

of power as a capacity rather than actual and overt exercise. Lukes thus distinguishes between three different dimensions of power, two of which are of an indirect nature:

1. *Overt power* concerns the power to prevail in decision making. It is the most obvious and direct form of political power. Overt power is evident with for example state authorities' mandate to legislate in education.
2. *Covert power* in defining and controlling the agenda around which decisions are made. This is more effective than overt power because covert power determines which issues decisions are to be taken about, thereby deflecting other issues and grievances from the decision-making arena.
3. The *power to shape desires and beliefs* by setting the very 'rules of the game' for how agendas are to be formed and who will be involved. More broadly we may see this as 'preference-shaping' (cf. Hay 2002) of 'what education is about'. This dimension of power helps to deflect conflict as well as grievances. The bias of the system can be mobilised and enforced in ways that reflect social structures and cultural patterns and that may be unintended or unconscious. This third kind of power can be the most insidious, and the least accessible to empirical observation. Despite apparent consensus between the powerful and the powerless, it might induce people to want things opposed to what would benefit them and to fail to want what they would otherwise recognize to be in their real interests (Lukes 2005, pp.14-30).

While the OECD and the EU have not been given the mandate or capacity to exercise overt power in the area of education, the agenda-setting influence of the OECD and of the EU in education during the last two decades has been documented (Caena 2014; Dale 2005; Henry *et al.* 2001; Lawn and Grek 2012; Rinne *et al.* 2004). Moreover, the clearest example of Lukes' third dimension of power is the development of international education statistics, performance indicators and benchmarks, which act to frame what is to be regarded as of importance and value in education systems (Dale 2005, pp.130-131; cf. Rutkowski 2007, 2008).

Hence, the second and third dimensions of power are likely to be at work in TALIS. The constitution of the TALIS ensemble shows that while policy decisions continue also to be taken at a national level, the very issues on which they are taken may have been decided at a different scale, such as in the TALIS BPC. Concerning the third dimension of power, TALIS might provide yet another example of international education statistics, performance indicators and benchmarks which shape policy actors' preferences with regard to the purposes and priorities in education.

4.2.1. The framework for analysing practical argumentation

In critical discourse analysis, discourse is understood as a 'moment' of the political, political-economic and more generally social that is dialectically related to other 'moments'. In critical discourse analysis, 'moment' refers to discursive or semiotic elements as distinctive from extra-semiotic or material elements. As one element of social processes, semiosis is conceived as dialectically related to others, that is, there are different elements to social processes, but these elements are not fully separate or discrete (Fairclough 2013, p.179). It follows that the TALIS ensemble, with its substantial internal relations, should be analysed as a *partly* semiotic object rather than a *purely* semiotic one, with internal relations between semiotic moments and the material. The ensemble internalises semiosis without being reducible to it. The analysis thus needs to identify and explain the internal relations between political discourses and extra-semiotic, material elements in social reality, together constituting the TALIS ensemble.

Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) proceed from a notion of practical argumentation as a social and rational activity comprising dialogical and dialectical social practices of complex speech acts focused on justifying or refuting a claim to persuade interlocutors, that is, reasonable critics, of the acceptability of the argument. We might thus understand practical argumentation as a complex speech act, with a distinctive premise-conclusion structure, as well as an activity that involves discussing reasons and claims as a form of legitimization.

In this sense, the thesis focuses on practical argumentation as a specific pre-genre in the political field that incorporates the semiotic category of discourses. In other words, practical argumentation is a way of political action that includes 'ways of representation'. Fairclough

and Fairclough (2012, pp.86-87) points out that the challenge is to incorporate the analysis of representations into the analysis of practical argumentation *“because ways of representing the world enter as premises into reasoning about what we should do”*.

Practical argumentation forms part of deliberation which is the major genre in the political field. Therefore, practical argumentation is central to individual ‘texts’ (whether spoken, written, electronic or multimodal), related to events in the field. More generally, practical argumentation is also central to the ‘orders of discourse’. ‘Orders of discourse’ are the semiotic dimension of social fields (such as the political field), institutions and organisations, which are constituted by networks of social practices. It should be noted that texts are *shaped* but not *determined* by orders of discourse. Yet, when texts are unconventional, they may well constitute semiotic aspects of social changes taking place in action and behaviour which ultimately might be established as changes in social practices and in orders of discourse (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, pp.82-85).

In critical realist terms, practical argumentation is thus related to the domains of the actual and the empirical. On the basis of analysis, we might theorise about underlying mechanisms in the domain of the real. We would expect various policy actors’ use of practical argumentation, including their representation of the world, to be relatively stable. In this respect, it is central to my approach that Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) propose an analytical scheme representing the premise-conclusion structure of practical argumentation in political discourse. They build on insights from Robert Audi (2006) on practical reasoning as a cognitive-motivational structure based on inference, and Douglas Walton (2006, 2007), but they add normative and circumstantial premises as new components based on the notion of ‘deontic modality’ inspired by Searle (2010).

As this scheme provides the framework for the analysis conducted in this thesis, it needs explication. First of all, the premise-conclusion structure of an argument includes a set of statements, one of which is the conclusion (claim) while the others are premises. The framework is based on the assumptions that practical arguments take circumstances and goals as premises; agents combine non-perfect knowledge of their circumstances and goals

with a presumptive means-goal relation that may take them from the circumstances they are in towards their goal, a possible and perhaps desirable future state of affairs. Agents choose certain actions over others in view of the goal and the circumstances they find themselves in; the circumstances, that is, the context of political action, thus restrict the range of actions that can be thought of. Moreover, goals as well as the description of circumstances, are shot through by values. This means that circumstances which provides the context of action as represented by the arguer - are described in ways that fit with the claim that is being made (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, pp.44-46).




Figure 7. The structure of practical argumentation

This leaves us with these basic components which can be arranged in a model (see Figure 7, simplified from Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p.48):

- Claim advocating a course of action (rather than others)
- Value premise includes underlying values and concerns

- Goal premise are informed by possible and perhaps desirable alternative future states of affairs construed in accordance with representations in the circumstantial premise and with underlying values and concerns.
- The circumstantial premise represents and problematises existing states of affairs.
- The means–goal premise involves a conditional form - if a course of action is pursued, it is likely to take us from the existing problematic state of affairs towards the possible and maybe desirable future in line with values (Fairclough 2013, pp.183-184).

A few points need to be spelled out in relation to these components. First, we would generally expect some of the components to be more explicitly formulated than others. If we consider, for example, an OECD report on teacher policy or an EC Communication, we would expect the claims to action to be clear and explicit, as well as the goals and the circumstantial premises, representing the world and the problem to be solved in a particular way. In contrast, values and means-goal premises might be harder to pin down because they would tend to be more implicit and vaguely formulated. They might be present ‘between the lines’ or taken for granted. In this case, complementary documents and interviews might prove helpful in detecting them.

In particular, the means-goal premise concerns causation, implicitly or explicitly based on a theory about social reality and the mechanisms driving it. In this way, it is related to what Pawson (2000) denotes the ‘programme ontology’, consisting of theories about how the proposed claim for action, typically the policy intervention, will bring about the imagined future state of affairs that constitutes the goal. This goes hand in hand with Peters’ (2015, p.5) argument that effective policy design must be based on a ‘model of causation’; that is, a clear conception of socio-economic dynamics that are producing the problem and how to solve it.

The various components in the framework could all feed into a given strategy. Strategies might be more or less sophisticated, for longer or shorter terms, but as consciously prepared plans for action they are oriented towards achieving goals through considering the

context of action, means–goal premises and claims to action. The very representation of circumstances could thus form part of strategy (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Fairclough and Fairclough (2012, pp.242-243) argue that ‘imaginaries’ envisage possible future states of affairs, and hence feature as goals in practical arguments (cf. Jessop’s (2004) cultural political economy). The performative power of these imaginaries depends on the ability and capacity of policy actors in transforming imaginaries from goals into circumstantial premises of action - *that is, to represent what is aimed for as an actual fact* - and gain collective recognition of those imaginaries as ‘facts’.

This is a crucial point. With Lukes’ (2005) three-dimensional concept of power, we would be focusing on whether policy actors would have the capacity to exercise covert power or/and shape desires and beliefs by their ability to achieve collective recognition of what is aimed for as facts. In the analytical framework of political discourse analysis, this would be indicated by the ability to set the agenda and ‘the rules of the game’ in terms of the ‘ways of representation’ in the circumstantial premise, with strong overlaps between this context of action and the goal component.

The issue has been referred to by several writers on neoliberalism and globalisation who argue that ostensibly objective accounts of globalisation often include neoliberal ‘ideological noise’ (Nederveen Pieterse 2009) which might either reinforce the distance between rhetoric and reality or actually serve as drivers in globalisation with their strong future orientation. In other words, representing what is aimed for as facts, they might help to create the institutional realities they purportedly merely describe (Arrighi 2008; Collins 2008; Piven 1995). Whereas a range of policy actors have an interest in doing this, Doogan (2009, pp.80-81) points to incidents where trade unions come to provide ‘left wing harmonies in the neoliberal chorus’ by exaggerating the extent of globalisation, the scope of institutional change and the vulnerability of domestic workforces. This intriguing argument implies that unions, in seeking to strategically represent their circumstances in the context of action, tend to exaggerate the problem to be fought, and as a result these efforts can be counter-productive.

In summary, my objective with adopting this framework is through political discourse analysis to identify the causal effects of orders of discourse, and the dialectical relations, on the one hand, to policy actors as producers and recipients of texts, and on the other hand, to extra-semiotic structures and mechanisms causing change. In order to identify politically significant differences in practical argumentation, we should analyse the ways various policy actors in the TALIS ensemble employ different representations of the world. In education policy, we know that some arguments, for example related to the knowledge-based economy, come to be recurrent across contexts in a relatively durable and stable manner. This indicates that the practical argumentation of the OECD has become 'recontextualised', either straight out 'colonizing' the discourses of other policy actors, or has been 'appropriated' by policy actors to local conditions and their own values and goals. The analysis will clarify how the main policy actors' practical argumentation help constitute the TALIS ensemble. However, doing so requires substantive theoretical resources in order to: i) address the relationship between semiotic and extra-semiotic factors, and ii) go beyond focusing on specific texts in particular events and contexts to the analysis, discussion and explanation of social change (Fairclough 2013). The next sections introduce these theoretical resources.

4.3. Substantive Theories on Mechanisms

For the objective of abduction and formulating hypotheses, this section theorises the mechanisms and internal relations of the TALIS ensemble. The entry point for the analysis in subsequent chapters is the practical argumentation of the main organisations constituting the core of the TALIS ensemble with regard to their claims to action and premises concerning the programme. In other words, the analysis focuses on the political actions these organisations advocate concerning the 'problem' of teachers, their representations of the circumstantial context for these actions, and how this relates to goals, values and the means-goal premise. In making sense of the various practical arguments and addressing the research questions, the section hypothesises that four mechanisms help to explain what has made the TALIS programme possible, what the programme does, and what it means: i) competitive comparison; ii) 'learning as development'; iii) institutional power resources; and iv) soft legalisation.

Chapter 3 pointed out that the OECD from the mid-1990s has been successful in branding 'knowledge-based economy' as the conceptual lens through which economic, societal and educational development could be promoted. The umbrella concept of the knowledge-based economy has been adopted around the world, signalling a convergence in political discourse. However, convergence is a tricky concept since existence of convergence across a variety of sites at one level or in one area (with regard to governance activities, between policy and practice, etc.) does not imply convergence at other levels or areas (Dale 2005, p.122). Chapter 3 thus made evident that teachers' work continue to be embedded in specific national institutional arrangements. The cases of Australia, England and Finland provide examples of this. With complexity theory, we would expect that the school systems in Australia, England and Finland would continue to represent distinctive institutional trajectories, and the outcomes of global political discourses in various settings would remain different. Rather than cross-national convergence of institutional arrangements, the emergence of the global education policy field has thus further added to the level of complexity.

It is remarkable that the education sector has often been deemed so 'special' in comparative political economy that it has been excluded from analysis (Iversen and Stephens 2008), albeit with a few exceptions focusing on vocational and higher education (see Estevez-Abe *et al.* 2001; Thelen 2004; Iversen and Stephens 2008; Schneider *et al.* 2010; Schneider and Paunescu 2011). This is problematic given that learning is precondition for innovation and reproduction of the workforce. The pluri-scalar nature of the TALIS programme further complicates the issue because most literature on comparative political economy remains based on methodological nationalism. The influential 'varieties of capitalism' literature is a case in point (Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 2004). There is much to learn from this literature with the distinction between 'liberal market economies' and 'coordinated market economies' as divergent production regimes, but school systems and education staff are left out of the analysis. Moreover, the empirical basis for the approach has been subject to critique as the binary typology does not appear to explain the complex trajectories of capitalist economies with their unfolding commonalities and differences (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Schneider and Paunescu 2011; Streeck 2010). Rather, I turn

to the notion of ‘competitive comparison’ which appears to capture the major threads outlined in chapter 3 with regard to the implications of the prominence of knowledge-based economy in political discourses globally, including the emphasis on indicators-based comparative research as policy instrument in educational governance.

4.3.1. Competitive comparison

Robertson (2012a) argues that the notion of competitive comparison has replaced international standard- and norm-setting (cf. Mundy 2007) as dominant governance mechanism. Competitive comparison acts as overarching mechanism since it incorporates the three other hypothesised mechanisms. There are four modalities of power at work in competitive comparison as a mechanism:

1. *Hierarchical space*: Competitive comparison provides a spatial framer and lever for allocating status by construing a global hierarchy of performers and underperformers that pitches one country and its teachers against others.
2. *Temporal rhythms*: Competitive comparison is reinforced through regular cycles of data collection which provides space for learning and improvement.
3. *Evaluative trajectories*: Judging the performance of a country in a teacher policy area relies on evaluative and normative definitions of ‘the good teacher’ from which countries and teachers are to learn. Evaluative trajectories invoke the affective through binary categories such as good/bad, better/worse; pride/shame.
4. *Scale*: Embedding competitive comparison in national, regional, and global projects amplifies its effects.

This notion of competitive comparison is related to Rutkowski’s (2007) four constructs by which intergovernmental organisations influence education policy towards global ‘soft convergence’ (in particular the construction of a multilateral space to create and exchange policy knowledge and construction of the concept of being experts in measuring and evaluating educational policy), yet it provides additional points of orientation for empirical inquiry and is less focused on the capacities of intergovernmental organisations. Still, Robertson (2012a) and Rutkowski (2007) agree more or less on agency and outcomes. Robertson argues (2012a) that the adoption of competitive comparison “*is being*

orchestrated by key global agencies” (p.586) and shifts “sovereignty and authority away from the national and the teacher to the global and global actors” (p.602). Rutkowski (2007) posits that while the authority of educational policy continues to lie with the sovereign national state, intergovernmental organisations like the OECD have by operating through the four constructs of ‘soft’ convergence been able to subtly “influence educational policy while avoiding protest from the state regarding national sovereignty in educational decision making” (p.244). Convergence here entails that the intergovernmental organisation work at “influencing and converging policy agendas so that the local, national, and global converge into the acceptance of a similar policy” (p.232).

Moreover, with Sellar and Lingard (2013a), we should note that political discourse is supported by extra-semiotic material factors in the workings of competitive comparison. Hence, OECD has over the decades enhanced its capacity in ‘infrastructural governance’ through building networks and systems collecting and comparing statistical data in education, which is complemented with the OECD capacity in ‘epistemological governance’ concerning the organisation’s capacity to shape the views of key actors in education across scales.

A few remarks substantiate the empirical inquiry of competitive comparison in the TALIS ensemble. First, with regard to hierarchical space, we might expect that the emphasis on ‘the global eye’ (cf. Nóvoa and Yariv-Mashal 2003) expands national authorities’ outlook to emerging ‘reference societies’ or ‘comparator nations’, highlighted for exceptional performance, thereby challenging established notions of these (Lingard and Rawolle 2011). Alexander (2011) argues that the phrase ‘world class’ is almost meaningless in practice in the context of teaching and learning because especially politicians and media selectively highlight some findings from international comparative research at the expense of others.

Second, while competitive comparison is reinforced through temporal rhythms and fixity, the uses of research findings are likely to be tortured by time constraints. Pawson (2002a, p.160; 2002b, p.340) points out that the policy cycle revolves more quickly than the research cycle. The result is that evaluation results tend to have little influence on policy

formation because political priorities and governments might change within the duration of the programme, and the programme might be sidelined for new initiatives. It is thus not often that a full cycle of 'policy-into-research-into-policy' is put into practice.

Third, with regard to the evaluative trajectories, Biesta (2015) in his critique of PISA, argues strongly against the persistence of technological expectations to make education systems 'work' as a deterministic input-output machine for the objective of predictability. He points out that such efforts are likely to curtail: i) the openness of the system in terms of physical structures, the organisation of learning in social groups; ii) the semiosis of the system, including the freedom of interpretation in curriculum and assessment; and iii) the recursivity of the system, that is, the feedback loop enabled by social learning and teachers, students and other actors' interpretation of their role. Evaluative trajectories are related to an emphasis on 'learning as individual development' which forms a separate mechanism elaborated further below.

Fourth, outcomes in terms of scale depend on power relations and governance. Concerning power in the global field of education policy, the outcome patterns of TALIS would appear to reflect tendencies of denationalisation and more generally the pluri-scalar nature of governance in the *"as yet inchoate global education policy field"* (cf. Lingard and Rawolle 2011, p.499). In terms of globalising processes, Sassen (2013, see also Sassen 2003) theorises that TALIS represents a 'denationalisation' of teachers' work. This dialectics entails that two distinct dynamics come together: i) The formation of explicitly global and intergovernmental institutions and processes. Together, these are constitutive of what is typically thought of as global scales; and ii) Processes that take place inside institutional domains which tend to have been constructed in national or sub-national terms. These processes become part of globalisation when they involve networks and formations connecting processes and actors across national boundaries. Denationalisation hence implies that the global, national, and local are not mutually exclusive domains. This corresponds with Dale (1997, 2005) who refers to governance as the 'coordination of the coordination' of the work of governing, often nested in, but not restricted to the national level. Dale argues that we are witnessing a developing functional and scalar division of the

labour of educational governance that cannot be conceived of as a zero-sum game, where the 'national' loses what the 'global' gains, or vice versa. Rather, the nature and functions of the state in the global education policy field are subject to change (Burbules and Torres 2000; Dale 1997; Lingard and Rawolle 2011; Martens 2007; Robertson 2012b; Ryan and Cousins 2009). Currently, state authorities are key players translating international agendas into nationally appropriate forms, with new governance mechanisms enabling it to be present within and across political structures (Dale 2005). At the same time, the state must also negotiate inconvenient and contradictory information since the highly codified forms of knowledge of international surveys like PISA and TALIS are difficult to control, cf. Rinne and Ozga (2013). Furthermore, considering the OECD *PISA-based Test for Schools* which aspires to connect OECD directly with schools (Lewis *et al.* 2016; Rutkowski 2015), the *TALIS Teachers' Guide* (OECD, 2014c) issued in the wake of the TALIS 2013 cycle inevitably leads us to ask whether it represents another attempt to establish substantial relations between OECD, schools and teachers. The dimension of scale is closely associated with the mechanisms of institutional power resources and soft legalisation, both introduced further below.

Fifth, and underlying the notion of competitive comparison, the strong belief in indicators-based statistics as a distinct and dominant form of policy knowledge relies on the assumed objectivity of indicators. Rutkowski (2008, pp.475-478) argues that indicators are persuasive policy instruments for ranking and legitimation that help to renounce fables about education with statistical proofs with which national leaders, staff and entire systems can be held accountable. In this sense, indicators offer unique opportunities but also risks for exposure. Moreover, Rutkowski argues that over time the use of indicators is self-reinforcing, gradually becoming the only acceptable way for policy actors to answer questions about "how are we doing?" and to legitimise their actions. In this sense, "*educational indicators embody the knowledge that realises power*" (Rutkowski 2008, pp.475-476). This means that while knowledge is regarded as the central force of production, it is the regulators of this knowledge, such as the OECD, who are the holders of power.

Finally, we should note that TALIS has been conducted twice and hence still is in its consolidation phase. It might be premature to say that competitive comparison is firmly in place with regard to teacher policy. We should pay close attention to Rinne and Ozga's (2013) argument that TALIS as a policy instrument remains vague and hard to control because it cannot offer strong conclusions and policy recommendations on human capital development and system performance as measured by student learning. The relation between the OECD PISA and TALIS programmes hence needs to be clarified, including what the international option of the TALIS-PISA link represents in that respect. Thus, while TALIS is part of the drive towards quantification in the education sector that has been subject to intense critique (cf. Alexander 2011; Biesta 2015; Goldstein 2004, 2008; Sahlberg 2011), we would expect less focus on the competitive element in the TALIS ensemble overall. Still, we would expect that the four dimensions of competitive comparison in various ways are acknowledged by the policy actors engaged in TALIS as characteristics of the programme. All policy actors are likely to recognize the OECD as 'expert' in the field and the organisation's unequalled capacities in running large-scale programmes like TALIS, based on its multilateral mandate.

4.3.2. Learning as individual development

Given the OECD's turn to new growth theory, I expect a strong emphasis on teachers as individual learners in the practical argumentation of TALIS ensemble policy actors. This hypothesis would seem rather obvious given the trenchancy of human capital theory and ubiquitous discourses of 'lifelong learning' in policy formation. However, the hypothesis is qualified in two steps: i) teachers' learning is primarily conceived as serving their individual careers and students' effective learning; and ii) teachers' knowledge and learning should be codified.

In contrast to the post-war emphasis on education development as means of nation-building (cf. Mundy 2007), 'learning as individual development' takes its logic from neoliberal imperatives on market-driven competition and individual learning as the basic unit in human capital development. Yet with regard to teachers, Robertson (2012a) argues that this neoliberal logic is contradictory because it has resulted in policies which have undermined the collective organisation of teachers' work, working conditions, professional

autonomy, and attractiveness and retention of the workforce. Sahlberg (2011) provides a related critique of the 'Global Education Reform Movement' (GERM) with the argument that market- and standards-based driven reform in the longer term undermines innovation and risk-taking, key elements in workplace and social learning, job satisfaction, productivity and the very capacity of the system to renew and adapt itself. In other words, many of the problems identified in *Teachers Matter* (OECD 2005) are related to neoliberal policies (see also Connell 2009; McBeath 2012), reflecting a major contradiction in contemporary education governance. I expect that this contradiction is still present, and that individualised or 'personalised' learning forms a central mechanism in the constitution of the TALIS ensemble, yet with policy actors emphasising different aspects of the mechanism.

With regard to codification, the very notion of knowledge-based economy emphasises the codification of knowledge at the expense of tacit knowledge. This is central to the OECD critique of contemporary schooling. OECD thus argues that schools risk being marginalised as learning institutions because teaching and learning is not based on a common body of codified knowledge. One major obstacle is that teachers' knowledge is tacit rather than explicit and codified knowledge. The OECD claims that the codification of teachers' knowledge would enable a pooling and sharing of knowledge leading to increased economic growth and productivity (OECD 1996, 2001a; Robertson 2005). Hence, the strong focus on learning as an individual activity is accompanied by a drive towards codification and sharing of knowledge, both of which require institutional frameworks. Throughout its history, OECD has promoted and re-launched various concepts suggesting that such institutionalisation is important for macroeconomic performance - hence trying to carve out a niche for itself in global governance (Godin 2006; Kallo 2009). This leads us to the next mechanism concerned with distributional conflict and 'institutional power resources'. The quest for knowledge codification goes to the heart of labour politics.

4.3.3. Institutional power resources

TALIS is the largest survey programme in history on teachers and their work. As policy instrument, the objective of TALIS is to improve the regulation of the teacher workforce through education reform. Therefore, I hypothesise that distributional conflict between employers and employees is central to understanding the TALIS ensemble. In particular,

‘institutional power resources’ are assumed to provide a central mechanism in explaining the outcomes of the TALIS programme.

Teaching professions have sought to advance their professional status and autonomy to manage their own labour based on claims to expertise and the complexity of their work - which is associated with high levels of tacit pedagogical knowledge. Thereby, teachers have - with very different results - sought to protect their work conditions and resist proletarianisation, that is, intensification of labour and loss of control over conception with regard to curriculum, practices and assessment (Robertson 2000, 2012a). With the imperative of managing and controlling knowledge comes the ‘taming’ (cf. Masschelein and Simons 2013) of the teaching professions in a new disguise:

“... teachers’ work is explicitly ideological work. Educational institutions are nothing if they are not about ideas. Workers in education have a central role in the production, transmission and the exchange of knowledge - and in a ‘knowledge economy’ these are not processes that can be left to chance, and this reinforces the need to assert control over teachers’ labour.” (Carter et al. 2010, p.10)

In this perspective, TALIS would appear to put pressure on the professional status and work conditions of teachers. Therefore, it could be conceived that teacher unions would recommend their members not to take part in the survey which would effectively make it fall apart. Yet, the global federation of teacher unions Education International is at the core of the TALIS ensemble, as shown in Chapter 3. Robertson (2012a) argues that this indicates a shift in global governance whereby the ‘pedagogic recontextualising field’ of educators is colonized by the ever more globally oriented ‘official recontextualising field’ of state authorities and intergovernmental organisations like the OECD. Effectively, the voice of teachers is stripped out of policy debates on the role of education and teachers in the new knowledge economy. How might we explain this paradox that teachers are very visible, as the object of study in TALIS, and simultaneously apparently sidelined from the global debate on teachers?

I expect that the explanation of TALIS outcome patterns needs to consider power relations between employers and employees, or class relations. Thereby, I assume that the political

economy of the TALIS programme is centred on distributional conflict rather than technocratic disagreement over efficiency and optimal coordination (Korpi 2006; Pontusson 2005; Streeck 2010, 2016). In this respect, we might conceive of teachers as a class in the sense that they form a category of individuals who share relatively similar positions in employment relations and labor markets (Korpi 2006, p.174). Specifically, I draw on power resources theory which assumes that employment relations involve distributive conflict between employees and employers, and that inequality, socio-economic stratification, and the size and structure of welfare states, to a large extent, is the outcome of these conflicts. Importantly, distributional conflicts most of the time work out to the mutual benefit for employers and employees ('a positive-sum mode'), yet at times they can have negative consequences for either one of them. Power resources refer to the capabilities of actors to advance claims, defend their interests, and reward or punish other actors (Korpi 1985, 2006).

During the past decades, unions have been on the defensive. Unlike during the postwar decades, they are no longer in a position to advance their own agenda. Therefore, they face tough strategic choices and often have to settle for second-best solutions and protect what they consider most essential in the face of political pressure to deregulate labour markets (Davidsson and Emmenegger 2013). This strategy would appear to resemble 'rapprochement'; that is, an accommodation to the central elements of the neoliberal regime of accumulation to maximise gains from interest-based bargaining. 'Rapprochement' is distinct from strategies of conflict-orientated 'resistance' and 'renewal', the latter coupling conflict with more participatory forms of organisation on workplace level (Carter *et al.* 2010; Stevenson 2010).

Davidsson and Emmenegger (2013) argue that unions' organisational interests, or 'institutional power resources', are the crucial variable explaining their behaviour. The underlying mechanism is that when unions are under pressure in difficult economic periods to liberalise the labour market, they are willing to assent to labour market reforms, but only reforms that do not fundamentally threaten to undermine their organisational interests. In other words, they prioritise policy reforms that protect their long-term institutional power

resources, even if these reforms come at the expense of short-term policy gains that would benefit union members. Union power is thus more than the capacity to mobilise members, that is, 'union density'. One important institutional power resource is the unions' institutionalised role in the formulation of labour market policy reforms that allows them to negotiate and influence the direction of labour market reform.

TALIS concerns labour market policies in the educational area, and institutional power resources provide an intriguing theoretical perspective on the internal relations of the TALIS ensemble, in particular the relations between TUAC/Education International and affiliate member unions to other policy actors. In addition, the apparently more marginal role of BIAC might be theorised in this way (cf. Davidsson and Emmenegger 2013 on origins of their approach). Institutional power resources might help explain the level of involvement in the national adaptations of TALIS as well as the uses of results.

The interest in maintaining institutional power resources might explain why EI chose to join the TALIS BPC although the programme aspires to codify teachers' knowledge and hence might undermine their professional status and autonomy. Moreover, institutional power resources could help shed light on the internal relations of the TALIS ensemble in Australia, England and Finland. Given the overall patterns of capitalist institutional arrangements (see Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Davidsson and Emmenegger 2013; Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen and Stephens 2008; Schneider and Paunescu 2011), we would expect the institutional power resources of the Finnish teacher union OAJ to be much stronger than those of teacher unions in England and Australia, and this is likely to be reflected in the level of cooperation with state authorities on TALIS. The issue then is whether there are trade-offs for OAJ of being involved. By all accounts, institutional power resources of unions in England are especially low (Carter *et al.* 2010), and they might have been completely sidelined from the adaptation of TALIS to the English context and how findings are being used.

4.3.4. Soft legalisation

As an OECD programme, TALIS belongs to the realm of soft law. We would expect soft law to be central for the overarching mechanism of competitive comparison because it serves to

frame, enable and constrain educational interventions on various scales (Dale 2013; Rutkowski 2007). Abbott and Snidal (2000) point out that international legalisation displays great variety, with most international law being soft. While international legalisation expanded during the 20th century as a response to the perceived scale of global interdependence, states remain reluctant in accepting harder legalisation due to the potential for inferior outcomes, loss of authority and sovereignty. This is especially the case in policy areas concerned with the relations between a state and its citizens or territory, hallmarks of Westphalian sovereignty. As highlighted in chapter 3, education is one of those areas. We might therefore expect state authorities taking part in TALIS to be sensitive on this issue.

Abbott and Snidal's (2000) argument is two-fold: i) policy actors choose to order relations through international legalisation to solve specific political and substantive problems; ii) policy actors choose softer forms of legalised governance when they are perceived to offer superior institutional solutions, either as a stepping stone to harder legalisation or preferable on its own terms. According to Abbott and Snidal (2000), 'hard' law encompasses strong *obligation*, *precision*, and *delegation*, whereas 'soft' law allows for one or two of these three criteria to be relaxed or absent. 'Hard' and 'soft' law is thus not a binary distinction; legalisation should be viewed as a continuum, involving varying degrees of these three dimensions in different combinations (see Figure 8, from Abbott *et al.* 2000, p.404).




Figure 8. Continuum of three dimensions from soft towards hard legalisation

Within this continuum, and based on the definitions provided by Abbott and colleagues (2000), the TALIS programme could be characterised (low obligation, high precision, moderate delegation) in terms of legalisation: i) the level of obligation is low because TALIS is a non-binding instrument where participants are not legally bound by rules or commitments, and their behavior is not subject to scrutiny under international or domestic law; ii) the level of precision is high because the 'rules' of TALIS are detailed, clear and unambiguous in terms of defining the expected conduct of participants, the intended objectives and the means of achieving it, including the scope for national adaptations (cf. the TALIS technical reports); and iii) delegation is estimated to be moderate, with low-moderate level of dispute resolution combined with moderate-high level of rulemaking and implementation. As an actor with delegated authority, the OECD has its own interests. In terms of dispute resolution, the OECD has not been granted adjudicative powers but coordinates political bargaining among member states and has introduced the social partners BIAC and TUAC into interstate relations. In rulemaking and implementation, OECD has considerable administrative power and expertise that enables the organisation to undertake substantial data collection, monitoring, and publication, which is instrumental for creating peer pressure and implicit sanctions for states wishing to be seen as trustworthy members of an international community.

This characterisation of TALIS in terms of soft legalisation would, if confirmed in the analysis, show that the OECD has been relative successful in terms of being delegated authority as a third party. Abbott and Snidal (2000, p.444) thus suggest that when both sovereignty costs and uncertainty are deemed to be high, the level of delegation tends to be low. Interestingly, Abbott and Snidal (2000, p.441) point out that a long process of legalised cooperation might lead to gradual institutionalisation, even against state resistance.

However, we should note that the degrees of obligation, precision, or delegation can be obscured in practice by political pressure, informal norms and other factors (Abbott *et al.* 2000, p.402). Moreover, the ambiguous relationship between politics and legal arrangements makes it difficult to identify causal effects of legalisation. Governments seek

to comply with rules for many reasons, not only due to their legal status, but also due to peer pressure, reputation, values and interests (Abbott *et al.* 2000, p.419).

Who benefits and sets the agenda in soft legalisation? Focusing on state relations, Abbott and Snidal (2000) seek to reconcile the traditional legal view that law operates as a shield for the weak with the realist view that international law acts as an instrument of powerful states. They argue that soft legalisation can further the goals of both weaker and stronger states and hence facilitates compromise. On the one hand, small and dependent states often seek harder legalisation because it offers protection and reduces uncertainty by demarcating the likely behavior of powerful states. Small states have less direct control over their own fates and therefore incur lower sovereignty costs from hard legalization. On the other hand, powerful states tend to have disproportionate influence over international outcomes, are less in need of protection, and face higher sovereignty costs. Moreover, third party institutions are frequently constructed to ensure them a leading voice. Yet, even the most powerful states cannot dictate the outcomes of negotiations, and they therefore need to make the substantive content of legalised arrangements attractive enough to encourage broad participation at an acceptable cost. The structure and decision-making rules of those bodies, including formal voting procedures, provide further means of balancing members' interests. Delegation to third parties is the major source of unanticipated sovereignty costs, ranging from simple differences in policy outcomes to loss of authority over decision making and more fundamental encroachments on state sovereignty. Therefore, strong states tend to prefer lower levels of delegation - to administrative bodies rather than judicial organs - because it prevents intrusions into sovereignty while allowing them significant influence over decision making and issue management (Abbott and Snidal 2000, pp.447-450).

4.4. Analytical Strategies and Hypotheses

This chapter discussed by way of abduction, theoretical perspectives on the TALIS programme. I argued that CCPEE and critical discourse analysis, focusing on practical argumentation, would enable breaking open the TALIS ensemble by showing how semiotic and extra-semiotic mechanisms help to explain the patterned outcomes of this ensemble. Four more substantive theoretical constructs were then discussed and hypothesised as mechanisms in the TALIS ensemble. They are incorporated in the hypotheses further below.

However, first I need to consider strategies in terms of diachronic analysis and synchronic analysis. Given the nature of the empirical material and the research questions, a dual approach is adopted to explain substantial internal relations of the TALIS ensemble and the underlying mechanisms. This means that in addressing research question 1, concerning what has made the TALIS programme possible, diachronic accounts of the TALIS programme 2005-2015 are complemented by synchronic accounts of TALIS 2013 in Australia, England and Finland. The fact that England and Finland have only participated in this round of TALIS calls for synchronic accounts. For these diachronic and synchronic accounts, the analysis of practical argumentation is employed, and the accounts will be centred on the hypothesised mechanisms.

We should note that there are tradeoffs between diachronic and synchronic accounts. In terms of visual media allegories, synchronic accounts are analogous to the taking of a photograph at a particular instant and diachronic accounts as film. In either case, the methodological choice enables yet constrains your analysis; there is only so much that you can capture within the frame, both when you stand still, and when you try to follow action along with the irreversible 'arrow of time' (cf. Prigogine 1987). Diachronic analysis, concerned with the process of change over time, has the potential to offer the greatest insight into the complex process of social and political *change* by highlighting incremental developments over time in arguments, deliberation, main policy actors, and thus continuity, narrative, and path-dependency. However, the uniqueness of each narrative in diachronic accounts complicates comparison. Fixed at a set point in time, synchronic accounts enable for rather 'neat' snapshots of political actions and ideas in various locations that are useful for documentation due to their sharp focus on particular events and potentially rich empirical detail. The methodological move of synchronisation – the arrangement of putting one snapshot beside other ones - lead to accounts that emphasise difference and contrast, at the expense of downplaying the history of the objects for comparison and theorisation of mechanisms in social change (Hay 2002, pp.148-150). In short, whereas the ontology of diachronic accounts is one of *becoming*, the ontology of synchronic accounts is biased towards *being*.

With regard to the hypotheses, the four suggested mechanisms are given various emphasis in addressing the research questions. Whilst analytically distinct, I expect the hypothesised mechanisms to be mutually implicated. However, competitive comparison, with its four modalities of power, provides a broader and perhaps overarching mechanism, with learning as individual development mainly forming part of evaluative trajectories, and institutional power resources and soft legalisation associated with scale. Drawing on Pawson (2000) and the paraphrase “*outcomes are the result of mechanisms in contexts*” (Dale 2013), the hypothesised mechanisms might be arranged in a schematic model (see Figure 9).




Figure 9. Hypothesised mechanisms, contexts and outcomes

I expect that all policy actors link engagement in the TALIS programme with arguments concerning the central economic role of teachers and teaching. All four dimensions of competitive comparison will be present in their practical argumentation, hence including the mechanisms of learning as individual development and soft legalisation, as well as institutional power resources in the cases of teacher unions and BIAC. Yet, the emphasis and what this actually means is likely to be different amongst these policy actors. More specifically, their claims to action will depend on the premises of their argumentation. This implies that the solutions to the contractions and core problems of capitalism - accumulation, social order and cohesion, and legitimation - would be sought negotiated in

different ways by the policy actors. This hypothesis applies to the practical argumentation both in respect to why policy actors take part in the TALIS programme, the uses of TALIS results in policy formation, and the selection of international options and national adaptations of the survey.

In particular, I expect all policy actors, except teacher unions, to refer to the 'knowledge-based economy' as *"not only an unproblematic idea but an unproblematic reality"* (Robertson 2005, p.166), that is, as circumstances in the context of action. However, teacher unions are likely to have a more critical view of the factual existence of the knowledge-based economy, but they feel compelled to relate to the TALIS programme and make most of their institutional power resources in order not to be sidelined from the education debate.

Thus, the analysis will seek to separate necessary and contingent conditions for triggering mechanisms, on the basis of the practical argumentation of the policy actors. For example, I expect teacher unions to be cautious or opposed towards competitive comparison, internationally and nationally. However, due to various institutional power resources, they would have different capacities in ensuring that competitive comparison is neutralised and un-triggered. This implies that I hypothesise that a necessary condition for competitive comparison to be triggered is that unions have *low* levels of institutional power resources. I do not find the alternative to be plausible; that unions with high levels of institutional power resources would endorse competitive comparison.

With regard to the comparative cases of Australia, England and Finland, I hypothesise that competitive comparison is more pronounced in the practical argumentation of the state authorities in Australia and England, than in Finland. In particular, I expect the evaluative trajectory - as dimension of competitive comparison - and learning as individual development to be less focused on the relationship between quality teaching and student learning outcomes in Finland than in England and Australia. Moreover, due to strong institutional power resources we would expect the Finnish teacher union OAJ to have been deeply engaged and cooperated with government authorities on TALIS 2013, including on

the use of results. In Australia and England, the analysis is likely to show less involvement and cooperation between teacher unions and government.

Concerning soft legalisation, I hypothesise that the diachronic account of the TALIS programme will show that the delegation from national governments of the knowledge provider and broker role to the OECD has a cumulative impact over time. The analysis will highlight that standardsetting and indicators-based research have descriptive and prescriptive dimensions; over time, they come to represent what education is about, thereby setting the agenda as well as defining the 'rules of the game', cf. Lukes (2005). On this basis, we might therefore anticipate a convergence in the thinking about preferences and priorities with regard to teachers' work. Yet, the TALIS programme does at this stage not include strong links between teachers and student performance, and policy recommendations tend to be vague. On this basis, I expect especially state authorities in England and Australia to be critical about the outcomes of TALIS, also because they as relatively larger countries are more concerned than Finland with regard to delegation to the OECD. Accordingly, I also expect England to be more critical of European Commission engagement in TALIS than Finland. In Part II these hypotheses will be confronted with reality as represented by the theory-laden empirical inquiry of policy documents and interviews.

PART II

CHAPTER 5. THE ENGAGEMENT WITH TALIS

5.0. Introduction

Chapter 3 focused on the TALIS programme as *explanandum*, that is, a patterned empirical outcome in the domain of the actual. Through abduction in chapter 4, the thesis hypothesised how this outcome is generated by the action of underlying mechanisms under specific conditions, together forming the *explanans*. With their particular foci, the three analytical chapters test and discuss the hypotheses with regard to how the outcomes of the TALIS programme constitute ‘results of mechanisms in contexts’. In this respect, retroduction is adopted and combined with political discourse analysis on the basis of documents and realist theory-laden interviews (see Table 3, research stage 5). Specifically, retroductive questioning helps identifying causal mechanisms underlying the TALIS ensemble, separating necessary conditions from contingent circumstances, and advancing from empirical observation of events to a conceptualization of transfactual conditions. Moreover, each of the analytical chapters concludes with a summary, where the relative explanatory powers of the hypothesised mechanisms are discussed and compared. These discussions corresponds with stages 6 and 7 in the research model (see Table 3) and addresses the third research question “What does TALIS mean?”

In particular, this chapter addresses part of the first research question concerning the objects, structures and mechanisms which has made TALIS possible and made it what it is - internationally, and in Australia, England and Finland. The question is divided into two sub-questions: a) What is the practical argumentation of the main organisations constituting the TALIS ensemble for engaging with the programme?; and b) How are the main organisations constituting the TALIS ensemble internally related? This Chapter addresses the former sub-question, whereas Chapter 6 is dedicated to the latter. Both Chapter 5 and 6 include a diachronic and a synchronic account in addressing the respective subquestions, as well as a more theoretical discussion as summary. Please note that Appendix E provides a list of the 32 interviewees and the codes used for referring to the interviews throughout the analysis.

In this chapter, the diachronic account first analyses the practical argumentation of the OECD, the EU, TUAC and BIAC concerning how they have engaged with the programme. This is complemented by a synchronic account for why government authorities in Australia, England and Finland chose to sign up for TALIS 2013. In this sense, government authorities are singled out as *the* major policy actor on national level with regard to engagement with TALIS. Yet, as the synchronic account will show, government authorities in the three jurisdictions emphasised domestic politics as shaping their engagement with TALIS, with the relations between government and teacher unions standing out.

5.1. TALIS 2005-2015: Competitive Comparison as Work in Progress

The diachronic analysis in this sub-section highlights the origins and developments of the TALIS programme, centred on competitive comparison as a mechanism explaining the trajectory of the programme. The analysis shows that the OECD and European Union (EU) set the agenda, with TUAC and BIAC reacting to it. The four dimensions of competitive comparison (hierarchical space, temporal rhythm, evaluative trajectories and scale) are particularly present, in different constellations, in the practical argumentation of the OECD and EU. In this respect, indicators development has been absolutely central. The OECD and EU have had distinctive preferences in this respect, with implications for the evaluative trajectories of what it means to be a good teacher. Regardless the different priorities of the OECD and EU, the TALIS programme is overall an effort to codify knowledge on prominent areas of teachers' work. The section proceeds by focusing on each of the policy actors OECD, EU, TUAC and BIAC in turn, showing how they became engaged in TALIS and how they have tried to shape it during the first two rounds of the programme.

5.1.1. The OECD and the pursuit of links between teaching and learning

The entry point for the OECD was that teaching was instrumental to increasing student learning. Accordingly, OECD has been pursuing links between indicators related to teachers' work and measures of student learning. These efforts are indicated in the practical argumentation of the OECD throughout the existence of TALIS.

On the basis of three key texts on TALIS (OECD 2006a, 2009a, 2014a), the section unfolds this argument in three steps by highlighting: i) the stability of the premise-conclusion

structure; ii) the pursuit of links between teachers' work and student learning; and iii) the efforts to establish links between TALIS and PISA.

In January 2006, OECD (2006a) issued an outline of an "OECD International Survey of Teachers, Teaching and Learning" at a point when the OECD wished to establish which countries would like to participate in the survey. The 5-pages document contains sections on the rationale, deliverables, survey design, and costs and timeline. Analysing the political discourse of the *Outline* in terms of practical argumentation (see Figure 10 below) shows how critical indicators development is to triggering the mechanism of competitive comparison.

The claims to action in the *Outline* include that the "*OECD survey of teachers, teaching and learning will be the most comprehensive empirical study of teachers in OECD countries*", focusing on three themes: the recognition, feedback reward and evaluation of teachers; school leadership; and teaching practices beliefs and attitudes. The survey, "*expected to be repeated every three years*", will address the "*paucity of data and support further policy developments*" by providing "*crosscountry comparisons and benchmarks of key variables related to the effectiveness of schools and the teacher work force*", as well as, "*through the possibility of conducting the survey in PISA schools, allow a greater understanding of the observed differences in student performance between and within countries.*" (OECD 2006, p.1).

The "*deliverables*", or "*key products*", from the survey were stated to include indicators; policy analysis; and raw survey data. With regard to indicators, the three main themes were the highest rated in a priority-rating exercise among OECD member countries, and the additional aspects were associated with the next four highest rated themes. Finally, variables on education and training and continuous professional development would be covered as far as practicable within these priority themes (OECD 2006a, pp.2-3). The survey would explicitly target and provide internationally comparative data and analysis on these issues. In this respect, the survey would build on the insights of the major teacher policy review (OECD 2005), and "*take this further through quantitative analysis of the pertinent*

issues and would also provide international benchmarking of teacher characteristics and responses” (OECD 2006a, p.2). Furthermore, policy analyses would examine *“the inter-relationships between the indicators, as well as drawing in external contextual information to seek a greater understanding of the policy implications”*. The main report was anticipated to address a range of issues, some of them implying a link to student performance: *“How do the practices for recognising, rewarding and evaluating teachers differ between and within countries and are these any different in better performing schools?”*; *“How do teaching practices, beliefs and attitudes differ between schools with different intakes and student performance?”*; and *“Are school policies towards continuous professional development correlated with the performance of the school?”* With regard to raw data, a fully documented international database of teacher and school principal responses, allowing original analyses to be conducted, would be made available free of charge on the web (OECD 2006a, pp.2-3).

The survey design was anticipated to comprise a cycle of surveys, *“each wave of which will have a main focus on teachers of a specific education level and their school principals, so that progressively over time all school teachers (primary through to upper secondary) are surveyed.”* While the first wave will focus on teachers of lower secondary education and their school principals, international options were to be available for countries to sample teachers in other levels of education.

Finally, the outline points out that the first wave of the survey would include an *“experimental link”* to PISA, with an *“option to conduct the survey in the schools that take part in the PISA 2006 international student assessment.”* It is asserted that *“The analysis of teacher data alongside the existing student and school data in PISA will strengthen our understanding of the learning environment in schools and the relationship this has with student outcomes.”* In this respect, the survey design was anticipated to incorporate *“a progressive move to a more fully implemented link of teacher data to the PISA survey, for those countries that wish to pursue that”* (OECD 2006a, pp.3-4).

These claims to action are closely related to the premises of goals, circumstances, and means-goals. In terms of goals, the survey would *“highlight the options available to policymakers”* concerning teacher policy and *“examine best practice across education systems given local circumstances and for countries to identify others facing similar challenges to their own”* (OECD 2006a, p.1).

The *“policy rationale”* for the survey, or circumstances in the context of action, was that there are *“recognised information gaps within and across countries”*. Hence, *“more needed to be done”* due to the *“significant gaps”* in the *“international knowledge base on teachers and teaching”*, as demonstrated by the previous OECD teacher policy review (OECD 2006a, p.1). In this respect, the themes to be addressed in the survey were *“leading policy issues in many OECD countries”*. Moreover, *“in-depth analysis of specific policy issues are often of great value to policymakers”*. The *Outline* also addresses the circumstances concerning costs. We see that at this point the OECD anticipated around 25 countries would participate since it was estimated that each country would have to pay around EUR 48,000 to take part, altogether equalling the needed EUR 1.2 million in international costs (according to Hammershøi (2011), the international costs ended being EUR 1.5 million). In addition, countries would have to pay the national costs for implementing the survey (OECD 2006a, p.5).




Figure 10. Practical argumentation of OECD Outline (OECD 2006a)




Figure 11. Practical argumentation of TALIS 2008 main report (OECD 2009a)




Figure 12. Practical argumentation of TALIS 2013 main report (OECD 2014a)

With regard to the means-goal premise, the *Outline* singles out two important stakeholders in the survey, the EU and TUAC, with whom the *“OECD has been working closely ... in the development of the survey”*. The *“constructive interaction”* between the OECD and the EU meant that *“the requirements of the European Union should be met through the OECD survey”*, centred on covering teachers’ professional development due to the EU Lisbon agenda. In this respect, the outline points out that *“the European Union will provide funds to member countries to support their involvement as long as the requirements continue to be met”* (OECD 2006a, p.4). With regard to TUAC, the outline points out that *“A successful outcome of this survey requires active participation of teachers and school principals”*. Accordingly, the OECD had been working with TUAC and spoken with various national teacher unions and professional organisations about the survey. The dialogue had been *“very constructive with strong support coming from these bodies”* (OECD 2006a, p.4). Relations with these other policy actors will be examined in detail in Chapter 6.

Considering the description of TALIS in Chapter 3, we see that the main features of the survey had been established at the point when the *Outline* was issued (see comparison in Table 17, based on OECD 2006a, 2009a). Major differences include the cycle of the survey, where it was originally scheduled to take place every three years, like the PISA cycle, and the moves towards addressing all ISCED levels (with a main focus on a particular level) and *“a more fully implemented link”* to PISA. As we know today, TALIS has so far not developed in these directions. Though the TALIS 2008 main report (OECD 2009a, p.19) also anticipated that *“TALIS is conceived as a sequence of surveys which over time, will survey school teachers from all phases of schooling”*, this prospect is absent from the TALIS 2013 main report (OECD 2014a).

	Outline 2006	TALIS 2008
Policy themes	3 themes: 1. Recognition, feedback, reward and evaluation of teachers 2. School leadership 3. Teaching practices, beliefs and attitudes + aspects of: 4. Experience, qualifications and responsibilities of teachers 5. Satisfaction and effectiveness of education and training 6. Profile of teachers' education and training 7. School climate + variables on education and training and continuous professional development covered within these priority themes	3 themes: 1. Appraisal of and feedback to teachers 2. School leadership 3. Teaching practices, beliefs and attitudes + Professional development of teachers as important theme + Aspects of other themes: School climate, division of working time, and job satisfaction
Core sample	ISCED Level 2 teachers and principals	ISCED level 2 teachers and principals
International options	ISCED levels 1 and/or 3 teachers and principals PISA link	ISCED levels 1 and/or 3 teachers and principals PISA link
Survey instruments	Separate 40 minutes questionnaires for teachers and principals	Separate 45-60 minutes questionnaires for teachers and principals
Cycle	3 years	5 years
Data collection	Pilot Sep - Oct 2006 Main study Sep-Oct 2007	Oct-Dec 2007 South Hemisphere March-May 2008 North Hemisphere
Release of main report	September 2008	June 2009

Table 17. Characteristics of early survey outline and actual survey

Moving to the two main OECD reports from TALIS 2008 and TALIS 2013 (OECD 2009a, 2014a), the overall premise-conclusion structure of the practical argumentation remain similar (see Figures 11 and 12). As pointed out in Chapter 3, the stated objectives of the survey are nearly identical in the two rounds, along with the principles guiding the survey (*Policy relevance; value added; indicator-oriented; validity, reliability, comparability and rigour; interpretability; and efficiency and cost-effectiveness*; OECD 2009a, p.19; 2014a, p.27). I understand these principles as constituting the means-goal premise in the practical argumentation.

The current reality of education is depicted in a similar manner as circumstantial premises, with the “Forewords” in the two main reports lamenting that education policies across countries do not support the accumulation of human capital (see Table 18, based on OECD 2009a, p.3; OECD 2014a, p.3). The “Forewords” of the main reports were signed by OECD Director of Education Barbara Ischinger for the TALIS 2008 cycle and Secretary-General Angel Gurría for the TALIS 2013 cycle, respectively.

TALIS 2008	TALIS 2013
<i>“The challenges facing education systems and teachers continue to intensify. In modern knowledge-based economies, where the demand for high-level skills will continue to grow substantially, the task in many countries is to transform traditional models of schooling, which have been effective at distinguishing those who are more academically talented from those who are less so, into customised learning systems that identify and develop the talents of all students. This will require the creation of “knowledge-rich”, evidence-based education systems ...”</i>	<i>“The skills that students need to contribute effectively to society are in constant change. Yet, our education systems are not keeping up with the fast pace of the world around us. Most schools look much the same today as they did a generation ago, and teachers themselves are often not developing the practices and skills necessary to meet the diverse needs of today’s learners.”</i>

Table 18. The OECD’s representation of the state of education

The clunky dichotomy of academic selection versus “*customised learning systems*” in OECD (2009a) implies that a shift towards learning as individual development is deemed desirable. In conjuring up ‘crisis’, these representations of the ‘problem’ to be solved might be problematised. For example, the representation in the TALIS 2013 main report is undermined by the fact that very little in the TALIS results suggests that schools today look the same as 25 years ago. Indeed, as Gurría points out on the same page: “*While teaching has often been thought of as an isolating profession, where teachers retreat into their classrooms and simply close the door, the TALIS data also show that this is no longer the case*” (OECD 2014a, p.3). Likewise, the “Foreword” to the TALIS 2008 report goes on to represent the context of action like this:

“The results from TALIS suggest that, in many countries, education is still far from being a knowledge industry in the sense that its own practices are not yet being transformed by knowledge about the efficacy of those practices” (OECD 2009a, p.3)

This provides a good example of how goals might be disguised as circumstances in the context of action. The argument is tautological in the sense that the implied goal of education as a knowledge industry requires a codification of knowledge that is still on the way. In other words, the very absence of the desirable ‘imaginary’ of education as a knowledge industry is represented as being the problem.

Finally, the OECD’s practical argumentation acknowledges, as circumstantial premises for the TALIS programme, the teacher workforce as being central to these efforts. Referring to research such as Rivkin and colleagues (2005), the TALIS 2013 main report forcefully asserts:

“Teachers play a crucial role in education systems – they are the front-line workers responsible for engaging students and promoting their learning. It is now widely accepted that within schools, teacher- and teaching-related factors are the most important factors that influence student learning” (OECD2014a, p.32)

Having demonstrated that the OECD’s political discourse on TALIS over the period is stable overall, I will now focus on two particular aspects: the links between teachers’ work and student learning, and more specifically the links between the two OECD programmes TALIS and PISA.

First, the practical argumentation underlying the TALIS programme is based on the representation that the selected policy themes have implications for student learning outcomes and hence human capital. In OECD political discourse, giving voice to teachers is not an end in itself; the legitimization of TALIS is that teaching and teachers serve as levers for human capital accumulation. The representation of the policy themes and findings as having relevance for student learning outcomes runs through the main reports for TALIS 2008 and TALIS 2013. For example, in the TALIS 2013 main report, each chapter seeks to establish those links (see Table 19).

Chapter 2. Teachers and their schools

“Teachers play a crucial role in education systems – they are the front-line workers responsible for engaging students and promoting their learning. It is now widely accepted that within schools, teacher- and teaching-related factors are the most important factors that influence student learning” (p.32)

Chapter 3. The importance of school leadership

“These demands require that principals manage human and material resources, communicate and interact with individuals who occupy a variety of positions, make evidence-informed decisions and provide the instructional leadership to teachers necessary for helping students succeed in school” (p.56)

Chapter 4. Developing and supporting teachers

“Ensuring that millions of teachers around the world have the essential competencies they require to be effective in the classroom is one of the keys to raising levels of student achievement” (p.86)

Chapter 5. Improving teaching using appraisal and feedback

“Teacher appraisal and feedback are important components of teachers’ careers and development. They can significantly improve teachers’ understanding of their teaching methods, teaching practices and student learning” (p.120)

Chapter 6. Examining teacher practices and classroom environment

“Quality instruction encompasses the use of different teaching practices, and the teaching practices deployed by teachers can play a role in student learning and motivation to learn” (p.150)

Chapter 7. Teacher self-efficacy and job satisfaction: Why they matter

“In education, research has shown that students’ self-efficacy has an important influence on their academic achievement and behaviour. Yet there is increasing evidence that teachers’ sense of self-efficacy, consisting of efficacy in instruction, student engagement and classroom management, also is an important factor in influencing academic outcomes of students, and simultaneously enhances teachers’ job satisfaction” (p.182)

Table 19. The emphasis on student learning in OECD (2014a)

According to a former OECD Senior Analyst, the entry point for the policy review “Attracting, developing and retaining effective teachers” (OECD 2005), and subsequently TALIS, was an interest in teacher effectiveness and effective teachers who help students learning (exOECDsenAnalyst). However, the nature of TALIS as a survey complicated matters:

“When we started TALIS, we quickly realised that you can’t measure teacher or teaching effectiveness based on self-reporting, and we commissioned various expert papers on whether a self-reported survey could say something about teacher effectiveness. Essentially, the papers showed that it can’t but you can talk about the conditions that are associated with being effective as a teacher and for creating environments that support effective teaching. So, it was there from the beginning. There was a policy interest in having something to say about effective teaching, but quickly it was recognised that TALIS couldn’t talk about effective teaching. In fact, if we had claimed that, then TALIS would never have got off the ground. We hoped to measure things that are relevant to teachers’ effectiveness, but not measuring effectiveness.” (exOECDsenAnalyst)

Due to this fact, later representations in the main TALIS reports of the suggested relations between teachers’ work and student learning can be problematised. We thus recognise that there is a contradiction between the principles guiding the survey (cf. *“validity, reliability, comparability and rigour”*) and the survey design. One example refers to teacher appraisal:

“Statistically, it can be difficult to prove a direct correlation between teacher appraisal and student achievement ... But when teachers receive continuous feedback on their teaching, it creates opportunities for them to improve teaching practices, which, in turn, can have a powerful impact on student learning and outcomes” (OECD 2014a, p.120)

The links between the TALIS survey themes and student learning outcomes remain implicit insofar as none of the column chart ‘country rankings’ included in the main reports for TALIS 2008 and TALIS 2013 include references to student achievement (see Appendices P and Q). The aspirations of the *Outline* (OECD 2006) were thus not realised in the first two rounds of TALIS. However, we should note that a ‘video study’ of teaching practices is offered as an international option in TALIS 2018 to look at what is going on in classrooms, thereby going beyond teachers’ self-reported data. This might over time prove a lever for re-starting the conversation in TALIS about the relationship between teacher practices and effectiveness.

Concerning the OECD’s pursuit of establishing links between PISA and TALIS, this was already indicated by the *Outline* (OECD 2006). Subsequently, the OECD has continuously explored ‘synergies’ between the two programmes. In 2012, the OECD Education Policy

Committee, the high-level OECD body on education, discussed such synergies (OECD 2012c). According to a former OECD Senior Analyst, the term ‘synergies’ implies:

“For sure, keep the separate identities of the two programmes, because they have different analytical objectives, but that doesn’t stop someone asking the question, is there something you could do differently, that could tell you something about the relationship between teachers, what they do in the classroom, and outcomes ...” (exOECDsenAnalyst).

These synergies could for example be pursued through the alignment of constructs (such as behavioural climate), definitions (like private and public schools), and the index and scales by which they are being measured in the two programmes (exOECDsenAnalyst). Accordingly, the longer-term strategy of PISA (OECD 2014g, points 31) also calls for greater alignment between the two programmes because *“... synergies between PISA and TALIS can enhance data quality and yield more and better policy insights from both studies”*. The PISA programme thus continues to be part of the context of action surrounding TALIS, encapsulated in the remarkable fact that OECD Secretary-General Gurría in the TALIS 2013 main report refers to the PISA programme before TALIS (OECD 2014a, p.3).

Moreover, the teacher-reported data from TALIS have been sought connected with the student achievement measures in PISA in three ways: i) the TALIS-PISA link; ii) introducing a teacher questionnaire as international option in PISA 2015; and iii) aligning the PISA and TALIS survey cycles.

Concerning the TALIS-PISA link, countries have hesitated in signing up; none signed up for TALIS 2008, eight signed up for TALIS 2013. The TALIS 2008 Technical Report (OECD 2010, p.25) points out that *“several countries expressed a desire to have the survey linked to outcome measures,”* and a link to PISA outcome measures was seen as the most obvious option. However, other countries raised concerns about conceptual and methodological issues. Two expert reviews subsequently clarified that *“insights to teacher and teaching effectiveness could not be gained through linking a teacher survey to PISA”*. Still, *“there would be value in using the teacher responses to develop a fuller picture of the learning environment of 15-year-old students in PISA schools and to examine the relationship with*

that and school level PISA outcome variables” (OECD 2010, p.25). On this basis, TALIS 2008 included *“an experimental link to PISA 2006”* as an international option, without any countries pursuing it (However, Iceland was later the subject of a paper on the basis of TALIS 2008 data, see Kaplan and Turner 2012). Finally, the Technical Report (OECD 2010, p.25) report suggest that *“further consideration will be given to the extent of the link between TALIS and PISA in planning future rounds of TALIS”*. The synchronic account below will explain in more detail why countries have been hesitant in signing up for the TALIS-PISA link.

The PISA programme has since the first round in 2000 included background questionnaires for students and school principals, with the latter providing some information about teachers. In addition, several optional questionnaires for students and parents have been introduced from PISA 2003 and onwards. PISA 2015 involved for the first time the international option of a teacher questionnaire (OECD 2016, pp.181-196). The 30-minutes questionnaire included a number of items taken from the TALIS 2013 questionnaires, thereby providing *“an additional source of information which can improve PISA’s ability to explain variation in educational outcomes”* and *“significantly enhance the analytical power of PISA in many policy areas”* (OECD 2014g, point 31, 38).

Finally, synergies might be pursued by aligning survey cycles. In 2015, the OECD proposed to the TALIS BPC to establish TALIS as a six years cycle from 2018 and thereafter. Thereby, the programme would coincide with every second round of PISA. The government representatives from participating countries agreed in principle to this recommendation (OECD TALIS team, email communication January 2017).

In summary, the analysis of the OECD practical argumentation for the TALIS programme 2006-2015 shows a stable political discourse. The contents of the premise-conclusion structure have not changed much since the early developments of the programme in the mid-2000s, being centred on the importance of teachers and teaching for student learning outcomes and the stock of human capital. Specifically, the goals of TALIS, the representation of circumstances surrounding education, and the means-goal premises have been stable

over the first two rounds of the survey, as well as the survey itself as a particular claim to action.

In terms of competitive comparison, the OECD has continuously sought to create the conditions enabling the comparison of educational systems centred on student learning outcomes, consistent with the knowledge-based economy paradigm and associated ideas of human capital accumulation. This section has shown that the OECD's practical argumentation for TALIS reflects the pursuit of links between teachers' work and student learning outcomes. However, in TALIS, these relations remain indirect, based on literature review of the survey themes. The links have thus not been put in place; the hierarchical spaces represented by the 'country rankings' in two main reports do not incorporate measures of student learning, and the uptake of the TALIS-PISA link is limited. This is unfortunate within the paradigm of the knowledge-based economy and new growth theory where measures of the stock of human capital, such as student learning outcomes, are considered imperative. Therefore, a recurring point on the side of the OECD has been to explore synergies between TALIS and PISA in order to link the student learning outcomes as measured in the PISA programme with the policy themes examined in the TALIS programme. In terms of evaluative trajectories, such coherence would provide the OECD with rich opportunities to represent - and entrench the view of - education as a 'knowledge industry' in which teachers' work is judged by evidence on measures of student learning. Hence, the account shows that the OECD is 'always moving' in terms of pursuing ways to enhance its profile and influence as the leading hub for education statistics, analysis and policy advice in the world.

5.1.2. The European Union: Teachers' professional development as entry point

This section explains EU engagement with TALIS. The practical argumentation of three texts (CoEU 2005; EC 2010a, 2014a) is analysed to show how EU policies on teachers have developed into an increasingly elaborate body. It is pointed out that TALIS engagement must be understood in relation to broader EU strategies. In particular, the focus on teachers' professional development in the EU Lisbon Strategy was directly related to engagement in TALIS, thereby emphasising this particular aspect of the evaluative trajectory associated with competitive comparison of teacher policy. Like the OECD, the European

Union engagement with TALIS was thus centred on the codification of knowledge through indicators development. In other words, both have approached TALIS as a project of epistemological governance (cf. Sellar and Lingard 2013a). However, whereas the OECD have emphasised the epistemological dimension of TALIS - with political implications - pursuing statistics-based 'synergies' between the TALIS and PISA programmes, EU emphasised TALIS as a political project - with epistemological implications – with a large number of policy initiatives addressing various aspects of teachers' work, supported by stronger governance frameworks. In this sense, OECD and EU efforts have complemented each other. Therefore, in explaining the TALIS programme, the cooperation between the OECD and the EU, and especially its executive arm the European Commission, cannot be overestimated.

When discussing EU, it is necessary to be specific about the various institutions engaging with teacher policy on the European level. The executive arm of the EU is the European Commission (EC). The analysis of texts and interviews with EC policy officers confirm that the EC's Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) has provided the most important fora in EU agenda-setting with regard to TALIS and teacher policy more generally (exEAC; EACanalysis; EACschools). The selection of texts for analysis reflects this fact. Conclusions of the Education Council of the European Union (CoEU), made up of Education Ministers from EU member states, have thus tended to follow the priorities suggested by DG EAC to a very large extent when responding to Communications issued by the Commission (compare CoEU 2005 with EC 2004b; CoEU 2007a with EC 2007a; CoEU 2007b with EC 2007b; CoEU 2008 with EC 2008; CoEU 2013a with EC 2012a). In this sense, it is justified that the literature on EU teacher policy often focuses on the central role of the European Commission (see for example Caena 2014; Caena and Margiotta 2010; Stéger 2014). However, we should note that the European Parliament, the directly-elected body of the European Union, has also engaged in teacher and school policy. The *"Resolution on Improving the quality of teacher education"* adopted by the European Parliament (2008) thus aligns with the priorities included in EC (2007b, 2008) and the CoEU (2007b, 2008), *"having regard to"* to PISA, the *Teachers Matter* report (OECD 2005) as well as the first 'McKinsey report' (Barber and Mourshed 2007).

The first text selected for analysis, the *“Council conclusions on new indicators in education and training”* (CoEU 2005) is a pivotal text in explaining what made TALIS possible. The central claim to action concerned that the EC was invited:

“... with regard to indicator areas where international organisations (e.g. OECD, Unesco, IEA) are planning new surveys, to cooperate with international organisations in order to satisfy the information needs of the EU in indicator areas such as ... professional development of teachers” (CoEU 2005, para.18)

Council Conclusions, whether from the EU summits of the European Council, or the Education Council of the EU, are interesting in that the main components in their structure to a large degree correspond with those of the framework for analysing practical argumentation. The text of CoEU (2005) thus consists of 20 paragraphs over 2 pages, with the sections addressing particular components of practical argumentation (see Table 20). Overall, the claims to actions are concentrated in the latter section, with the remaining sections providing premises legitimating those claims. Altogether, the text thus provided the practical argumentation for EU engagement with OECD’s upcoming survey (see Figure 13).

The section of *“Having regard to ...”* sets out circumstances in the context of action which due to references to previous policy decisions and documents take on a distinctively political-institutional character, centred on the Lisbon Strategy, the Education and Training Work Programme 2010 (ET2010), and subsequent efforts in defining priority areas for indicator development. This serves to highlight two issues: First, EU member states’ participation in TALIS was the outcome of several years of preparation on the side of the EU. Second, the TALIS programme was initially interesting for the EU due to the priorities of the Lisbon Strategy, and more specifically the Education and Training Work Programme 2010. Moreover, the analysis further below shows that EU engagement with TALIS 2013 was associated with the Europe 2020 Strategy and the Education and Training Work Programme 2020 (ET 2020).

Point	Section	Contents	Practical argumentation
1-7	<i>"Having regard to"</i>	References to a series of EU policy decisions and documents: European Council (2000, 2002, 2005), Council of the European Union (2002, 2003), Council of the European Union and European Commission (2004), European Commission (2004b)	Circumstances in the context of action and goals
8	<i>"Reaffirms that"</i>	<i>"periodic monitoring of performance and progress through the use of indicators and benchmarks is an essential part of the Lisbon process ..."</i>	Means-goal premise
9-12	<i>"Recognises that"</i>	<i>"desirable to develop a coherent framework of indicators and benchmarks to monitor performance and progress in the field of education and training"</i> <i>"the development of the necessary data for new indicators can be a long-term project ..."</i> <i>"the establishment of the 'research unit on lifelong learning' at the Joint Research Centre at ISPRA can significantly increase the Commission's research capacity in terms of the development of new indicators"</i>	Goal Circumstance Means-goal premise
13-15	<i>"Stresses that"</i>	<i>"full use should be made of existing data and indicators while further efforts should be made to improve their comparability, relevance and timeliness"</i> the principle of subsidiarity – <i>"the development of new indicators shall fully respect the responsibility of Member States for the organisation of their education systems"</i> <i>"a need to continue to enhance cooperation with other international organisations active in this field (e.g. OECD, Unesco, IEA), particularly in order to improve international data coherence"</i>	Means-goal premise Means-goal premise Means-goal premise
16-20	<i>"Invites the Commission"</i>	Reference to various indicator areas, instruments and strategies for data collection, including follow-up actions	Claims to action

Table 20. Sections of EU Council Conclusions from 2005 and practical argumentation

With regard to goals, the practical argumentation of CoEU (2005) are thus inseparable from the goals and objectives formulated in the beginning of the 2000s with the Presidency Conclusions from the EU Lisbon Summit (European Council 2000, para.5) which stated that the "strategic goal" for the European was *"to become the most competitive and dynamic*

knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.” Specifically on education, the CoEU (2002) subsequently put forward *“ambitions but realistic goals”* to be achieved by 2010, including that *“Europe will be recognised as a world-wide reference for the quality and relevance of its education and training systems and institutions”* (CoEU 2002, paragraph 3.2). This goal was subsequently adopted in the Presidency Conclusions from the EU Summit in Barcelona in March 2002 (European Council 2002; see Appendix R).

Concerning the context of action, circumstantial premises included that human capital was deemed to be Europe's most important asset (CoEU 2005, pt.2; cf. European Council 2005). The problem to be solved in this respect was that Europe's education and training systems was found to be in *“need to adapt both to the demands of the knowledge society and to the need for a higher level and quality of employment”* (CoEU 2005, pt.3; cf. European Council 2000). In addressing this situation, the quality and comparability of existing indicators, particularly in the field of lifelong learning, had to be improved, and new indicators had to be developed (CoEU 2005, pt.6; cf. CoEU and EC 2004).

In monitoring progress towards the objectives, the use of existing indicators was deemed crucial along with the development of new indicators that would respect the responsibility of Member States for the organisation of their education systems, that is, the principle of subsidiarity (CoEU 2005, pt.14). To improve *“international data coherence”*, cooperation with other international organisations could be pursued (e.g. OECD, UNESCO, IEA). These provide means-goal premises, because they provide (enabling and constraining) conditions in the movement from circumstances towards goals.




Figure 13. Practical argumentation of Education Council Conclusions (CoEU 2005)




Figure 14. Practical argumentation of EC - OECD joint report (EC 2010a)




Figure 15. Practical argumentation of EU Analytical and Policy Note (EC 2014a)

According to a former DG EAC Policy Officer (exEAC), the background for the Council Conclusions from 2005 and the cooperation with OECD on TALIS were to be found in the discussions of Working Groups created by DG EAC from late 2001. These Working Groups consisted of national experts appointed by EU member states and focused on areas deemed central to the Lisbon Strategy and the ET2010 Work Programme. The latter had been adopted by the Council (CoEU 2002) and presented three “*strategic objectives*”: i) Improving the quality and effectiveness of education and training systems in the EU; ii) Facilitating the access of all to education and training systems; and iii) Opening-up education and training systems to the wider world. Within this framework, 13 objectives were identified (see Appendix S). Teacher policy was most directly related to objective 1.1 “*Improving education and training for teachers and trainers*”. Under this objective four key issues were identified (CoEU 2002, p.7):

1. *“Identifying the skills that teachers and trainers should have, given their changing roles in knowledge society*
2. *Providing the conditions which adequately support teachers and trainers as they respond to the challenges of the knowledge society, including through initial and in-service training in the perspective of lifelong learning*
3. *Securing a sufficient level of entry to the teaching profession, across all subjects and levels, as well as providing for the long-term needs of the profession by making teaching and training even more attractive*
4. *Attracting recruits to teaching and training who have professional experience in other fields.”*

Teacher policy was also deemed to have implications for some of the other objectives. In particular, with regard to objective 1.2 “*Developing skills for the knowledge society*”, the report pointed out that “*the quality of teaching is an essential criterion for the acquisition of key competencies. There must therefore be a close link with objective 1.1. ‘Improving Education for Teachers and Trainers’*”. With regard to objective 1.2, we should note that the indicators framework of the Detailed Work Programme included attainments levels as measured by PISA (CoEU 2002).

With regard to teacher policy and TALIS, two DG EAC Working Groups were important; the Working Group on “Improving the education of trainers and teachers”, set up in September 2002, and a cross-cutting “Standing Group on Indicators and Benchmarks” which was established to support the Working Groups in identifying appropriate indicators for measuring progress (exEAC). Based on the recommendations from these Groups, two Commission Staff Working Papers from 2004 (European Commission 2004a, 2004b) pointed out the lack of indicators on teachers. The Commission Staff Working Paper *Progress towards the common objectives in education and training* suggested that indicators and benchmarks were “needed to make progress easily visible and to break down overall ambition in achievable goals in different policy areas”. Without indicators, “the shared European ambition of becoming the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world could become hollow” (European Commission 2004a, p.10). In this respect, the document lamented that the three available indicators on teachers (age of teachers, number of young people, and ratio of pupils to teaching staff) merely related to shortages and surpluses of teachers without addressing the strategically very important area of the quality and content of teaching. Accordingly, the Staff Working Paper called for the development on new indicators on teachers and trainers undergoing continuing training, shortage/surplus of teachers, and clarifying definitions of “qualified teachers” (EC 2004a, p.18).

Point 7 in the key text CoEU (2005) refers to another European Commission Staff Working Paper from 2004, *New indicators on education and training* (European Commission 2004b). This paper provides the first instance where an OECD survey on teachers was mentioned in EU documents. The paper distinguished between short-, medium, and long-term activities in indicator development. In the medium term (up to 3 years), the Commission was to “examine the possibility of using international instruments covering an adequate number of member states in order to collect information on teachers at school level”, for example “the teacher survey that the OECD is aiming to launch. The survey aims to describe the learning environment of students and teachers and teaching effectiveness, and could possibly be linked to PISA 2006” (EC 2004b, para.76-77).

By tracing the issue of indicators development through EU documents from the early years of the Lisbon Strategy we thus see that strategic objectives, issues and indicators were incrementally formulated during the 2000s. We might hence see the ET2010 work programme as being concerned with ‘substantiating’ - through indicators development and data collection - the goals formulated in the beginning of the 2000s. CoEU (2005) are indicative of the nature of these efforts, including the cooperation with OECD on TALIS.

The Council Conclusions from 2005 were followed up in 2007. Responding to the EC Communication (EC 2007a) which suggested 20 core indicators (including *“Professional development of teachers and trainers”*) for measuring progress under the ET2010 work programme, CoEU (2007a) reaffirmed the *“need to continue to enhance cooperation with other international organisations active in this field, in order to improve international data coherence and comparability, to avoid duplication and to satisfy EU data needs ...”* and invited the EC to pursue the development of indicators on professional development of teachers and trainers. Moreover, member states and the Commission were invited to *“work towards the objective that the indicators in that framework should cover all Member States”* (CoEU 2007a). In terms of competitive comparison, this is an important point. By 2007, the EU had 27 member states and not all of them took part in TALIS. In the two first rounds of TALIS, 16 and 19 EU member states took part (cf. Chapter 3).

The EU’s sustained focus on teachers’ professional development was confirmed by the joint commissioned report with secondary analysis of the TALIS data, issued by the EC and OECD in the wake of TALIS 2008 (EC 2010a). This is the second text singled out for closer analysis (see Figure 14). The report was the main follow-up of the EC on TALIS 2008 and was centred on teachers’ professional development. The report includes a chapter written by DG EAC’s teacher policy coordinator at the time about the “European Political Context”, divided into four sections: i) Introduction; ii) The changing world of teaching; iii) Teaching and Schools Policy; and iv) Peer learning in teacher education. The chapter sets out the EU priorities on teachers, specifically concerned with professional development and initial teacher education. The Lisbon Strategy remains the point of reference, and the practical

argumentation is similar to the one put forward in Council of the European Union (2005). The context of action is represented as follows:

“Though the organisation and content of education and training systems are entirely their responsibility, Member States of the European Union increasingly acknowledge the benefits of policy co-operation with their European Union partners to address common challenges in these fields.” (EC 2010a, p.11)

On this basis, the chapter proceeds with a range of references to various policy documents issued by EU institutions to highlight *“the fact that education systems in general, and schools in particular, are recognised as playing an important role in achieving the European Union’s Lisbon goals.”* (EC 2010a, p.11): ET 2010; Council conclusions (CoEU 2003, 2006b, 2007b, 2008), European Parliament and Council (2001, 2006), EC (2005, 2007b, 2008), and European Parliament (2008). The chapter points out the claim to action:

“It is against this background of closer co-operation on school education policies among Member States that the Council, in May 2005 and May 2007, asked the Commission to co-operate with the OECD on the development of the Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS), in order better to satisfy EU needs for data on the professional development of teachers. This demand should be seen in the context of the quest for evidence-based policy making to support the identification of good performance for peer review and exchange, and for the analysis of progress towards agreed common objectives.” (EC 2010a, pp.11-12)

On this basis, we should thus understand EU engagement with TALIS as part of *“the quest for evidence-based policy making”* within the Lisbon Strategy and ET2010 framework. Moreover, the chapter is interesting due to its representation of a European *political context*, as well as a *context of education, teaching and learning*. In the text, the former is more prominent, yet the chapter points with regard to the latter, that research (including reference to Rivkin and colleagues (2005) amongst others) *“suggests that teacher quality is significantly and positively correlated with pupil attainment ... that it is the most important within-school explanation of student performance and that there are positive relations between in-service teacher training and student achievement”* (EC 2010a, p.13).

The concern with two distinctive, yet related, contexts of political action and education are typical of EU documents, indicating the emphasis on governance frameworks in legitimating EU initiatives in teacher policy.

This emphasis is also indicated by the means-goal premises, referring to the principle of subsidiarity and the open method of co-ordination. These are central to EU governance in education as they promote peer learning and the use of indicators and benchmarks to support evidence-based policy making (EC 2010a, p.11). The report also notes that the EC Working Groups were directly involved in preparing the TALIS survey instruments (2010a, p.12). Finally, the claims to action reflect the representation of the political context insofar as they distinguish between European-level actions, mainly programmes undertaken by the EC, and recommendations to member states.

In June 2010, the Heads of State and Government adopted the successor to the Lisbon Strategy, 'Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth' (European Council 2010, see Appendix T). However, already in 2009, a new 'strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training' had been adopted by the Education Council. This framework, ET 2020, put forward four strategic objectives, subsequently approved by Ministers of Education (CoEU 2009; see Appendix U):

1. making lifelong learning and mobility a reality
2. improving the quality and efficiency of education and training
3. promoting equity, social cohesion and active citizenship
4. encouraging creativity and innovation, including entrepreneurship at all levels of education and training

Teachers are included in two of those four strategic objectives, both of them similar to previous objectives in ET2010. With regard to "Making lifelong learning and mobility a reality", demographic change and the regular need to update and develop skills in line with changing economic and social circumstances call for a lifelong approach to learning, with mobility and periods of learning abroad for learners, teachers and teacher trainers forming an essential element. Concerning "Improving the quality and efficiency of education and training", high quality teaching, adequate initial teacher education, continuous professional

development for teachers and trainers, and making teaching an attractive career-choice will help to *“ensure the acquisition of key competences by everyone, while developing the excellence and attractiveness at all levels of education and training that will allow Europe to retain a strong global role.”*

The third EU text adopted for analysis is part of this new political reality (see Figure 15). The EC’s main follow-up on the release of TALIS 2013 results was an ‘EU Analytical and Policy Note’ (EC 2014a), prepared by policy officers in DG EAC (EACschools; EACanalysis). The Note includes: i) a five-pages Executive Summary; ii) a one page Introduction; iii) the main section on “Main Findings and Policy Implications” (20 pages); and iv) Country Profiles including selected results in areas where the particular country is doing well and faces challenges, respectively (five pages). The Note contains approximately 30 pages of contents and is indicative of the expanding substantive scope of EU teacher policy as well as the stronger framework of EU governance in the area.

Theme	Problem
Teacher shortages	School leaders report shortage of qualified teachers
Teachers’ self-efficacy and attractiveness of the teaching profession	TALIS results call for boosting the attractiveness of the profession
Initial teacher education and induction	While teachers feel well prepared for the subjects they teach, too few of them receive systematic support during their first years on the job
Continuous professional development	Teachers say they need more training on ICT, special needs teaching, and teaching in multicultural and multilingual settings
Teaching practice	Teachers who are involved in collaborative learning report using innovative pedagogies and being more satisfied with their jobs
Teacher appraisal and feedback	Teachers consider that feedback is only used to fulfil administrative requirements
School leadership	In school leaders’ views, resources, regulatory framework and school environment are critical factors for effective school management

Table 21. Policy themes and problems (EC 2014a)

In highlighting seven policy themes, the executive summary follows the structure of the main section on findings and policy implications. The executive summary is structured around the themes, each with a statement representing the problem in the educational context of action (see Table 21).

This representation of problems as circumstances for action hints at the goals as well as claims to action advocated in the note. In the executive summary, circumstantial premises and claims to action are succinctly phrased in one or two sentences under policy implications (in italics) for each of the seven themes.

The first paragraphs of the executive summary (EC 2014a, p.4) and the introduction (EC 2014a, p.9) set out the premises for EU engagement with TALIS. The executive summary focuses on what we might call the ‘political context of action’ and indicates the dense governance arrangements in place by 2014 under the Europe 2020 Strategy. In 28 lines, a range of governance instruments and documents are mentioned: Strategic Framework for Education and Training 2020 (ET2020), the Communication *Rethinking Education* (European Commission 2012a), Council Conclusions from 2013 and 2014 (CoEU 2013a, 2014), the 2014 European Semester and Country-Specific Recommendations (see Appendix V).

Together, these references in the executive summary serve to emphasise the importance of teachers for student learning (“... *high quality and well-trained teachers have an important influence on ensuring that learners develop the skills and competences demanded by a rapidly changing global labour market ...*”) and hence also in EU policy efforts (“... *supporting Europe's teachers as one of its priorities ...*”, “...*confirmed the importance of revising and strengthening the professional profile of the teaching profession ...*”; “... *Member States committed to increase the attractiveness of the teaching profession, ensure quality Initial Teacher Education, and promote professional development ...*”) (EC 2014a, p.4).

Subsequently, the emphasis in “Introduction” (EC 2014a, p.9) is more focused on the reality of teaching. The section opens with “*Teachers are the most important in-school factor affecting student outcomes*” as a circumstance not to be forgotten – and a sharp

reformulation of the circumstantial premise pointed out by the OECD (2014a, p.32) and in EC (2010a, p.13).

Accordingly, the claim to action involves developing *“coherent and comprehensive systems for the recruitment, selection, education, induction, and career-long professional development of the teaching professions”*. However, shortages in qualified teacher staff and declining attractiveness of the profession limits the possibilities for attracting the best resources to teaching. Moreover, teachers require a much broader and sophisticated set of competences: *“In order to offer high quality teaching in spite of fast changing work environments – with new technologies, a greater diversity of learners, and increased expectations placed on education - teachers need to keep their practice under continuous, critical review and adjust it in the light of students’ outcomes and latest research”* (EC 2014a, p.9).

Circumstances in the context of action here take on aspects of goals; are fast changing work environments already a fact or do they reflect a goal? Finally, TALIS results are found to be helpful in feeding into the existing EU policy priorities and the associated claims to action for member states and the EC’s *“tailored support and advice”* with regard to those actions (EC 2014a, p.9), in line with the stronger economic governance of the Joint Assessment Framework and the European Semester driving Europe 2020 and ET 2020 (EC/Joint Research Centre 2014; see Appendix V).

Compared with the two previous texts of the EU (CoEU 2005; EC 2010a), this text (EC 2014a) is different in terms of its representation of political and educational circumstances. EC (2014a) thus focuses on the implications of the economic recession and cuts in many education sectors across Europe. The text several times refers to conditions of crisis that are in marked contrast to many EU policy documents from the early 2000s (cf. *“conditions of budgetary constraints”* (p.18); *“current circumstances of limited budgetary possibilities”* (p.20); *“current budgetary conditions”* (p.20)).

In this way, the text is closely aligned with the priorities in the EC Communication *Rethinking Education* (2012a) which again corresponds with the Europe 2020 Strategy's economic emphasis on growth and jobs (European Council 2010; see Appendix O). Symptomatically, the first section in the Communication bears the headline *"Education and Skills – a core strategic asset for growth"*. The Communication acknowledges the broad mission of education in terms of promoting active citizenship and personal development. However, it asserts that *"against the backdrop of sluggish economic growth and a shrinking workforce due to demographic ageing, the most pressing challenges for Member States are to address the needs of the economy and focus on solutions to tackle fast-rising youth unemployment."* (EC 2012a, p.2).

Subsequent analysis in Chapter 6 on the internal relations of the TALIS ensemble examines in further detail how this strong focus on 'economic needs' is complemented by the stronger governance framework introduced with Europe 2020 in the area of education and teacher policy.

Finally, with regard to evaluative trajectories, the relation between teaching and student outcomes is pronounced in the text of EC (2014a). While this indicates an emphasis on students' individual learning development, we should note that teacher collaboration is strongly encouraged in professional development, appraisal and feedback, and classroom practices, within and across schools in Europe (EC 2014a, pp.5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28). For teachers, lifelong learning is thus represented as a common rather than individual enterprise.

As a tentative summary, the point to be made concerning EU engagement is that TALIS feeds into the existing practical argumentation of the EU. The entry point was that TALIS should serve indicators development and the codification of knowledge related to teachers' professional development specifically, due to the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy. In this way, TALIS feeds into existing policy agendas; TALIS serves the monitoring of progress towards political objectives, not the shaping of them. The specific focus on professional development has more recently been broadened; engagement with TALIS is now related to

more areas of teachers' work, as indicated by the scope of the EU Analytical and Policy Note (EC 2014a).

5.1.3. TUAC and BIAC

The formal mechanisms for social dialogue in OECD, BIAC and TUAC, share characteristics in their engagement with TALIS. The analysis suggests that both endorse and contribute to competitive comparison and the codification of knowledge concerning teachers' work. Yet, it should be noted that neither TUAC or BIAC emphasise temporal rhythm or hierarchical spaces in their practical argumentation. Their main interests are maintaining or enhancing the interests of labour and capital rather than managing capitalist crisis.

TUAC: Enhancing institutional power resources

The analysis confirms the hypothesis on teacher unions' priority for maintaining or enhancing institutional power resources in OECD fora. EI and TUAC prioritised participation in TALIS BPC rather than calling on affiliate teacher unions to ask teachers not to take part. This is interesting given that the OECD (2006, 2009a, 2014a) in its practical argumentation points out that the TALIS programme requires active participation from teachers and school leaders.

The analysis mainly draws on interviews with four individuals who have engaged with TALIS as representatives of TUAC, Education International or ETUCE. Three of them have represented the organisations in the TALIS BPC (Eloff, Elconsult, ETUCEoff) and two of them have taken part in EC Working Groups over long periods (ETUCEoff, ETUCErep). In addition, the analysis includes a paper (EI 2007), the argument of which resonates with the interviews, although it focuses on PISA.

In some ways, the analysis does not conform with the hypothesis. The entry point for union representatives was not whether teachers' work should be subject to a codification of knowledge. Rather, in the wake of the PISA launch, they endorsed and encouraged the OECD to develop a teacher survey so that the assessment of student learning outcomes in PISA would not stand alone. The EI and ETUCE interviewees differed somewhat in the sense of agency and influence that unions had in influencing the international debate in OECD and

elsewhere, but neither of them questioned the codification of knowledge as such. However, they all remained critical in terms of the contents of the survey and the types of knowledge included in codification.

Over the period, EI and ETUCE became increasingly engaged in the OECD as well as EC fora. The analysis suggests that it was the political uses of data that raised concerns among EI and ETUCE representatives rather than the OECD programmes in themselves. In this sense, EI and ETUCE have endorsed competitive comparison, with the evaluative trajectory emphasising the professional status, job status and self-efficacy of teachers. Yet still, the hypothesis of institutional power resources is confirmed as EI and ETUCE endorsed an international teacher survey in reacting to the launch of PISA. Thus, PISA is inseparable, as a fact in the context of action, from EI and ETUCE's practical argumentation for engaging with TALIS.

This leads us to *Education International Guide to PISA 2006* (EI 2007) which was prepared by the EI research unit to help EI affiliates to prepare for the launch of PISA 2006 results. The practical argumentation of the paper (see Figure 16) is particularly interesting in terms of the representation of circumstances as a “*new context of educational policy making*” (EI 2007, p.10). Drawing on Clegg (2005) and Martens (2007), among others, this representation in many ways shares the outlook of Dale (2005), Novoa and Yariv-Mashal (2003) and Rutkowski (2007) (see Chapters 3 and 4). In the main section “The political use of PISA”, the paper argues that policy formation had changed globally since the 1980s, becoming centred on “what works” and evidence-based policy and practice and stimulated by New Public Management in public sector reform involving performance measurement and accountability based on narrow conceptions of ‘effectiveness’. The paper pointed out that definitions of what counts as ‘evidence’ and ‘effectiveness’ is bound to have political implications. In this sense, politics and ideologies remain very much alive although evidence-based policy sometimes was associated with a ‘post-ideological’ approach to governance, emphasising pragmatism over ideology and blurred traditional distinctions between left and right wing policies (EI 2007, p.11).

With regard to education, the paper suggested that international comparative research had become harnessed for evidence-based policy, with PISA being the most prominent example. Accordingly, the OECD was held to play an increasingly important role in national policy-making, regarded as authoritative both as a provider and broker of ‘evidence’ (EI 2007, p.11). The paper stressed that there were positive and negative sides to PISA and the evidence-based policy paradigm more generally. Among the positives, PISA had generated – through media coverage - public awareness about the importance of quality education. Moreover, governments often welcomed PISA and OECD influence to support their political own political argumentation. In this respect, the key point of the paper is that data from PISA and other studies could be useful for unions too. The foremost negative aspect was the simplistic representation of PISA results, confirming EI’s cautious prediction from the late 1990s. By focusing on rankings, media and politicians reduce education to a calculable item, thereby threatening the quality of and access to education in the longer term. Moreover, PISA results was often used by politicians – and media which often have political affiliations - to serve their agendas. For unions, the widespread accept and recognition of PISA had made it more difficult for unions to make their point on education in public debates and consultation as social partners, especially when they put forward interpretations of the PISA results which differ from the ones presented by media and politicians (EI 2007, p.9-10).

Thus, the emphasis on ‘what works’ in policy formation involved constraints as well as possibilities. The main issue was not that the OECD and others developed research programmes, but that the results were misused. Indeed, EI General Secretary Fred van Leeuwen pointed out in the “Foreword” (EI 2007, p.3) that *“Education International welcomes comparative international research in education. ... The great merit of PISA has been that it has highlighted both quality and equity issues”*. The paper also noted that PISA had helped to highlight *“interesting correlations”* and that *“sound education policies can enhance both quality and equity”* (EI 2007, p.22).

On this basis, the paper argued that *“political influence follows the providers of data”* (EI 2007, p.12). Hence, to enhance their influence, the political landscape required that unions got involved in the politics of knowledge:

“In order to keep representing workers in the current knowledge society, ... unions need new instruments, such as research, which can be used along with the more traditional tools such strikes and bargaining” (EI 2007, p.12)

This provides the means-goal premise in the practical argumentation. Engaging with research was presented as a means to counter narrow definitions of ‘evidence’ and ‘effectiveness’. As a collective effort, unions should join forces and resources in putting forward the argument that evidence must be based on other parameters than *“the pragmatics of technical efficiency and effectiveness”* (EI 2007, p.21). Thereby, teacher unions would provide a voice of reason in political debate: *“Education unions must warn the public – and policymakers in the ministries – of the danger of over simplifying, of paying attention only to the headlines”* (EI 2007, p.3). In this respect, scale was an important dimension, because: *“[W]henever we can make a link between union work at the national level and the work of EI and TUAC at OECD level, that is a plus for the union movement”* (EI 2007, p.23).

With the aim or goal – in line with one of the aims in the EI Constitution (EI 2017) – of *“helping each union to remain a strong and significant voice in current and future debates on educational policy”* (EI 2007, p.10), the paper provides recommendations to unions. These claims to action can be summarised as follows:

- Before the release of PISA 2006 results, education unions should consider context-specific key messages, prepare press briefings and responses to the media as well as prepare information on union websites and in journals, to keep PISA in perspective by pointing out that the assessment does not convey the complexity of education. Timing and preparation were held to be imperative, as media and politicians – with the latter enjoying pre-launch access to reports – would often (mis)use results to suit their agendas from the day of the release.
- More generally, *“... in a political landscape where policy-making is increasingly founded on evidence, it becomes absolutely crucial for unions to be another provider of evidence”* (EI 2007, p.20). Such union research, serving external and public purposes, might relate results to the national context and compile other studies *“to*

balance and if necessary challenge the PISA results with a broader picture” (EI 2007, p.22).

- Finally, unions at the national level should actively seek involvement in PISA by contacting PISA national project managers and national committees to obtain information on current developments and offer expertise (EI 2007, p.20)

The practical argumentation of the “PISA Guide” (EI 2007) is consistent with the approach to TALIS. In terms of the main priorities and competitive comparison, EI and ETUCE’s political discourse have remained stable throughout the period. Indeed, we see the main points from the “PISA Guide” repeated in an EI (2012) news item endorsing TALIS. Here, John Bangs, Senior Consultant for Education International and Chair of the TUAC Education, Training and Employment Policy Working Group, was cited:

"The most important point about TALIS 2013 is that its results should not be the sole property of governments. Since the survey is about teachers' views the prime owners of TALIS should be teachers themselves and their unions so that the profession itself can create teacher policy. Engagement in TALIS is often the best way of making sure this happens."

Accordingly, the news item (EI 2012) reported that EI would ensure that the OECD’s main report on TALIS 2013 fully reflected teachers’ views, arguing that *“...often it is not the results of the surveys themselves that are the problem but the selective and political use of results by governments”*.

Together, the interviews resonate with this argument (see Figure 17). In fact, it surprised me to learn that two of the interviewees affiliated with EI (EIconsult) and ETUCE (ETUCEoff) had encouraged the OECD to conduct a teacher survey already from around 2002. However, I would argue that this should be understood in the context of PISA. The two interviewees, at separate occasions, pointed out to the OECD Secretariat that the teacher perspective was lacking from PISA and called for a teacher questionnaire to be included. We might see this as an issue of maintaining institutional power resources as TUAC was not granted access to the ‘PISA Board of Participating Countries’ - from PISA 2003 re-labeled the ‘PISA Governing Board’ (OECD 2004, p.474) - at the time due to opposition from a range of countries,

including UK (ETUCEoff). Moreover, the US representative was opposed to support ‘teacher voice’ by including a teacher questionnaire in PISA (Elconsult). Finally, the OECD Secretariat pointed out the methodological issues of including a teacher questionnaire in PISA (ETUCEoff).

Whilst the union representatives were not successful in calling for a contextual teacher questionnaire in PISA, EI and ETUCE during the following years kept calling for an instrument of teacher voice in OECD programmes as well as access to the PISA Governing Board. As we know, the OECD eventually initiated the design of a separate teacher survey. According to the EI Senior Consultant, *“one of the reasons for creating TALIS was to actually provide the teacher voice which could not be included in PISA”* (Elconsult).

EI and ETUCE were granted access to the TALIS BPC from the second meeting in 2006. At this meeting, they made explicit their critique of the draft teacher questionnaire due to its emphasis on rewards and the general objectification of teachers rather than taking their opinions seriously. They made a strong point that they were going to advise their member affiliates whether TALIS was a worthwhile exercise (ETUCEoff).

We should note that *Teachers Matter* (OECD 2005) had been issued at this point, and the report had raised concerns in EI:

“And at that time, with that report, we saw a danger. Because we thought and that’s how it looked like, that the OECD is going down a very, not primitive, but somehow very straightforward policy agenda of privatising things and introducing business working methods in education, and more flexible hire-and-fire issues with teachers, you know, and we took it as kind of, kind of attack, little bit. So, we were quite defensive, and we spoke against it, and we managed quite well, I think, because starting from our interaction with that report, OECD took out many of these statements about private sector and the private working methods, etc. etc.” (Eloff)

For EI, the issue of performance-based pay for teachers stood out *“like a red line that we have to do whatever it takes to counter”* (Eloff). Hence, the union representatives in the TALIS BPC fought the inclusion of questions on performance-related pay, and the

questionnaire over time developed into something more in line with EI and ETUCE priorities (ETUCEoff; Elconsult; Eloff).

TUAC has had access to the TALIS BPC since 2006, and Chapter 6 on governance in the TALIS ensemble will return to this in more detail. In explaining the practical argumentation of TUAC for engaging with TALIS, we should note that PISA had changed the political context (cf. EI 2007), and that EI and ETUCE identified a need for an instrument focusing on teachers, perhaps as a lever for gaining more direct access to OECD education policy fora:

“I think the key thing about TALIS is that it conforms to a consistent EI policy. It is an achievement to have got TALIS. It forms a EI consistent policy and it says that if you want to do international surveys, you cannot do them without a teachers’ voice. That is a very important principle. Whatever you think about how they are operated, or questions you might not want in there, or the approach, the principle remains the same. Which is why the EI has not opposed, although it has worries about it, not opposed the teacher questionnaire in PISA [2015], because it follows the principle of teacher voice.” (Elconsult)

More specifically, EI sought to become engaged in the TALIS BPC to influence the construction of knowledge generated through the programme. In line with the questioning of what counts as evidence in the PISA guide (EI 2007), EI has treated TALIS as a political construction which through the prioritisation of certain policy themes and indicators, and the phrasing of questionnaire items, is bound to contain a bias towards particular notions of education, teachers’ work and society. Therefore, it was imperative for EI to seek influence on the survey questionnaires at the TALIS BPC meetings:

“Everybody agrees that of course policies should be based on evidence, but what that evidence is, who defines it, how it is collected, I mean, even down to the fact what kind of questions you ask. And that is where we clashed always ... I mean, the most political was the discussion of the TALIS questionnaires, that is where you really get down, why are you asking this question, what do you want to ... what is your purpose, what will you do with the answers? ... I mean, by phrasing the questions you already imply what kind of evidence you are looking for. ... they never asked questions whether you would like to be paid based on test results of your students. If they would try to ask that question we would oppose that very forcefully, and not because we don’t want to know what

teachers actually think about it, but because we know that that would not be beneficial for the policies that we advocate.” (Eloff)

The EI Official also pointed out that they were critical about the concept of teacher appraisal and feedback, and the implications in terms of incentives, rewards and emphasising student performance. In this respect, they raised the issue in the TALIS BPC why TALIS did not ask teachers about their opinions concerning whether and how often they would like to receive feedback (Eloff).

More generally, the teacher union representatives sought to question the very notion of ‘effectiveness’ underlying TALIS (ETUCEoff), and the implications of the emphasis on evidence in contemporary policy formation. In this respect, the EI Official suggested that knowledge might be harnessed for legitimating the sidelining of social dialogue between government and labour:

“... we perceive as a general danger that evidence somehow hijacks social dialogue. That is our underlying deeper, broader - as broad as you can get it - concern. Our understanding of policy is that teachers have their representative bodies and unions, and government represent the people, and they should stick together and through social dialogue establish conditions, and also to some extent the contents of education [...] That should be a democratic process, that both sides come together, and government says OK, we offer this, and the unions say, no, we disagree, we offer that, and they reach some agreement about how the system is adapted. Now, when you come in with your evidence, and you start making claims, that based on whatever research findings you know that shows that this works better, rather than this kind of arrangement, then we have a problem, obviously.” (Eloff)

In this respect, the union representatives were concerned that the rise of major companies as providers and brokers of evidence, including Pearson, McKinsey and Co. and Gates Foundation would provide further leverage for private business interests in education. Accordingly, they emphasised that a key task for unions is to maintain strong working relationships with government, including in OECD and EC fora such as DG EAC Working Groups on key competences and entrepreneurship education (Elconsult; ETUCEoff;

ETUCErep). In line with the PISA guide (EI 2007), research findings from OECD and elsewhere should be used by unions in consultations and negotiations with government:

“My view is that teacher unions should be mercilessly plundering OECD research, and there is a lot of stuff there, to back their own policies when they are negotiating with government because it would put government on the backfoot and on the defensive.” (Elconsult)

Hence, teacher unions might be able to use such evidence to become *“in charge of the narrative”* in *“the battle of ideas”* with government. The EI Senior Consultant added out that he multiple times had put forward the argument, based on an EI survey and OECD findings, that there is a correlation in countries between high student performance and having strong teacher unions with full consultative structures. In addition, connections between teacher self-efficacy and student learning outcomes might be exploited:

“One of the most important findings of TALIS 2013 is the argument on distributed leadership in schools and teacher leadership specifically, and the contextual relationship between high levels of teacher self-efficacy and the outcomes of countries. ... for most countries, there is a contextual link between teacher self-efficacy and high performance. Now that is an important message to governments. If your teaching profession is not happy and doesn’t feel proactive, you can forget about results. That is a very powerful policy message for teacher unions.” (Elconsult)

In this sense, EI and ETUCE endorse competitive comparison as a driver for education policy formation. The analysis suggests the belief that international comparative research programmes like TALIS, which allow teachers a voice, can help maintaining or advancing the professional status and interests of the teacher profession in line with the aims and principles of the EI Constitution (EI 2017). First, ensuring ‘teacher voice’ in international comparative research contributes to a richer evidence basis for policy formation, which unions across scales can use in their work. Second, through such research programmes, the union movement would have better opportunities to increase their institutional power resources in OECD, as well as more generally. TALIS might thus more indirectly help enhance the institutional power resources of unions as governments would need to be more open

towards maintaining a dialogue with unions in order to ensure the necessary survey response rates (ETUCErep).

It is important to note that the practical argumentation of teacher union representatives is based on the premise that politicians and media are all too willing to misuse evidence for their own purposes, and private businesses are becoming involved as knowledge brokers. EI and ETUCE have concerns with this direction of travel and have therefore continuously pursued that teachers should be given a voice in the codification of knowledge on teachers' work, and furthermore that teacher unions' institutional power resources are maintained or enhanced in the OECD which they regard as an increasingly important political forum.




Figure 16. Practical argumentation of Education International Guide to PISA (EI 2007)




Figure 17. Practical argumentation for TUAC engagement with TALIS (interviews)

BIAC engagement in TALIS was not concerted

The analysis confirms the research evidence that BIAC was not as strongly involved in TALIS as TUAC. BIAC currently includes seven Policy Groups, each divided into Committees. The “Employment, Skills, and Society” Policy Group includes an Education Committee. The BIAC (2017) website provides access to a number of documents on education, including annual reports, surveys among employer organisations, and statements for OECD Ministerial Councils. However, based on the interviews conducted for this study, BIAC does not appear to give a high priority to education. There was not any concerted effort, let alone objective, of the BIAC Education Committee with regard to TALIS. A former OECD Senior Analyst recalled:

“During my time of involvement in TALIS, I can’t remember once when BIAC asked to be part of the TALIS meetings. I think once they might have come and asked for a seat at the table, and there is a seat there that they are entitled to. My perception is that they were just less engaged than TUAC. Through the Education Policy Committee they would have seen all the papers and get a chance to comment and they would have known when meetings were coming up. They just seemed less engaged.” (exOECDsenAnalyst)

Still, BIAC had two observer seats in TALIS BPC. A senior manager from *Microsoft Partners in Learning* (later renamed *Microsoft in Education*) took part in TALIS BPC meetings throughout the 2013 cycle, along with a representative from the Confederation of Danish Industry. However, according to the former, these two BIAC representatives did not have the feeling that they undertook a concerted effort for BIAC when taking part in BPC meetings. They reported to the BIAC Education Committee Lead after those meetings, but otherwise had little communication with BIAC (MicPart).

This calls for considering whether I am in a position to analyse BIAC’s practical argumentation for engaging with TALIS. The following analysis mainly draws on an interview with the *Microsoft Partners in Learning* senior manager (see Figure 18). I treat the interview data as representative of BIAC’s practical argumentation as it actually happened to be represented in the TALIS BPC, although we cannot interpret it as an expression of a concerted effort of BIAC as the formal mechanism for consultation with private sector

interests in the OECD. However, the practical argumentation accounted for below resonates with official BIAC statements on for example “*Equipping effective teachers for the 21st Century*” (BIAC 2010). Yet, it should be noted that this account only refers to the TALIS 2013 cycle, and not the entire period from the mid-2000s.

The senior manager pointed out that it was somewhat a coincidence that she became part of the TALIS BPC. *Microsoft Partners in Learning* had commissioned a study on ‘education renewal’ through student-centred, personalised learning (including beyond the classroom), and integration of ICT into pedagogy, in eight countries (including Australia, England and Finland). A key concept in the study was ‘21st century skills’, centred on knowledge building; self-regulation and assessment; collaboration; skilled communication; problem-solving and innovation; global awareness; and ICT use. These skills were held to be associated with demands in the labour market. The study found that students’ opportunities to develop 21st century skills tended to be scarce and uneven within schools and across countries. Moreover, the use of ICT in teaching, while becoming more common, remained an exception (ITL Research 2011). The enterprise sent the report to the OECD which found it interesting and asked whether the senior manager would take one of the BIAC seats in TALIS BPC meetings (MicPart).

According to the senior manager, her job at the time was to influence various fora on behalf of *Microsoft Partners in Learning*. In the particular case of TALIS, she sought to make a case for that perspectives were included in the survey in which her company had an interest. Like TUAC, the means-goal premise for BIAC thus was to seek influence through the TALIS BPC, with the content of questionnaires being particularly relevant. The two BIAC representatives thus both sought to influence the debate by commenting on the questionnaire items, emphasizing the use of ICT and 21st century skills in teaching practices and teachers’ professional development. These priorities were ultimately addressed in the questionnaires though not to the extent the BIAC representatives would have hoped for. In advancing these claims to action, the senior manager thought that she represented business and industry interests in a broader sense - albeit not identifying herself with being a BIAC representative -

arguing that Microsoft's interests were not unique in that modern enterprises overall have an interest in that young people develop 21st century skills (MicPart).

We should also note that the BIAC representatives supported the idea of linking TALIS and PISA, to raise the level of attention directed towards TALIS. In this respect, the voices of educators could help to 'soften' and contextualise the 'harder' findings of PISA (MicPart).

Concerning the goal premises, the focus of *Microsoft Partners in Learning* at the time was to cooperate with educators, organisations and policy makers to transform learning processes towards a higher focus on '21st century skills' and employers' requirements of workers. Working for this transformation of learning, in which ICT would serve as a tool, was compatible with the commercial interests of her company in selling ICT products. For these objectives, the enterprise had in particular engaged with professional development and training materials for school leaders and teachers (MicPart).

More implicitly, circumstances in the context of action include that the ways that educational institutions currently operate do not reflect surrounding society, including in the use of ICT and the sort of learning processes and skills that employers value. This representation of reality entails that schools and teachers do not sufficiently emphasise the needs of the labour market.




Figure 18. Practical argumentation of BIA representative in TALIS 2013 (interview)

5.1.4. Summary of diachronic account

The account above highlighted the various entry points for the OECD, the EU, TUAC and BIAC in terms of their engagement with the TALIS programme. The analysis of their practical argumentation showed that their engagement is associated with the mechanism of competitive comparison; the OECD and the EU were trying to put the basic conditions into place through indicators development and their application; TUAC pursued a survey instrument of ‘teacher voice’ to complement PISA; and the senior manager from Microsoft Partners in Learning (as BIAC representative) had a particular interest in the evaluative trajectory and learning as individual development centred on ‘21st century skills’. The summary of the Chapter will discuss the explanatory powers of the hypothesised mechanisms in the light of the diachronic and synchronic accounts combined. Yet, for now we should note the incremental nature in the OECD’s development of TALIS, and in parallel, the EU’s steady quest for ‘evidence-based policy making’, with the high-profiled PISA programme very much part of the political context. The next section turns toward the comparative cases of Australia, England and Finland and the reasons for why government authorities in those countries were interested in TALIS 2013.

5.2. Why did Australia, England and Finland take part in TALIS 2013?

The analysis of the practical argumentation for engaging with TALIS in Australia, England and Finland to a large extent confirms the hypotheses, and thus also the initial theorisation of the three cases in Chapter 3. In all three cases, state authorities hence endorse notions of competitive comparison. The synchronic account below mainly draws on interviews with a Civil Servant from the Australian Government Department of Education and Training (AusDfET), a British Department of Education Official (EngDfE), and a Senior Official in the Ministry of Education and Culture (FinMinEdu), complemented with the national TALIS 2013 reports. The analysis shows that ideas of competitive comparison help to explain the cases’ engagement in TALIS 2013. Yet, they do so with various emphases, and the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 in more detail shows how the four dimensions of hierarchical space, temporal rhythm, evaluative trajectories, and scale are shaped and contested by state authorities in the three comparative cases.

The account in this section suggests that one particular condition stands out as being necessary in making TALIS possible: in all three cases, the OECD is recognised as a major and influential provider of evidence. In the practical argumentation of the state authorities, this recognition is part of the representation of reality, that is, in the circumstantial premises underpinning the argumentation. Hence, the retroductive question *“Would TALIS be possible without the recognition of the OECD as provider of evidence?”* would yield a negative answer. This implies that competitive comparison to some extent is underpinned by soft legalisation, an issue that will be analysed in Chapter 6.

More pointedly, we might ask whether state authorities in the three cases would have signed up for TALIS if PISA did not exist. The analysis suggests that Australia and England, both being cases emphasising student performance as measures of teacher accountability, would not have been interested, while Finland may have joined. The entry point for Finnish state authorities for taking part in TALIS 2013 was thus an interest in teachers’ professional development, overlapping the EU’s practical argumentation in this respect. This different position indicates that Finnish participation in TALIS 2013 was associated – and legitimised – with the specific goal of teachers’ learning, rather than increasing student learning outcomes as in Australia and England.

Finally, the analysis below hints at the very different positions of teacher unions in the political landscapes of the three cases, as represented by state authorities. In Australia, they were not considered; in England, state authorities were aware of the position of unions; and in Finland, as a major policy actor that could not be ignored. The analysis in Section 5.2 will elaborate on this point.

5.2.1. Australia

In Australia, TALIS 2013 was the second time around. During the interview, the Australian Government DfET Civil Servant emphasised the potential for learning that comes with taking part in programmes like TALIS (see Figure 19 for practical argumentation). In this respect, her reflections resonated with Nóvoa and Yariv-Mashal’s (2003) ideas of the ‘global eye’ and the ‘national eye’ complementing each other:

“[...] we undertake international as well as domestic work partly to make some triangulation to make sure that we are seeing something. Secondly, learning from what other countries are doing. It is very easy to set your own baseline and ignore everybody else and forget that you’re in fact slipping in the world and not learning new things. So, we are interested in what happens internationally because we are interested in what others are doing.” (AusDfET)

In terms of our analytical focus on the construction of hierarchical space, the Civil Servant pointed out that OECD’s international comparative research helps to shed light on the global ‘negative space’ surrounding Australia. Ideally, participation in OECD programmes could thus spark general reflections about the agenda and preferences of education policy in Australia and put them in perspective. In this respect, rankings and league tables were deemed of less relevance in terms of education policy formation:

“The real value is not so much about the ranking, but about how we learn from what other people are doing, and an awareness of ourselves as a result of looking elsewhere. Sometimes you define who you are by looking elsewhere at those people that are not like you. In a painting, the background serves as a negative space. This is defined not just what is in it but also by what’s not in it. So, having a context that serves as a basis to assess what’s inside is important. For us, it’s about being able to understand ourselves in a global context. Therefore, the negative space is of interest to us. The negative space in our terms is about other countries and what they are doing. Because they highlight something and questions that we need to ask about ourselves, and of ourselves.” (AusDfET)

Lingard (2010) argued that a national system of schooling, including national curriculum, is emerging in Australia as part of the reconstitution of the nation in the face of globalisation and related economisation of education policy. We might note in this respect that national reports on the school teacher workforce, wholly or partly funded by the Australian Government and intended to inform teacher workforce issues and planning, have been prepared in Australia at least since 2007. The most important reports in this respect are “Staff in Australia’s Schools” (SiAS) which goes back to 2007, and the “National Teaching Workforce Dataset” from 2013 (DfET 2017).

However, when asked about this issue, the Civil Servant contested this representation of the political context in Australia and the notion that there is a trend of national-level centralisation in education policy. Rather, the Civil Servant emphasised the complex federal structure of Australian governance. According to the “Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act”, the policy area of education are regulated primarily by laws of the Australian States and Territories rather than by laws of the Commonwealth Parliament (Commonwealth of Australia 2010, p. vi). In this respect, the Civil Servant clarified that the ‘national architecture’ of education governance includes an Education Council, composed by Ministers from all nine jurisdictions, including eight State and Territory and the Commonwealth governments. The Education Council provides a forum through which policy on school education, early childhood and higher education can be strategically coordinated at the national scale of government to address issues of national significance. The Education Council is one among nine ministerial councils sitting beneath the Council of Australian Governments which is constituted by the Prime Minister and the Premiers of the eight States and Territories (AusDfET).

In the Education Council, the work of school teachers are deemed one of the issues that are of national significance and common purpose. Concerning the work and responsibilities of the Australian Government DfET, the Civil Servant pointed out that “... *we have a focus on human capital development, and in education that translates into all the layers of learning, including the key factors that influence learning, where teachers is one of them*” (AusDfET). In particular, the Education Council has in recent years debated the training of teachers. The governments of Australian State and Territories have raised questions concerning around how well teachers are prepared for practice in schools, once they have completed their formal training in universities and associated placements during courses. The federal Australian Government, on the other hand, has an interest in teachers because it funds universities and hence teacher training. In other words, the focus on teacher policy in Australia and Australian engagement in TALIS should be understood within the context that the various scales of government in the national architecture have their particular foci in terms of teacher policy. In broad terms, States and Territories have responsibility for their

teacher workforces, while the federal government level monitors overall performance of the national system (communication with Australian Government DfET, April 2017).

Moreover, the national architecture of education governance also includes Committees, sitting underneath Ministers. These Committees are constituted by senior officials from the various Departments. With regard to TALIS, one of these Committees concerns data and evidence. Made up of representatives from all 9 jurisdictions, this Committee discusses which data would be useful at the national level and in the individual jurisdictions, with TALIS being of those potential data sources (AusDfET).

The decision to participate in TALIS 2008 and TALIS 2013, including the international options of the TALIS-PISA link and ISCED level 3 sample in TALIS 2013, would thus formally be taken by the Australian Government. However, with a view to implementing such a survey successfully and reflecting the complex and collaborative governance structure in Australia, it was necessary also in the case of TALIS to consult the States and Territories in the decision-making process in order to secure their support. In terms of our analytical focus on practical argumentation, we might understand this multi-scale decision-making process as a means-goal premise, enabling the claim to action and the pursuit of goals in engaging with TALIS:

“In the past, it has always been a decision that the Australian government has made. Before making that decision, we would always have made sure that we could actually implement it. Consequently, it would have been tested with the states, informally, to make sure that they are happy with it. But formally, the decision would be ours. From the OECD perspective, they’re dealing with the national government, but in undertaking that decision we need to know that we can actually manage to implement it. We know that we cannot do that unless we have the support from the States and Territories.” (AusDfET)

With regard to the goals of taking part in TALIS, the Australian report on TALIS 2013 (Freeman *et al.* 2014, p.7) merely repeated the aims of the international OECD report (OECD 2014a, p.27), without pointing out any specific objectives for Australia’s participation in the programme. Again, we should note that in Australia, participation in TALIS was the outcome of decision-making in line with the national architecture, and each of the involved policy

actors might have distinctive reasons for their decision to support TALIS participation. For the Australian Government DfET, their monitoring role of overall system performance meant that their interest in teachers' work primarily revolves around student learning outcomes and how to improve them:

"We are interested in students, and we know from the literature, in Australia and internationally, that one of the key influences inside of schools is teachers. Consequently, the natural link between learning and what teachers are doing is of interest to us. The TALIS instrument helps to inform us to some extent."
(AusDfET)

This emphasis on student learning outcomes is consistent with recent initiatives in Australia, such as the high-stakes NAPLAN testing framework, the publication of school performances (see Lingard 2010; Lingard and Rawolle 2011), and more recently the report from the Teacher Education Ministerial Advisory Group (TEMAG 2014, p.ix). The TEMAG report asserted that *"... in conducting our work, we have kept a solid focus on student outcomes as the fundamental driver for teacher quality. Teachers matter"*. In this respect, Australian students' declining performances in PISA are singled out as a main concern with regard to the quality of teaching (TEMAG, 2014, p.2). The introduction of the Australian policy context in Chapter 3 noted the strong trenchancy of PISA in Australia-based media and policy, and this helps to explain why Australia took part in the TALIS-PISA link in TALIS 2013.

In terms of claims to action and implementation, the Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER) won the bid to become National Project Manager - like it was the case for TALIS 2008 - in charge of implementing TALIS 2013 in Australia. ACER thus effectively constituted the National Project Centre (NPC) in Australia. Implementation structures and involved stakeholders were similar for TALIS 2008 and TALIS 2013 in Australia, with an advisory group (named differently for the two TALIS rounds) meant to provide a forum for communication and collaboration between ACER as National Project Manager, the Australian Government DfET, the States and Territories (through their respective education departments), and Catholic and Independent education authorities (AusDfET; AusNPC1). Given our focus on the institutional power resources of teacher unions, we should note that teacher unions were not represented in this advisory group.

Finally, we might observe that due to the exceptionally long distance from Australia to the OECD headquarters in Paris, a Paris-based government representative of Australia took part in TALIS BPC meetings during the first two rounds - unlike for example the PISA Governing Board where representatives travel all the way from Australia to attend meetings. This pragmatic decision (in terms of time and costs) is based on the status of programmes in the OECD organisational structure; for Level 1 bodies (including the PISA Governing Board), representatives tend to travel from Australia, and for Level 2 bodies (such as the TALIS BPC in the first two rounds of TALIS), representatives tend to come from the Australian OECD Delegation based in Paris (AusDfET). Chapter 6, focusing on soft legalisation, will return to the distinction between Level 1 and Level 2 OECD bodies in much more detail.

5.2.2. England

In England, the decision to take part in TALIS 2013 was taken in 2010 by the incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat government. Previously, the teacher unions had expressed their desire that England should take part, and the outgoing Labour government had signalled their intention to sign up. However, the final decision could only be taken by the new government (EngDfE).

Formally, the decision was based on a Ministerial Agreement as it was understood that taking part in TALIS would influence the work of the Department for Education (DfE). The procedure followed was that a civil servant in the DfE submitted a document introducing the TALIS programme, the costs, time scales, deliverables, and asking for the opinion of the relevant Minister. The DfE Official told that in the case of TALIS, the DfE were confident about the sort of questions that the Minister and the Government would be interested in and how that related to the policy themes of TALIS. In this respect, the Official pointed out that a lot of data is collected nationally on teachers in England (EngDfE). This includes: i) the national *School Workforce Census* which documents the organisation of schools, e.g. their numbers of different types of staff – teachers, teaching assistants, administrative and other staff – salaries, work experience, and qualifications; ii) DfE *Teachers' Workload Diary Surveys*, the most recent held in 2013, containing information on the hours worked by a sample of teachers and how that time is spent during the day, and iii) *Teacher Resignation*

and Recruitment Surveys, conducted annually by the National Foundation for Educational Research, which reveal the characteristics of teachers leaving schools.

According to the DfE Official, there were a range of reasons for taking part in TALIS 2013: i) changing UK governments have for decades continuously shown interest in teachers and their work; ii) high-performing countries in PISA, such as Finland and Singapore, had signed up for TALIS 2013; iii) Teacher unions, had shown a strong interest in taking part; and iv) the high profile of OECD and PISA. These were thus all background factors in the political context of action (see Figure 20 for practical argumentation). The official pointed out with regard to the latter point:

“It’s also the profile that OECD work gathered, and has gathered with PISA. So, people were looking more internationally because PISA was becoming a bigger thing. OECD has developed this big student assessment, and then people were saying that, well, this is just one kind of aspect of international benchmarking, comparing students’ attitudes, engagement and performance, but what about a comparison of teachers. So, because there was so much momentum gathering on the PISA side there was a kind of acceptance that there is so much information here, and there is a bit of a gap in terms of having that comparison of teachers too. So, I think that also helped in the decision.” (EngDfE)

Concerning the educational context, the national report on TALIS 2013 provided a section on the *“quasi-market in English secondary schooling”* which is in line with the initial theorisation on England provided in Chapter 3. For example, the report noted that (Micklewright *et al.* 2014, p.22): *“There has been a more concerted effort in England to ensure that schools hold teachers accountable for the quality of their practice, as measured in a variety of ways. The view that teaching quality can be raised also sees teachers needing continued professional training during their careers”*. In this context, ‘accountability’ in particular translates into measures of student performance. Hence, like in Australia, there is a strong focus on student learning outcomes in England, as measured nationally and internationally (cf. Chapter 3). Thus, the introduction in the English report on TALIS 2013 begins:

“Good teaching matters a great deal for pupil learning. The importance of good teaching makes it vital to find out more about teachers’ attitudes, their teaching practices, and their professional development.” (Micklewright et al. 2014, p.21).

In considering the circumstantial premises for engaging with the TALIS programme, we should note that the decision to take part in TALIS co-incided with the launch of the White Paper *“The Importance of Teaching”* (DfE 2010). In many ways, the political discourse in this White Paper reminds of the TEMAG report in Australia (TEMAG 2014), with Prime Minister David Cameron and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg stressing that “[...] *what really matters is how we’re doing compared with our international competitors. That is what will define our economic growth and our country’s future. The truth is, at the moment we are standing still while others race past*”. This verdict was based on declining PISA rankings, and the paper called for *“learning the lessons of other countries’ success”*, and – with a reformulation of one of the key messages from a McKinsey report (Barber and Mourshed 2007, p.16) - *“... the first, and most important, lesson is that no education system can be better than the quality of its teachers”* (DfE 2010, p.3). In the two “Forewords” (the second provided by Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove), variations on ‘world class education systems’ were invoked six times. Framed in this way, the White Paper then suggested a large number of initiatives concerning initial teacher training, teaching, leadership, curriculum and assessment accountability measures, school types, etc. (DfE 2010).

In terms of the broader goal for engaging with TALIS 2013, this might thus be summarised as ‘a world-class education system’ out-performing international competitors, as measured by PISA.

The claims to action included that DfE put out a call for a National Study Centre. Edu-tech firm RM Education asked the UCL Institute of Education (IOE) whether they would prepare a bid with them. Together, they won the bid in early 2011, with RM Education designated as the lead in implementing TALIS 2013 in England, and IOE being responsible for conducting the data analysis and preparing the national report (EngDfE, EngNPCres, EngNPCsen). The DfE also composed a Steering Group to monitor the implementation. It was composed by officials from different DfE teams, working on teacher policy and international evidence, and

representatives from the National Study Centre. The English representative in the TALIS BPC was from the DfE (EngDfE, EngNPCres, EngNPCsen). Moreover, the DfE took the initiative to establish an 'advisory group' with 10 members. This group served as a stakeholder consultation group and mainly included senior management representatives from the main teacher and headteacher unions (EngDfE).

5.2.3. Finland

The decision to sign up for TALIS 2013 was taken in 2010 in a 'Leading Group' composed of department managers in the Ministry of Education and Culture on the basis of a proposal by a senior policy officer (see Figure 21 for practical argumentation). Moreover, this group decided that Finland would take part in the three international options, and how the costs would be divided between the different departments. The relevant Minister was informed but it was the 'Leading Group' that made the practical decision (FinMinEdu).

The interviews with the state authorities suggest that cost was an important reason for not taking part in the first round of TALIS (FinMinEdu; FinBoard). However, for the 2013 round, and the international options, *"it wasn't really a question of budget anymore. We were able to find the funding to participate. Basically we just felt that it would be very useful to have all the options in order to get more data"* (FinBoard).

The Finnish report on TALIS 2013 main study results (Taajamo *et al.* 2014) includes an abstract in English (as well as in Finnish and Swedish) and the stated aims of the study are similar to the those of the OECD (Taajamo *et al.* 2014, p.7; compare OECD 2014a, p.27). Like in the other cases, data on teachers are also collected in Finland. National teacher surveys were conducted in 2008, 2010, and 2013. We might note that the latest edition includes a few chapters in English unlike earlier editions, based on OECD indicators. The teacher surveys comprise statistical data from pre-primary education to adult education, including formal qualifications of staff, gender and age structures, types of teaching duties and regional differences, the attractiveness of teacher education, professional development of teachers, and forecasts are made on the basis of the statistics (Opetushallitus 2009, 2011, 2014). Moreover, OPEPRO (*'Anticipatory Project to Investigate Teachers' Initial and*

Continuing Training Needs') surveys have been conducted in 1998-2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010 and 2013 (Opetushallitus 2014, p.32).

When prompted, the Senior Official from the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture suggested that the initial interest for Finnish participation in TALIS 2013, including the full package of international options, was associated with professional development and teacher education:

"The most important interest was teachers and their professional development. Not PISA. We didn't think that this link was so important. We were more interested in teacher education and especially in-service teacher education because since the beginning of the 2000s we have every third year conducted national surveys concerning the structures and work of teachers, including in-service training and professional development. We have noticed that the situation is not good at all. This was one of the most important reasons why we wanted to know more about this situation. Another thing was teacher education. We have done quite a lot to develop our teacher education, and Finnish teachers have a good reputation. They are highly qualified, and the status of teachers in Finland is very positive. We thought in 2010 that it would be useful for us to have possibilities to compare the status of teachers, teacher education, and the respect of the teaching profession with other countries. These were the main reasons. Of course, the TALIS-PISA link was one interesting thing for us, but not at all the main reason for taking part in TALIS." (FinMinEdu)

This was confirmed by the Official from the National Board of Education who pointed out that since 2010, Finnish government had helped funding teachers' professional development, furthering the interest in internationally comparable data (FinBoard). A major concern is that there are many providers, not all of them research-based:

"We have had research-based teacher education for a long time, and now we also need research-based professional development and in-service training. There is too big a difference between teacher education and professional development. I would like universities and polytechnics to have much bigger responsibility for teachers' professional development. My dream would be that there is a systematic continuum from teacher education, during teachers' whole career to support professional development and in-service training." (FinMinEdu)

We should note that the notion of ‘systematic continuum’ has also been used in EU political discourse (cf. EC 2010a) on teachers’ professional development as part of life-long learning. In the Finnish state authorities’ practical argumentation, it represents a succinct goal premise for taking part in TALIS.

The entry point in Finland for taking part in TALIS thus emphasised *teachers’* learning, rather than *student* learning. In other words, the association between teachers’ work and student learning was much more implicit than in England and Australia. In the abstract of the Finnish report, student learning was mentioned in the context of motivation and critical thinking (Taajamo *et al.* 2014, p.7). Notions of ‘world-class’, ‘top performers’, and an orientation towards standardised measures of student performance and their assessment are wholly absent, in contrast to the practical argumentation in England and Australia. The focus on teachers’ learning, and indeed educational development as a collective property (cf. Connell 1995) is further highlighted with the suggestion of the target group for the national report:

“In Finland, the results will be useful for the national educational administration, education providers and teachers and school principals who receive extensive international comparative data on school as an operating environment and on their own educational development” (Taajamo *et al.* 2014, p.7)

With this focus, it is interesting that Finland indeed signed up for the TALIS-PISA link. As the initial theorisation pointed out, Finnish education owes much of its global reputation to the students’ performance in PISA, yet the country’s school policy does not align with OECD recommendations in many respects. Considering the circumstantial premises for taking part in TALIS, we also recognise an ambiguous relationship to the OECD. On the one hand, the OECD was clearly recognised as an important policy actor globally. On the other, the Senior Official pointed out that *“you need to have your own glasses”* when reading OECD recommendations due to the differences in political preferences between the OECD and Finnish school policy currently and historically:

“We have to have in mind that the truth of the OECD is just one truth. It is not the only truth. OECD has for so long done statistical work, good analytical work

and published very much, but for me it is clear that you also have to be critical.”
(FinMinEdu)

Chapter 6 on soft legalisation will return to the Finnish state authorities’ perception of the OECD in more detail. For now, it should be pointed out that the Finnish Institute for Educational Research, University of Jyväskylä, won the call for tender to carry out TALIS 2013 launched by the Ministry for Education & Culture. This Institute has vast experience with conducting large-scale international programmes like PISA. Moreover, a Steering Group was named by the Ministry of Education, with the Minister of Education signing the appointment letters (FinMinEdu; FinBoard). The Steering Group was chaired by a representative from the Ministry of Education and Culture, with the Official from the National Board of Education being the secretary and representing Finland in the TALIS BPC. According to the latter, the group was composed to prevent tensions between the main policy actors in the field in Finland:

“When we decided to appoint the broad steering group, the idea was basically to include all relevant stakeholders. When the research went forward, there would then not be any elements that perhaps the teacher union or somebody else might not appreciate. So they were involved in the entire process”
(FinBoard)

In this respect, we should note the representation of OAJ in the Steering Group. The Ministry Senior Official told that *“... we only have one teacher union, so it is a very big and very important organisation”* (FinMinEdu). The OAJ special advisor confirmed that the organisation is indeed a major policy actor in Finland, and that it was interested in TALIS:

“OAJ supported the idea that Finland should take part in TALIS. I have presented TALIS results in our own working groups and seminars. Always, teachers, representatives and our board have been very interested in the study. Of course, OAJ policies and goals are based on studies. We don’t just invent them. Of course we are a labour union, and we have an agenda, like any labour union, but our claims and goals are strictly based on different kind of studies. It’s very important for us that OAJ in Finland is seen as one of the main experts on education in Finland. We are pretty much part of every working group on education in Finland. This is a different situation if you compare Finland to other

countries. It's very rare that a labour union is part of every working group"
(FinUnion)

This line of thought would appear to fit very well with the EI Senior Consultant's call for unions to be 'in charge of the narrative'. In this way, the analysis indicates that OAJ has large capacities of institutional power resources, a point to be taken further in Chapter 6.

5.2.4. Summary of synchronic account

The analysis shows that the decision by government authorities in Australia, England and Finland to take part in 2013 was based upon considerations of specific domestic issues as well as a strong desire to complement nationally collected information with a more 'global eye' through TALIS. In this respect, the OECD is recognised as major policy actor not least due to the PISA programme. The analysis also indicated that there were various goals of taking part in TALIS 2013, related to different emphases in learning and education, and that teacher unions were granted very different positions in the practical argumentation of the government authorities.




Figure 19. Practical argumentation of Australian Government Department for Education and Training




Figure 20. Practical argumentation of Department for Education, England




Figure 21. Practical argumentation of Ministry of Education and Culture, Finland

5.3. Chapter Summary and Discussion

The diachronic and synchronic accounts in this Chapter provided insights into the practical argumentation of main policy actors in their engagement with TALIS. In particular, the Chapter highlighted a sense of agency among these actors though they clearly have different capacities, roles and mandates. In this sense, they help constitute the TALIS ensemble through their political discourses. Chapters 6 and 7 will return to this issue on the basis of the analyses conducted in those Chapters.

This Chapter showed that the OECD and the EU (particularly the EC) have put large efforts into the indicators development and application that could ‘substantiate’ and trigger comparative comparison in the area of teacher policy, and how governments in Australia, England and Finland had their own reasons for engagement, based on distinctive ideas related to comparative research as policy instrument.

In this way, the chapter shows that when asking the question “What has made TALIS possible?”, the notion of competitive comparison provides an answer. It is very hard to imagine the programme existing without this set of ideas, as it is strongly present in the practical argumentation of the major organisations involved in TALIS. In this sense, the notion of competitive comparison helps to explain what has made TALIS possible and the patterned outcomes of the programme. This argument implies two important points: i) ideas, as articulated in political discourses, have causal powers; ii) the TALIS programme is a distinctively political construction, indicated by that all actors paid close attention to the political context in their engagement with TALIS.

The development of TALIS so far might thus be explained as concerned with construction of the four modalities of power at work in competitive comparison; hierarchical spaces are created; temporal rhythm is imperative for the OECD as well as the EC; the evaluative trajectories of what it means to be a competent teacher; and concerns about the embedding of competitive comparison across scales. The latter was for example highlighted by the fact that the Education Council of the European Union effectively gave the EC the mandate to pursue that all EU member states should take part in TALIS to ensure the

coherence of the indicators framework (CoEU 2007a). This analytical point confirms that *“educational indicators embody the knowledge that realises power”* (Rutkowski 2008, pp.475-476), in the sense of power as agenda-setting and defining the rules of the game for what education is supposed to be about. However, we know that not all EU member states have taken part in TALIS, and the Chapter showed the recurrent and so far unsuccessful efforts of the OECD to link the TALIS programme with PISA, although participating countries have shown little interest in pursuing this link. Hence, the Chapter highlighted that competitive comparison does not act as a ‘global steamroller’.

Rather, the analysis – and Chapters 6 and 7 will pursue that point – indicated that indicators development and application on teachers’ labour is very much work-in-progress, incremental in nature, and continually contested not least by teacher union representatives. The analysis also showed that government authorities in Australia, England and Finland had their own ideas of what TALIS is supposed to be about. In other words, it appears that *ideas* of competitive comparison act as a mechanism generating the TALIS programme, yet various trajectories and preferences of national education and policy contexts constitute contingent circumstances that enable as well as constrain the triggering of the mechanism.

Still, one analytical point stands out. Regardless the different priorities of the policy actors, they all recognise that TALIS is an effort to codify knowledge on prominent areas of teachers’ work, and that the outcomes of the survey constitute persuasive policy instruments. In this respect, it was surprising that teacher unions have endorsed and encouraged TALIS, yet I would argue that this should be understood in the light of the high-profiled PISA programme which compelled teacher unions to get involved in the politics of knowledge creation.

Finally, the analysis in this Chapter hinted at the explanatory powers of CCPEE. Conceiving TALIS outcome patterns as results of mechanisms in context, and the ‘TALIS ensemble’ as a unity of multiple determinations, appears to make sense so far. Subsequent Chapters will further pursue the epistemic gains and limitations of this approach on the basis of the results of the empirical inquiry.

CHAPTER 6. THE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS OF TALIS

6.0. Introduction

The TALIS programme is an ensemble composed of a complex set of governance arrangements distributed across multiple scales – from the global to the national. In this sense, TALIS is both an instrument of and is constituted by pluri-scalar governance. This chapter analyses the governance frameworks of the TALIS programme and shows that the outcome patterns of TALIS are shaped by these arrangements. The substantial internal relations of the TALIS ensemble is unpacked with a focus on the hypothesised mechanism of soft legalisation and, more broadly, competitive comparison. First, a diachronic account covering the period from the mid-2000s to 2015 focuses on the formal and enacted OECD governance arrangements of the TALIS programme in the OECD, including relations to the EU, TUAC, BIAC, and state authorities in general. Subsequently, a synchronic account of TALIS 2013 in Australia, England and Finland highlights the considerable scope for politics on the national level in managing the implementation of TALIS. Thereby, the chapter addresses the second sub-question of the first research question, focusing on the internal relations of the TALIS ensemble. Finally, the Chapter Summary discusses the findings in relation to the hypotheses.

6.1. The Governance of TALIS 2005-2015

The account below shows that the formal characteristics of the TALIS programme as an instrument of soft governance have remained stable during the first two rounds. Drawing on Abbott and colleagues (2000), the account confirms the hypothesis that TALIS programme as a governance instrument could be characterised as having features like low obligation, high precision, and moderate delegation. Yet, the analysis highlights a range of nuances to these general features. The analysis suggests that the dimension of delegation is the hardest and most complex to settle, whilst the dimensions of obligation and precision are more clearcut.

6.1.1. Obligation

The level of obligation has remained low throughout the period. TALIS is a non-binding instrument, and participants are not legally bound by rules or strong commitments. In

general, the OECD policy area of education is subject to low levels of obligation, as indicated by the number of legal instruments. The hierarchy of 'OECD Acts' includes 'Decisions', 'Recommendations', 'Declarations', 'Arrangements and Understandings', and 'International Agreements', with various degrees of obligation (OECD 2017a). Currently, there are OECD legal instruments in 36 subject areas. In education, there are only two Recommendations - on Quality Provision in Cross-Border Higher Education (2005) and Earthquake Safety in Schools - and one Declaration on Future Educational Policies in the Changing Social and Economic Context from 1978. Subject areas with more weight in terms of Decisions and Recommendations include competition; consumer policy; digital economy policy; environment; fiscal affairs; insurance and private pensions; investment; and public governance (OECD 2017b).

The low level of obligation is also indicated by the fact that the OECD Council has only been involved in TALIS to a very limited extent. It is the Council which has the capacity to adopt legal instruments. The OECD Council is one of three main institutions in OECD governance and is chaired by the OECD Secretary-General and comprises representatives from member states and the European Commission. In addition to the Council, the OECD Secretariat - constituted by the various Directorates - collects and analyses data. On the basis of this data, Committees work together on specific issues. Committees comprise country representatives, observers, and the OECD Secretariat (OECD 2017c).

In understanding the nature of soft legalisation in OECD especially with regard to the level of obligation, it is important to distinguish between so-called Part I and Part II programmes. The OECD budget is divided into funding arrangements for Part I and Part II programmes. OECD member countries fund the budget for Part I programmes, accounting for about 53% of the consolidated budget of EUR 357 million in 2014. These contributions are based on a proportion that is shared equally, and a scale proportional to the relative size of economies. Part II programmes include programmes of interest to a limited number of members. They are funded according to a scale of contributions or other agreements among the participating countries (OECD 2014h). Until 1 January 2016, TALIS was a so-called Part I programme. This meant that it involved a particularly low level of obligation from OECD

member states, also from those which had signed up as participants. As Part I programme, TALIS used to receive a minor contribution from the Part I core budget (less than 5 % of the total TALIS budget). Countries thus signed up and paid for participation one round at a time, based on a scale of contribution. In principle, countries could leave the project at any time. This made it harder for the OECD and countries to plan ahead in terms of funding and direction of the programme because funding for the programme basically ran out when a cycle was completed.

It should be noted that the OECD Directorate of Education and Skills hosts a relatively high number of Part II programmes (OECDanalyst). This means that, apart from mandatory work on indicators and data collection, the programme of activities in education might be compared to a 'menu' of options. The composition of the menu is determined collectively by OECD member states who then choose from the menu. This reliance on Part II programmes arguably increases the likeliness of relative consensus, and hence space for consultation, among those taking part in a programme.

In terms of decision-making, the TALIS BPC was until 2016 a so-called Level 2 body reporting to the Education Policy Committee (EDPC). EDPC has a role in the governance of most OECD education programmes as a Level 1 body. Level 1 bodies, which also include the Governing Boards of PISA and Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI), report directly to the OECD Council, whereas Level 2 bodies report to the EDPC. As a Part I programme, TALIS was part of the ongoing EDPC programme of work; the TALIS programme and budget was hence discussed biannually in the EDPC before being approved by the OECD Council. In practice, most decisions on the TALIS programme, including survey design and policy themes, were taken in the TALIS BPC. In addition, there was indicators and data exchange with the INES Working Party and the subgroup of NESLI. The latter collects system-level indicators, also on teachers (In *Education at a Glance*, this includes all D indicators, such as teacher salaries, teacher working hours and professional development). The INES Advisory Group was more peripheral to the TALIS BPC and did not have any influence on the indicators used in TALIS. The group is dedicated to themes related to the INES Working Party and advises EDPC concerning INES cooperation and *Education at a Glance*. Finally, the TALIS

programme's relations to non-OECD states were specified by the EDPC global relations strategy (OECD 2017f) (see Figure 22; based on BPCmember, exOECDsenAnalyst; OECDanalyst).




Figure 22. The TALIS BPC and its transition in the OECD organisational structure

Explanatory note: Constructed on the basis of interviews (OECDanalyst; BPCmember). This diagram focuses on the TALIS programme in the OECD structure. Arrows denote data exchange. Many other bodies have been omitted, and relations between INES and other programmes are not addressed. Finally, the structure of the OECD Directorate for Education and Skills is distinct from the OECD structure; under the former, INES for example falls under CERI.

Seen in this way, the TALIS programme was vulnerable during the first two rounds, and the commitment and financial contribution from the EU appears even more important in this light. This is put into perspective with the fact that on 1 January 2016, TALIS became a so-called Part II Programme (see Table 22, based on BPCmember, exOECDsenAnalyst; OECDanalyst). In this way, TALIS joins other Part II programmes such as PISA, PIAAC, CERI and INES. The transition had been on the way for some time, as a proposal was discussed in the EDPC in November 2011. With the transition, the TALIS BPC was relaunched as the TALIS Governing Board which will be in place until the end of 2020 (OECD Council 2015).

	Part I Programmes	Part II Programmes
Governance	<p>Tend to be governed by a Level 2 body that reports to the EDPC</p> <p>Relations to non-OECD states are governed by the EDPC Global Relations Strategy</p>	<p>Tend to be governed by a Level 1 body that reports to the OECD Council</p> <p>Specify their own relations to non-OECD states</p>
Funding	<p>Funding mainly comes from participating states.</p> <p>Funding run out after each cycle.</p> <p>Minor contribution from Part I budget.</p>	<p>Self-funded by states which as members of that particular programme commit to pay a set contribution on an ongoing basis.</p> <p>The programme does not receive funding from the Part I budget.</p>
Obligation	<p>States sign up for one round at a time</p>	<p>Once member of a programme, states have actively to announce if they would like to leave.</p> <p>Participating countries have to give one year's notice before leaving the programme.</p>

Table 22. Characteristics of OECD Part I and Part II programmes

The transition has implications for the consistency of the programme, obligations and the possibilities for future planning in the medium-term. Part II programmes “*can determine a little bit more their destiny*” (OECDanalyst) because their governance is more independent of the EDPC Programme of Work. Starting from 2016, the TALIS Governing Board reports directly to the OECD Council though it should seek the guidance of EDPC for recommendations and decisions with major policy and financial implications (OECD Council 2015). In addition, when countries sign up to the programme, they are part of it until they make the formal decision to leave it. In terms of funding, Part II programmes involve an ongoing commitment of countries to pay a set contribution, including a one year notice period if a country should wish to leave the programme. Finally, Part II programmes are fully in charge of their external relations which implies that they can specify how they relate with non-OECD member states. We should note that the exchange of data with the INES related groups continues also after the transition to Part II programme (BPCmember; OECDanalyst;

exOECDsenAnalyst). In the words of a former OECD Senior Analyst, the transition marked that TALIS is becoming a more consolidated programme:

“The advantage of a Part II programme is that you can get longer, stable funding. You can plan for the future. Whereas a Part I programme basically lasts a biennium, so you only get two years of funding, and you have to keep asking for more. Now that TALIS is becoming an established programme with more countries participating, it makes more logical sense that it becomes a Part II programme”. (exOECDsenAnalyst)

Yet, even with the recent transition, the level of obligation remains low in the sense that TALIS is still a rather non-binding instrument because states might choose to join or leave, and the uses of results are not subject to legal rules, commitments or sanctions. Still, in terms of competitive comparison, the transition might prove important because it provides a stronger basis for consolidating the temporal rhythm of the programme.

6.1.2. Precision

In the TALIS programme, the level of precision is high. Once a state has signed up for the programme, the implementation of the survey follows detailed guidelines which participants are required to follow. The TALIS Technical Reports (OECD 2010, 2014b) indicates the high level of detail in the methodological instructions to national project managers, including the translations and adaptations of questionnaire items. The interviews confirmed that deadlines and guidelines were applied in a strict manner by the international consortium and the OECD TALIS Secretariat during TALIS 2013 (AusNPC1; AusNPC2; EngDfE; EngNPCres; EngNPCsen; EngNPCmem; FinNPCres; FinResMan). However, the synchronic account will show that the level of precision is less demanding in terms of the national coordination of TALIS, apart from the demands for National Project, Data and Sampling Managers, with Australia, England and Finland representing three very different cases in terms of actors included in the TALIS ensemble nationally.

6.1.3. Delegation

The hypothesis estimated the dimension of delegation to be moderate, combining low-moderate level of dispute resolution with moderate-high level of rulemaking and implementation. The diachronic account largely confirms this hypothesis, yet there are

several issues which calls for discussion. The analysis shows that the OECD constitutes a policy actor with delegated authority and its own interests. This is an important point considering the OECD's, as well as other actors', practical argumentation for TALIS (see Chapter 5). In terms of dispute resolution, the analysis also confirms that the OECD with the TALIS programme coordinates political bargaining, without any adjudicative capacities, among member states and beyond, and has introduced the social partners BIAC and TUAC into interstate relations. Moreover, the analysis highlights the OECD's moderate-high level of rulemaking and implementation with regard to teacher policy. This is related to the OECD's acknowledged capacity for 'epistemological governance', also part of the practical argumentation of Australian, English and Finnish state authorities for taking part in TALIS (see Chapter 5). Through the TALIS programme, OECD undertakes the data collection, monitoring, and publication which is instrumental for creating peer pressure and *"implicit sanctions for states that wish to be seen as trustworthy members of an international community"* (Abbott *et al.* 2000, p. 418). The latter point is particularly interesting, and the synchronic account on TALIS 2013 shows that the assumption of peer pressure in TALIS is far from unambiguous.

In the analysis of delegation, my attention is focused on the TALIS BPC which stands out as the most important OECD body for multilateral decision-making on TALIS. The analysis focuses on the relationships between three (groups) of policy actors to the BPC. These are important for capturing the level of delegation, particularly with regard to dispute resolution and political bargaining, associated with the policy instrument of TALIS: i) state governments; ii) EC; and iii) the positions of TUAC and BIAC in the TALIS BPC.

The TALIS BPC is one of numerous 'substantive committees' in the OECD. According to a recent OECD Resolution, substantive committees *"produce the outputs of the OECD, the policy advice, guidelines, principles ("soft law") and best practices"*, and the *"working methods of the committees are one of the institution's hallmarks, the source of its added value and the support it enjoys in capitals."* In this respect, *"it is important not to want to shackle committees too tightly by imposing on them a single working method"* as *"each*

substantive committee would like to tailor its working methods to its own needs” (OECD 2015c, p.5).

This ‘flexibility’ and scope for adaptation and accommodation would appear to be an important feature of the TALIS during the first two rounds. We should note that OECD Committees do not exercise the same degrees of openness. The TALIS BPC has by all accounts been relatively open towards inviting interested policy actors to take part in the forum. The interview material provides a clear picture in this respect, with relations to TUAC, BIAC, and non-OECD member states standing out.

Concerning the enacted relations in the TALIS BPC, personnel from the OECD as well as DG EAC interviewed for this study were keen to emphasise that their organisations are first of all intergovernmental fora for cooperation (EACschools; exOECDsenAnalyst). The TALIS BPC met approximately a dozen times in each round of TALIS. Throughout the period 2007-2014, meetings were consensus-based, in line with the OECD open method of coordination. Not a single vote was conducted on substantive issues, and all delegates were invited to put forward opinions. In this respect, non-OECD members taking part in TALIS enjoyed similar rights in terms of decision-making and access to documents. The BPC Chair summarised meetings in a consensus-based manner, ensured that all interests are heard and was involved in preparation of meeting materials. The Chair was elected on the basis of nominations from states. During the first two rounds of TALIS, the Chair was the Norwegian representative (EngDfE; FinBoard; BPCmember).

For TALIS 2013, the Chair took the initiative to establish an ‘executive strategic group’ within the TALIS BPC. This smaller group would involve more government representatives in preparing the BPC meetings. The group would hence meet prior to TALIS BPC meetings and go through the BPC meeting agenda and check whether there were any outstanding issues. In addition to the Chair, the executive group consisted of representatives from Finland, Australia and Japan, joined in 2012-2013 by the US representative. Like the Chair, the members of the executive group were elected by the BPC (FinBoard, BPCMember).

While consensus-based, the TALIS BPC involved political bargaining and dispute resolution. Thus, state authorities could to some degree extend their horizon of influence beyond their own jurisdictions into the territorial spaces of other nations. The OECD Analyst stressed that the advocacy of state authorities would have a limited impact on the final questionnaires, with perhaps three questions (out of around 50) being the result of direct pressure in the TALIS BPC and complementary bilateral meetings:

"... some countries join TALIS sometimes for their very very specific reason. They want international data on a specific indicator, so they will keep bringing it up on all the meetings, and if it doesn't make it in, it's always this big issue. Even if we say that if you look at the priority-rating exercise, it didn't get overall highly rated. So, there is some politics. The people who come to our meetings are under pressure by their governments of course to try to get what they want out of the project. These are the data that they need, and then they put pressure, and some countries are better than others in kind of asserting that pressure."
(OECDanalyst)

With regard to state authorities that stood out in shaping TALIS, interviewees would not single out any particular influence. Concerning my interest in the US in this respect as the main funder of the OECD, none of the interviewees estimated that the US representative exercised stronger influence than other representatives on the direction of TALIS. Prompted by my question on whether the US would have a particularly strong voice in the EDPC, the former OECD Senior Analyst pointed out:

"No. If you would have asked me how important was the US in getting the INES up and running, then I would say yes it was. The US gave additional funding back in the mid-1990s because they saw the dire need for better international data in education. So, yes, they invested in that. Without them – who knows – INES might not have taken off. But, for Education Policy Committee work, I honestly don't see that they got a stronger voice than anyone else. I sat through many Education Policy Committee meetings, and people are just as ready to listen to Finland, or Denmark or Norway, as the US." (exOECDsenAnalyst)

According to the OECD Analyst, the Norwegian representative and BPC Chair were influential as a strong proponent of TALIS and in being able to get other countries to come

on board. In line with the open method of coordination, the TALIS BPC thus appears to have provided a multi-lateral forum for political bargaining on teacher policy.

In this respect, some state governments have been more interested in the TALIS-PISA link than others. Overall, participating countries have, since the launch of TALIS, tended to insist that the two programmes should be treated as separate programmes with distinctive identities on political as well as methodological grounds (OECDanalyst; exOECDsenAnalyst; BPCmember; exEAC; Eloff). According to the BPC long-term state government representative:

"There are different points of view, for example with regard to the link to PISA. The solution has been that it has not been imposed on countries to have this link between TALIS and PISA. Many of the countries did not want the link. But it is an option for countries to have it." (BPCmember)

The OECD Analyst pointed out that the political reasons for keeping the TALIS and PISA as separate programmes concerned relations between governments, teacher unions and teachers, and the challenge of meeting the required response rates:

"Yes, because for them in order for TALIS to be successful, it could only be successful if it was separate. Otherwise, they knew that they wouldn't get their teachers on board. Also for many countries, their interest lies in getting teachers' opinions and input. For them that could be done through TALIS, but it could not be done through PISA. Even now when we're speaking of increasing synergies between TALIS and PISA, every single country meeting that we've had ... when you look in the summary records where countries in principle would agree to bring synergies between them, they always, always, ensure that we add the line that both projects will maintain their identity and their separate governing structure. Even though we're talking about bringing them closer together and synergies, the countries are still insisting that they are kept separate, and that TALIS remains the voice of teachers" (OECDanalyst)

The range of state positions on the TALIS-PISA link put the OECD TALIS Secretariat in a particular position. The analysis of the OECD's practical argumentation for engaging with TALIS highlighted the importance of PISA and the continuous efforts to align the two programmes. In this respect, the OECD Analyst referred to the interests of state

governments in avoiding unnecessary duplication – and hence costs - in data collection, for example with regard to the optional teacher questionnaire in PISA 2015:

“For example, we don’t want to have countries paying for a teacher questionnaire in PISA, and paying for TALIS which gathers some of the same information, when they could be saving both in terms of money and in terms of resources, both in the Secretariat but also in National Centres as well. We are consciously trying to make sure that our projects are better aligned; that we use the same items, we use the same definitions, we align the data collection period so that we can use perhaps only one questionnaire instead of two.”
(OECDanalyst)

There is thus a tension between this principle of ‘efficiency and cost-effectiveness’ (one of the guiding principles of TALIS), as part of the general efforts of the OECD to align PISA and TALIS, and the preference among most state authorities to keep the two programmes separate. This hints at the nature of delegation to the OECD from state authorities. Hence, while the TALIS BPC is a consensus-based forum for multi-lateral political bargaining, the OECD also has some capacity to shape agendas. And this is indeed what member states expect and have given them the political mandate to pursue:

“I do really stand by the fact that the agenda is set by countries. It happens from time to time that certain directions need a push. Going back to 2004 or 2005, yes, we had calls for more quantitative data on teachers, but it needed the OECD to come up with how to conceptualize this, how could we come up with something that could be operational? The secretariat does not have an agenda, but we come up with what we think will work. ... All I’m saying is that there’s always an element of OECD showing some leadership in order to provide governments with what they need. It’s also true to say that governments look for that. Politically, some things are more critical for them to do nationally than to see them happening internationally. That plays into the agenda-setting as well.”
(exOECDsenAnalyst)

In many ways, this quotation captures some defining features of soft legalisation as cooperative in nature, incremental and ad-hoc in development over time, and with a scope of flexibility and adaptation to changes in the political landscape. It also points to the ‘grey zone’ where it is hard to pin down what actually drives development apart from the general

observation that different policy actors work together on common issues, with each of them pursuing specific goals and interests.

The dispute resolution and political bargaining in the TALIS BPC in this sense share features with the ‘soft persuasion’ of ‘peer reviews’, another OECD policy instrument, the effectiveness of which depends on the sharing of values as indicated by the convergence among the participating countries on the standards and criteria against which to evaluate performance; adequate level of commitment in terms of financial and human resources; mutual trust; and credibility of the peer review process (OECD 2003, pp.19-20). With regard to the relations between the OECD TALIS Secretariat and government authorities, the former OECD Senior Analyst pointed to the imperative of trust:

“What I do think is important is that the TALIS Board of Participating Countries, and the PISA Governing Board, have to trust the Secretariat. If there is a breakdown in trust, then business becomes very ... slow. Government representatives then don’t trust the secretariat and ask to see everything that is going on. I know from my own experience from the TALIS Board of Participating Countries that this was very important in those first meetings because there was some concern about what TALIS was going to examine and whether it was going to be controversial for the teacher unions. The governments have to trust the secretariat and we worked quite hard at that. One’s personality can help or hinder that, of course it can. You can quickly lose that trust as well, so it’s not a case of sweeten everybody up and then we go and do what we want.”
(exOECDsenAnalyst)

It is clear that, in line with its reputation as a premier ‘think-tank’ for the richest countries around the globe (Carroll and Kellow 2011; Woodward 2009) and major supplier of educational statistics (Henry *et al.* 2001; Lawn and Grek 2012; Mahon and McBride 2008; Meyer and Benavot 2013), the OECD TALIS Secretariat was expected to exert leadership in terms of indicators development, survey design, analysis and what the findings would mean in terms of policy implications. In practical terms, this is also indicated by the fact that all BPC meeting materials were produced by the OECD TALIS Secretariat. These are all constitutive of ‘epistemological governance’ and the capacity of the OECD to influence policy debates – and part of the expectations from Australia, England and Finland as shown

in Chapter 5. Through TALIS the OECD is thus able to pursue its own interests in a way that goes beyond merely facilitating ‘bottom-up’ multi-lateral cooperation.

This is for example indicated by the agency of the OECD in profiling the programme:

“Certainly for TALIS 2008, we were trying to generate support from countries and build a critical mass. So yes, we were chasing countries, pursuing them, asking if they were going to join, and if not, why, and what we could do, and encourage certain countries that would attract other countries. Going into TALIS 2013, we thought, and this was what countries were telling us, that they wanted to see Finland, Japan, the US, UK included ... So we made a case to those countries. I think surely there would be an interest in getting all the OECD countries to participate in TALIS in the future”. (exOECDsenAnalyst)

In a similar manner, the OECD Analyst described the profiling of TALIS as a ‘chicken-and-egg’ situation; the OECD TALIS Secretariat would highlight the benefits of taking part in the programme and encounter situations where some state governments are waiting to see which other countries will join the project (OECDanalyst). In this respect, TALIS 2013 succeeded in attracting countries with a higher appeal:

“If you compare the countries that participated in TALIS 2008 and 2013, 2008 was successful but with due respect to the countries that took part there was some big countries missing. When TALIS 2013 came along, suddenly the UK, USA, Japan, France showed interest. It takes on a different level. With these countries coming in, and it’s not the case that they had a different agenda to the 24 countries in the first round, but it brings a new perspective. Some countries will say OK, it is important for us, for the US to be in there, that Japan is there, because we want to compare ourselves with those systems. It is important for Finland to be there. If those countries - particularly if they have successful education systems - say that this is an important topic for us, then other countries will say that they are interested too.” (exOECDsenAnalyst)

Moreover, we might see it as indicative of the capacity of the OECD to achieve ‘buy-in’ from governments that, despite the general scepticism, eight countries signed up for the TALIS-PISA link in TALIS 2013, including Australia and Finland.

This observation on the OECD leads us to another intergovernmental policy actor with agency in shaping TALIS, namely the EC. Chapter 5 spelled out how important the EU interest and support has been in getting the TALIS programme off the ground. This is in line with the recent strengthening of cooperation between the OECD and the EC in the field of education and skills, as reflected in the *Framework of Collaboration* (EC 2012c) and the *Education and Skills Cooperation Arrangement* signed in October 2013 (EC 2013c). TALIS is mentioned in both. We should also note that the OECD in the past decade has signed partnership agreements with the ILO (ILO and OECD 2011), and the World Bank (OECD 2006b) and continues to work together with UNESCO (OECD 2017e).

According to a former DG EAC Policy Officer (exEAC), TALIS was one of the first projects where cooperation between EC and the OECD resulted in a concrete and useful outcome. Interestingly, a principle of ‘efficiency and cost-effectiveness’ similar to the one adopted by the OECD Analyst was invoked when legitimating the cooperation with OECD on TALIS:

“I believe TALIS was one of the first projects where we really worked together with the OECD, with concrete outcomes. EU has invested a fair amount of money in TALIS but has also benefited from a data collection in line with our political priorities. Doing the data collection through the OECD also made it cheaper for us and the Member States, rather than doing it ourselves”. (exEAC)

The close relationship between DG EAC and the OECD is encapsulated in the fact that the former set up a particular Working Group in the wake of the Council Conclusions (CoEU 2005; cf. Chapter 5), with the task of defining how TALIS could meet EU data needs. This Working Group emphasised that the theme of teachers’ professional development should be incorporated in TALIS, formulated questionnaire items on the theme and ensured that these items were included in the survey. In addition, the EC subsidised the international costs for EU member states to encourage them to participate in the survey (exEAC; EC 2010a, p.12).

However, since EC merely has observer status in OECD fora, DG EAC hosted preparation meetings with EU Member State representatives before nearly every TALIS BPC meeting. DG EAC stressed that the economic support depended on their actions to ensure that teachers’

professional development was indeed included in TALIS. At the same time, we should note that DG EAC actions were based on the Council Conclusions from 2005 and 2007 (CoEU 2005, 2007a), the latter stating that the EC and Member States should *"work towards the objective that the indicators in that framework should cover all Member States."*

In this way, the EC was actively involved in ensuring that more countries took part in TALIS. The former DG EAC policy officer estimated the EC contribution and the international costs of TALIS 2008 to be higher than those included in Hammershøi (2011), suggesting that the financial support to the 16 EU member states amounted to approximately 1.2 millioner Euro in the first round, equalling 50-60 percent of the international costs of the survey (exEAC). Therefore, OECD sought to accommodate TALIS as much as possible to the objectives of the EC - which was also reflected in the OECD Outline of the survey (OECD 2006; cf. Chapter 5). Moreover, the close working partnership between the OECD and the EC on TALIS was indicated by the fact that when the OECD launched the TALIS 2008 results in July 2009, the venue for the press conference was Berlaymont, the main EC building in Brussels. It was the first time that the OECD chose to launch results from one of their programmes at the EC. The joint EC–OECD thematic report on teachers' professional development (European Commission 2010a) was also launched there (exEAC).

So far, this section have focused on the relations between state governments and intergovernmental policy actors in the TALIS BPC. Turning to the representation of teachers' interests in the political bargaining, the analysis above suggest that the relationship to teacher unions was a sensitive issue for participating state authorities. TALIS requires high response rates, and the support of teacher unions could have an impact on those. The basis for this capacity is that teaching globally is one of the most unionised labour market sections, in public sectors and overall. At first glance, this would appear warranted, as the EI Senior Consultant points out:

"The core power of the unions in every OECD study is that, and we occasionally remind them of this if they start forgetting, is that we could advise the affiliates not to fill in the questionnaires and not participate" (Elconsult)

It is a vital point in this respect that in most countries, teachers are not legally required to take part in international surveys as part of their work. Moreover, while some legal leverage is available in England and Finland, making explicit demands on teachers to fill in for example TALIS questionnaires would be seen as counterproductive for the quality of the data and, more generally, relations between government and teachers (EngNPCsen; FinResMan; Elconsult).

EI and ETUCE have taken part in TALIS BPC meetings since 2006 (cf. Chapter 5) and was granted permanent observer status in 2009, in the wake of the first round. Attaining this status, EI has been consulted on draft chapters and enjoyed enhanced opportunities for submitting comments and ideas. Interviewees from EI, ETUCE, OECD and DG EAC all characterised their cooperation on TALIS as constructive.

EI and ETUCE was engaged in the TALIS BPC through the TUAC Education, Training and Employment Policy Working Group, on the basis of a broad mandate by its affiliates to negotiate on their behalf. The TUAC Working Group comprises teacher unions as well as other trade unions and meet twice annually at OECD in Paris. Exceptionally, a TALIS subgroup has been set up within the TUAC Working Group. This TALIS group is open for EI affiliates, and for TALIS 2013, the group included NEA (US), SNES (France), UEN (Norway), NASUWT (UK), an affiliate from Italy, DLI (Denmark), and EI. The EI representatives in the TALIS BPC reported to this sub-group after BPC meetings (Elconsult; Eloff). EI thus sought to engage affiliate members in TALIS, and in this sense, the dimension of delegation is also relevant in understanding teacher union relations. We should note that EI is financed by its affiliates which also determine the overall policy priorities. Among the affiliates there has been some discussion on what would be the better strategy in coping with the undeniably strong position of the OECD in global education governance (Eloff; Elconsult).

The scope for TUAC in the TALIS BPC to exert influence on the conception, design, reporting and other outcomes of TALIS was inferior to that of participating countries. Neither TUAC nor BIAC is involved in the appointment of the international contractor or survey design, including the selection of policy themes and indicators. It is state authorities of participating

OECD members which were invited to select policy themes through a priority-rating exercise. Observers such as TUAC and BIAC can only react to this institutional fact. Moreover, TUAC and BIAC representatives are excluded from taking part in BPC discussions on budgets and the future development of the survey (Eloff; MicPart; OECDanalyst; exOECDsenAnalyst). The former OECD Senior Analyst suggested that the role of TUAC was one of consultation and reaction to developments in the TALIS BPC:

“The governments have the final say, they sign off the questionnaires, sign off the analytical plans, the whole framework. TUAC, with Education International, had a group giving their views on the questionnaires and the wording of the questions. ... I wouldn’t be able to give a single example where TUAC wanted something included and pushed and pushed it, I suspect that’s not what happened. I think it was more a case of “if you want to ask about teacher self-efficacy or teachers’ professional development, then that’s not the way to ask it”, or “that’s going to be misunderstood or offend teachers”, or “if you want to get into this topic, then this would be the way to ask it”. I think this was valued by countries as well as by the OECD Secretariat.” (exOECDsenAnalyst)

Considering the issue of institutional power resources, this is intriguing. On the one hand, OECD and state authorities acknowledged that teachers and teacher unions were part of the political context, and that they needed to be on board to ensure that TALIS could actually be implemented. For TALIS 2013, the OECD TALIS Secretariat attempted to mobilise teachers in the US through the unions to fill in the survey when it became clear that it would be hard to meet the required response rates (OECDanalyst). Cf. Chapter 5, EI has perceived TALIS as an opportunity for enhancing institutional power resources, and therefore encouraged member affiliates to mobilise teachers’ support for TALIS (EI 2012; Elconsult). According to the EI Senior Consultant, *“if there is one study that shows that it is possible to have social partnership it is TALIS”*. He pointed out that EI also was represented in the Instrument Development Expert Group for TALIS 2013, and that TUAC at the TALIS 2013 launch in Japan was given a place and speaking rights at the discussion table equivalent to the ministerial places (Elconsult).

On the other hand, the institutional power resources granted to TUAC in the TALIS BPC were limited and did not enable unions to shape TALIS substantially. We might say that, for both

TUAC and BIAC, their status as permanent observers in the TALIS BPC includes a right to be consulted and heard, without any guarantee that they will be listened to. Ultimately, there is not any third party for them to call upon. On this basis, EI's (2012) assertion that *"... through its position on the TALIS Board, EI will be vigilant in ensuring that the report fully reflects teachers' views"* does not appear warranted.

In explaining the position of unions in the political bargaining on TALIS, the relationships in the TALIS BPC between, on the one hand, the OECD TALIS Secretariat, EC and state governments, and on the other hand, TUAC, would appear to be substantial, internal, and symmetrically necessary (with the policy actors conditioning each other), as the representation of unions was deemed important for making TALIS happen in practice. Yet, the relationship is not equal. However, unions do not see any alternative to the pursuit of institutional power resources in the thickening global educational policy field, centred around standards and codification of knowledge on teaching. We might note in this respect that ETUCE was originally created to pursue dialogue with the EC, as a *reaction* to the deepening EU cooperation on education. Correspondingly, EC engagement with TALIS gave ETUCE impetus to follow developments in the programme (ETUCErep). With regard to the OECD, PISA made it clear that unions were required to react. The response has been to seek influence on the codification of knowledge through the institutional mechanism of TUAC.

In this way, the analysis confirms Robertson's (2012) argument that EI's engagement in TALIS indicates that parts of the 'pedagogic recontextualising field' has been colonised by the 'official recontextualising field'. However, we need to consider that neither of these fields are fixed and ask whether the colonisation works both ways. Thus, interviewees from EI, ETUCE, and OECD noted that the OECD over the last decade has become more aware of the importance of maintaining dialogue with teachers and their unions in education reform. According to the EI Officer, this is part of a more general move towards a broader understanding of education during the last decade:

"I think that in the last years, even in the last 10 years, we can say with Teachers Matter report, OECD has tried very hard, and that is for the benefit of the secretariat, to avoid these economic determinations. They are trying to

promote their capacity as experts in education per se. That is my impression. It was in the beginning maybe much stronger, but now that economic background has slipped away, at least from the surface, at least from what they do in PISA and TALIS.” (Eloff)

In particular, the EI Senior Consultant pointed out that the OECD and EI agreed on the importance of teacher self-efficacy and getting the profession on board when education reforms are under way:

“Actually, by and large, the one thing that he’s [Andreas Schleicher, OECD Director for Education and Skills] sold on is that you can’t get education reforms without a willing engagement and participation from the teaching profession. ... So, whatever the relationship from day to day, strategically he is on or near us on having a teaching profession that has high levels of self-efficacy.” (Elconsult)

There are other overlapping priorities. The OECD, EC and teacher unions tend to agree concerning the need for sustained investment in education (ETUCErep), a long-lasting priority for the OECD as pointed out in Chapter 3. Moreover, while the EC work on education especially during the 2010s have emphasised ‘employability’, unions have endorsed the EC focus on teachers’ professional development in TALIS (Eloff; exEAC; ETUCErep).

Finally, concerning the emerging ‘commercial recontextualising field’ (cf. Robertson 2012), Chapter 5 pointed out that BIAC had the status as observer in the TALIS BPC along with TUAC, but that their efforts were considerably less coordinated. Still, considering that a senior manager from *Microsoft Partners in Learning* took part in BPC meetings, it is interesting that a key staff member in the OECD TALIS 2013 Secretariat previously was employed in the UK offices of *Microsoft Partners in Learning*. This arguably serves as an indication of the relative small size of the epistemic community working on education and teacher policy internationally (Haas 1992; Kallo 2009). Moreover, while it is a product of the Gates Foundation, and not the Microsoft enterprise, the MET Project (Gates Foundation 2013) was referred to during TALIS BPC meetings (MicPart), as well as in the TALIS 2013 main report in relation to teacher feedback and appraisal (OECD 2014a, pp.119-147).

These circumstances do not change the fact that BIAC appeared to have been less concerned about the outcomes of TALIS and less involved in BPC debates. Yet, they do indicate that private enterprises are part of the political landscape surrounding the TALIS programme. This was confirmed by the Microsoft senior manager who pointed out that public sector organisations over the last decade have become more open for cooperating with business. This also applies to the EC which used to be very hard getting access to. Xavier Prats-Monné, the DG EAC Director-General, for example held the opening speech at a *Microsoft in Education* event in 2014 (MicPart). He also contributed to a *Manifesto* (Microsoft, no date) which he pointed out was in line with the call in the EC Communication *Opening up Education* (EC 2013a) to modernise education systems and encourage innovation in teaching and learning.

6.1.4. Summary of diachronic account

The section showed that the soft legalisation governance arrangements of the TALIS programme remained stable throughout the first two rounds of the survey, with the features of low obligation, high precision, and - arguably - moderate delegation. In this period, the programme were in a somewhat vulnerable position as a Part I programme. This reinforces the argument that the interest and support from the EU were pivotal for getting TALIS off the ground. In this way, EI's strong interest and support should not be overemphasised in the explanation of what made the programme possible and shaped its direction. In the future, it will be interesting to follow whether its recent 'upgrade' to a Part II programme – hence attaining a status like PISA - will have implications for TALIS. It appears that the new status entails a slight change towards 'harder' legalisation in terms of obligations, once countries sign up. Another point worth noting is that costs efficiency of data collection is part of the practical argumentation of the EC and OECD, with regard to monitoring EU progress towards strategic objectives and aligning PISA and TALIS.

This analysis is put further into perspective by the synchronic account below which focuses in more detail on the national-level processes of implementing TALIS 2013, including the responses to OECD's apparently leading role in the 'epistemological governance' in education.

6.2. The Management and Implementation of TALIS 2013

The synchronic account in this section focuses on two issues. First, we return to the issue of teacher unions' institutional power resources, now in the contexts of Australia, England and Finland, and their impact on the outcomes of TALIS. This part of the analysis incorporates an introduction of the structures in place for managing the implementation of TALIS 2013 in the three countries.

Second, in explaining whether soft legalisation in the form of the TALIS programme contributes to competitive comparison, an important question is how state authorities view TALIS and relate to OECD in general. In this respect, the synchronic account shows some of the perceived strengths and limitations of TALIS that have real implications for the four dimensions of competitive comparison - construction of hierarchical space, temporal rhythm, evaluative trajectory and scale.

6.2.1. The National Project Centres and the institutional power resources of unions

In many ways, the TALIS programme provides an example of how state authorities seek to shape their relations through forms of soft legalisation which enables them to pursue their values and interests (Abbott and Snidal 2000). The analysis suggest that taking part in TALIS had real implications in the three cases, and we cannot dismiss TALIS participation as mere 'window dressing'. State authorities in Australia, England and Finland were interested in TALIS 2013 due to the potential for identifying superior institutional solutions (cf. Abbott and Snidal 2000). These had various connotations in three cases, as suggested in Chapter 5. In this sense, TALIS 2013 to some extent allowed states to adapt commitments to their various preferences. The diachronic account above pointed out that the dimension of precision is high in TALIS, in terms of the level of detail in the requirements for implementation. However, with regard to the coordination of national implementation, the outcome patterns of the TALIS ensemble vary markedly in terms of the involvement of policy actors (see Table 23). With regard to the presence of teacher unions' institutional power resources, the analysis confirms the hypotheses and the findings of Chapter 5; Finland stands out in terms of including teacher unions in the TALIS ensemble. In Australia, they were absent, while in England, teacher unions were part of an advisory group.

The interviews with the National Project Centres (NPC) of TALIS 2013 in Australia, England and Finland recall Thrift's (2005, pp.2-3) point that the analysis of the 'cultural circuit of capitalism' requires looking for the 'routine base' as well as the sexy. Interviewees affiliated with the national TALIS centres at ACER, RM Education and IOE, and the Finnish Institute of Educational Research described numerous challenges that they had to overcome in conducting the survey and produce the report. A key concern in this respect was recruiting schools and teachers to meet the required response rates, and this involved much repetitive work of getting access to schools and teachers and follow up on participation (AusNPC1; EngNPCmem; FinNPCres).

		Australia	England	Finland
National TALIS partners in steering group		Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER)	Department of Education RM Education	Ministry of Education and Culture National Board of Education
		Advisory group to support implementation:	Institute of Education, UCL	OAJ, Trade Union of Education in Finland
		Australian Government Department of Education and Training		Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities
		Education Departments of States and Territories		OPSIA, Specialists for Education Administration*
		Catholic and Independent Schools representatives		AMKE, The Finnish Association for the Development of Vocational Education and Training
				Association of Headmasters in Finland*
National TALIS website				Finnish Institute of Educational Research, University of Jyväskylä
		None	http://www.talis.org.uk/	https://ktl.jyu.fi/talis/talis-pa-svenska

Table 23. National TALIS partners in Australia, England and Finland in TALIS 2013

Note: * My translation of organisation names 'Opetus- ja sivistystoimen asiantuntijat' and 'Suomen Rehtorit'

The relatively high response rates required in TALIS (75% of sampled schools) were perceived as a challenge in all three comparative cases. This was an issue that interviewees returned to and emphasised. To put the TALIS requirements in perspective, the national TALIS 2013 report for England (Micklewright *et al.* 2014) points out that the median school response rate in surveys in 2004 was about 40 %, referring to the study by Sturgis and colleagues (2006) that was conducted in the wake of the exclusion of the UK from the OECD PISA 2003 reports due to low response rates.

In this respect, a basic challenge was to raise awareness about TALIS. In Australia and England, call centres were established to increase participation rates (AusNPC1, EngNPCmem). An English NPC member told that TALIS had to be marketed as much as possible because nobody knew what the survey was about. Incentives included offering schools 200 pounds and a copy of the national report if they would take part (EngNPCmem).

Another lever was launching a dedicated website with information and endorsements of the TALIS programme that would also constitute the entry point for on-line TALIS questionnaires. Such websites were created in England and Finland (a little used Facebook profile was also created in Finland). In England, a NPC member believed that the possibility for filling in the survey on-line was crucial for meeting the response rates (EngNPCmem). In Australia, preparations for a website was stalled after attempts to request union leaders for endorsements of TALIS for use on the website did not bring any results (AusNPC2).

	Participating schools	Responding teachers in participating schools	% school participation - before replacement	% school participation - after replacement	% teacher participation in participating schools	% overall participation
Aus	123	2059	58	81	87	70
Eng	154	2496	56	75	83	63
Fin	146	2739	91	99	91	90

Table 24. School and teacher participation in TALIS 2013, main study

The minimum teacher participation rate was 75% of the selected teachers in participating schools, and the response rates was met in the three cases (see Table 24, based on OECD 2014a, p.210). The numbers indicate that meeting the response rates was less of a challenge in Finland, also in terms of less reliance on replacement schools as substitutes for non-responding schools. Overall participation in TALIS 2013 was 82 percent, with Finland above and Australia and England below that percentage (OECD 2014a, p.209). We should be careful when interpreting the response rates, yet the interview material suggest that the level of support and coordination with teacher unions had some impact.

The Research Manager in Finland confirmed that it was “wise” to involve the teacher union OAJ in TALIS 2013 because it ensured contact to teachers, for example through the OAJ journal *Opettaja* (FinResMan). The management of TALIS in Finland involved remarkably more cooperation among organisations than those in England and Australia. The Steering Group was named by the Ministry of Education. According to the Ministry Senior Official who also chaired the group, there were three reasons for this approach (FinMinEdu):

1. Transparency to ensure that the main domestic policy actors would know what was going on, in particular OAJ and the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities.
2. Raising awareness to ensure response rates; With so many “VIP’s” in the group, *“information about the project would also reach more grassroots people, and that would help them to think positive and to participate in TALIS”*
3. Better dissemination of results to schools and municipalities.

The Senior Official estimated that the strategy succeeded because information on TALIS was disseminated through media and events during the project period. The representative of the National Board for Education was the secretary of the Steering Group and the country representative in the TALIS BPC. Due to their experience, and because Finland was deemed a small country, the chair and the secretary knew the other representatives on beforehand. The Steering Group had altogether around 12 meetings from 2011 to 2015 in advance of

TALIS BPC meetings to discuss propositions from the OECD TALIS Secretariat and prepare the secretary to present Finnish responses (FinMinEdu; FinBoard).

In England, the Steering Group was centred on the DfE and the contractors in RM Education. The Group met regularly during the entire TALIS 2013 project period and focused on project monitoring, questionnaire adaptations and the preparations of the national report with the IOE research team. In addition, the DfE convened an ‘advisory group’ which met at the beginning and end of the project. The creation of this stakeholder consultation group provides an indication that the relationship to unions was deemed important for getting teachers on board. The advisory group was thus composed by senior representatives from the main teacher and headteacher unions (see Table 25, list provided by DfE):

“So, where there were particular parts of the project where it was felt that a different and external perspective might be needed, such as from the teacher unions, then that group was convened to either discuss particular aspects of the project or to help make decisions on what we wanted to do. I think they met a couple of times right at the beginning, and the main reason for that was how do we sell this study to teachers? ... And then we convened them right at the end, and that was to talk about the positioning and handling of the report findings, and to make sure they felt that we were all kind of joined-up in being prepared for the publication”. (EngDfE)

Organisation	Position
National Union of Teachers (NUT)	General Secretary
NASUWT (National Association of Schoolmasters/Union of Women Teachers)	General Secretary
ATL (Association of Teachers and Lecturers)	General Secretary
NAHT (National Association of Head Teachers)	General Secretary
Association of School and College Leaders (ASCL)	General Secretary
Independent Schools Council	-
Headmasters’ and Headmistresses’ Conference (HMC)	General Secretary
Local Government Association	-
National Governors Association	Chief Executive
Universities' Council for the Education of Teachers (UCET)	Policy & Liaison Officer

Table 25. Composition of TALIS 2013 Advisory Group in England

The teacher unions in England thus nominally supported TALIS, including with endorsements on the designated website. Still, there were mixed messages as when some unions during the main data collection communicated to teachers that they should not do anything outside their teaching responsibilities. This created confusion, as some teachers would tell the NPC that they believed filling in the TALIS survey was part of what trade unions were referring to as outside work responsibilities (EngNPCmember). Chapter 7 on the uses of results will return to the testy relationship between government and teacher unions in England that appears to have derailed the DfET's press release on TALIS 2013 results.

Compared with England and Finland, Australia had leaner structures in managing TALIS 2013. The term 'steering group' have not been used in Australia with regard to TALIS. As pointed out in Chapter 5, The National Project Manager ACER effectively constituted the National Project Centre. In addition, an advisory group was set up by the Australian Government DfET (for TALIS 2013, the advisory group was called the "AEEYSOC National Teaching Workforce Dataset Working Group" - in the Australian TALIS 2013 national report (Freeman *et al.* 2014, p.156) shortened to "TALIS Australian Advisory Group") to support implementation and project monitoring. As a forum for communication and collaboration, this group is equivalent to what is referred to as a steering group in England and Finland - and in this study - and included the Australian Government DfET, Education Departments of States and Territories, and Catholic and Independent Schools representatives. In Australia, the workings of the group reflected the national architecture of education governance, with the DfET explaining the project to States and Territories and asking them to support ACER in getting access to teachers through a distinctive National Advisory Committee. This committee was composed of contact persons in each of the eight jurisdictions (AusDfET). The ACER researchers told that they sent this Committee an update during TALIS 2013 about progress and survey participation rates. Whilst a few of the contact persons helped them in getting access to schools, communication between ACER and the other members of the group was limited during the implementation of the survey. Subsequently, in the preparation of the national report (Freeman *et al.* 2014), ACER was mainly communicating with the Australian Government DfET (AusNPC1; AusNPC2).

As noted in Chapter 5, teacher unions were not engaged in the implementation of TALIS 2013 in Australia. For TALIS, it would thus appear that their institutional power resources were very limited. Moreover, interviewees from teacher unions pointed out that there overall was not much awareness of TALIS in Australia - in contrast to PISA - and that this was partly due to the fact that TALIS does not involve representative samples for the states and territories (exAEU; AusUnion). However, teacher union activities still had some impact on the implementation of TALIS 2013, like when a teachers strike in the State of Victoria involved the call for teachers not to participate in any surveys. While the teacher union in the State subsequently changed position and actively supported TALIS, it affected the data collection (AusNPC1).

Overall, the analysis of teacher unions' institutional power resources in the three cases shows that in England and Finland where the unions had showed interest in TALIS 2013, they were included to some extent in the implementation of the survey. In this respect, we should note that these unions did not appear to have any concerns about the codification of knowledge on their work. An important point is that it was possible to conduct TALIS in Australia although teacher unions were not part of the TALIS ensemble, a fact that may have to do with the low profile of the programme, nationally, and in States and Territories.

6.2.2. Relations between state authorities and the OECD

With regard to relations to the OECD, state authorities in the three cases recognised the organisation for its capacity as provider of international comparative research. At the same time, there were important nuances, including critique, which are central to understanding the potential for competitive comparison to be triggered.

Their observations reflect that the notions of infrastructural and epistemological governance (Sellar and Lingard 2013a) and Rutkowski's (2008) list of constructs for enabling 'soft convergence' in education policy help us to understand mechanisms in the global educational policy field. Again, the dimension of delegation as part of soft legalisation stands out as the most contentious, and especially delegation of rulemaking and implementation, drawing on the terms of Abbott and colleagues (2000).

With regard to the other aspect of delegation, the state authorities agreed that there is a scope for political bargaining and dispute resolution in the TALIS programme, by seeking influence through the BPC, but also by negotiating and building alliances with other policy actors outside meetings (AusDfET; EngDfE; FinMinEdu; FinBoard). The Australian DfET Civil Servant remarked that much of the political bargaining actually takes place before BPC meetings:

“Countries that come better prepared – and not all countries are equally well prepared – and that have a stronger interest in something, are usually more influential. By the time you get to the meeting itself, if the OECD has done its homework well, it tends to be fairly cordial and consensus-building, because all of the real discussion would have taken place outside and before the meeting. So, you don’t observe that because it’s not part of the formal governance process.”
(AusDfET)

Moreover, the interviews with state authorities highlighted the expectations to the OECD as a provider *and* ‘broker’ of international comparative research. In other words, state authorities in the three cases were looking for leadership in terms of infrastructural and epistemological governance (cf. Sellar and Lingard 2013a); they expected the OECD to provide a multilateral space for creating and exchanging policy knowledge, lead by the expertise of the OECD (cf. Rutkowski 2008) - and which could be better exploited by governments. According to the Australian DfET Civil Servant:

“Like in other countries, our research area is not that big. The OECD represents to us a whole extra lot of resources that our government pays for in part ... The OECD has the capacity because they are the OECD and can bring in international experts that we would have difficulty in bringing into our country. How do we translate that capability into something that is useful to us? It’s like having an extra library, or research capability that sits abroad. Do we actually visit that library very often and use the information well? The answer is no. We need to be smarter and a little less green.” (AusDfET)

The DfE Officer in England suggested that evidence from the OECD was useful in domestic politics because the OECD would be perceived as an independent external agency. Being ‘one step removed’ (drawing on quotation of a former EDPG Chair in Henry *et al.* 2001, p.

41) from the national arena, evidence from the OECD would be seen as more credible, unbiased and legitimate:

"... because one of the good things with OECD studies is that it is not government-run studies, and it's not a union-run study, but it's a study that comes from an external place. Everyone can, like, look at the results together and not say, well, that's because you only asked these people in your study, and someone says you, you only asked them. So, it's really a good platform to say, look, these are the results, so let's talk about them." (EngDfE)

In accordance with the hypothesis, England and Australia were as relatively larger countries more critical about the delegation of rulemaking and implementation to the OECD. In fact, the state authorities in England and Australia were looking for more leadership and more concrete 'rules' in the form of policy recommendations (hence, with a low level of obligation). The English DfE Officer pointed out that the TALIS 2013 findings were too vague and left a gap in terms of a link to student performance. This is remarkable given that England chose not to take part in the TALIS-PISA link:

"... one lesson is that TALIS doesn't really tell you which countries have high quality teachers, and which don't, and which countries have the best policies in kind of fostering high quality teachers. Which is an obvious kind of gap in that evidence. So, it tells you a lot about different models ... but it doesn't really tell you what you should look for. ... in TALIS, it's really difficult to know, so are we OK, where we are, do we want to be a bit to the left, is the actual best place to be in the middle? That is a bit of a question unanswered, and there's possibly a bit more work that they could do in linking up, not necessarily linking TALIS with PISA, but linking the results at country level from one [programme] and compare it to the other. Certainly, something that we did straightaway with a lot of the TALIS comparisons was to highlight England in the comparison and then highlight all the countries that perform significantly above England in PISA." (EngDfE)

In Australia, they also called for more leadership in terms of brokering knowledge, that is, the OECD should be better at 'translating' and building bridges between data and policy:

"OECD has the capacity to recruit really capable people. What they are missing is actually people with experience in policy. ... Much of the evidence still needs to be

translated, and our job is essentially to harvest and translate it. Their job, I would like, is for them to come a bit closer. It's like a bridge. There is the evidence, and there is the policy, the work of the bridge is actually not very strong, in translating it into something that is useful in a policy perspective. " (AusDfET)

The analysis thus suggests that there is a pressure from some governments on the OECD to be 'bolder' in the translation of TALIS data into policy recommendations, and if possible framed by the golden standard of student learning outcomes. We see that the OECD has to navigate between numerous and sometimes opposing expectations; most countries, as well as teacher unions, insist on treating TALIS and PISA as separate programmes, yet others are calling for closer alignment of the two programmes despite the methodological issues.

More specifically, the DfE Officer from England pointed out that there is a certain circularity to the OECD's recommendation of 'best practices'. Since the literature reviews in the TALIS reports tend to be centred on evidence from English-speaking countries, the findings end up advocating best practices from these countries rather than explore what is going on elsewhere, like in the Far East. On this basis, the officer called for the OECD to take account of a broader literature, so as to prevent TALIS merely "*confirming the old evidence*" (EngDfE). This is a strong critique that reminds of Sahlberg's (2011) analysis of GERM in suggesting that the very research basis for OECD's work in education is biased and helps propagating 'best practices' from countries such as the US.

Likewise, the Senior Official in the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture noted that the very term of 'best practices' has been used so much that she would like to know more about "*next practices*" (FinMinEdu). In fact, the Finnish state authorities were more critical than expected. They thought that the OECD had promised more than the organisation could deliver. The Finnish state authorities were not satisfied with the scope and depth of OECDs work on the international options of ISCED levels 1 and 3 as well as the delays in the release of reports (the OECD has not yet released a report on the TALIS-PISA link though see working paper by Le Donné *et al.* 2016). On this basis, they suggested that Finland would only take part in the main study in TALIS 2018 (FinMinEdu; FinBoard).

In short, the state authorities have extraordinary expectations to the OECD: research-based with a truly global outlook, and politically savvy and bold, exercising a sort of ‘thought leadership’. This is interesting given that, simultaneously, government authorities in the three cases were emphatic in asserting their national sovereignty in education policy (AusDfET; EngDfE; FinMinEdu; FinBoard). The analysis thus confirms the hypothesis that sovereignty in education policy is considered imperative. However, none of the government officials in the three comparative cases interviewed in this study expressed concerns about any sovereignty costs in OECD relations; although OECD was recognised as influential, the level of delegation of rulemaking and implementation to the OECD was not seen as an issue. Rather, the issue of state sovereignty was pronounced in relations between the English DfE and the EC, and Australian Government towards the other eight jurisdictions in the national architecture, as established in the Australian Constitution (Commonwealth of Australia 2010).

With regard to relations between English government and the EC, the English DfE Officer commented on the ‘touchy’ subject of EC engagement in TALIS, and OECD more generally. We should note that the DfE was responsible for some of the monitoring related to ET2020:

“Well, umm, the European Commission and the OECD is like a touchy subject, perhaps, from the England perspective in the research. Because sometimes we think that they are trying to have too much of a voice. They do have a big impact on European countries participation, mainly because they provide funding for quite a lot of the countries. And important and vital funding, so countries won’t participate if they don’t get that. It’s a huge political question in England, and UK, if we should be part of Europe or not. I think it’s an even bigger question in education, because education is supposed to be a devolved responsibility, so therefore, arguably, there shouldn’t be a European Commission perspective on a teacher research project. So, yes, they are used to building alliances and having a European position, and they fund a lot of this for their countries, so they want to make sure that those countries have their say represented, and I get that. We don’t feel that there should be a European position on education policy and priority research questions, because they don’t have policy competence in that area.” (EngDfE)

Why is the EC singled out for critique and not the OECD? In EU terminology, we might say that the quotation shows a critique of the perceived sliding of the ‘support competence’ of the EU in the education sector, enshrined in the Treaty, towards a ‘shared competence’ (EU 2016; see Appendices W and X). In this respect, the strengthening of governance arrangements in the EU in the 2010s with the European Semester, the Joint Assessment Framework, and Country-Specific Recommendations, also in the education sector (see Appendix V), appear to imply a higher sense of obligation and delegation than that found in the OECD open method of coordination.

Finally, we should note that peer pressure between states appears limited. This is interesting given that one of the reasons for why policy actors choose to order their relations through soft legalisation is the objective to solve specific problems that are perceived to be common in nature (cf. Abbott and Snidal 2000 and Chapter 4). While the OECD is expected to undertake substantial data collection, monitoring, and publication, the use of this capacity for creating peer pressure, and hence implicit sanctions for states wishing to be seen as trustworthy members of an international community, is not addressed in the interview material. In line with their assertion of national sovereignty in education, the three comparative cases might be said to be looking for their *own* solutions and not *common* solutions. Thus, a sense of mutual responsibility or need for convergence in education policy were not present. None of the interviewees in Australia, England and Finland commented on the situation in other countries as problematic. Whilst there might be a range of reasons for the interview participants not to be explicit on this issue, the empirical material and the analysis suggests that the amount of state-state peer pressure is limited.

6.2.3. Summary of synchronic account

The chapter showed that the TALIS programme is shot through with soft legalisation governance, and state authorities are demanding and critical consumers of the OECD’s work in education. While state authorities are calling for bolder ideas, ‘rules’ and policy recommendations from the OECD, this appears to depend on low levels of obligation, formally respecting state sovereignty, and a scope to be flexible in the implementation of TALIS allowing for context-specific accommodation and consultation with various policy actors, not least teacher unions.

6.3. Chapter Summary and Discussion

Asking “*Would TALIS have been possible without soft legalisation?*” yields a negative answer. In this respect, explaining the outcome patterns of TALIS was qualified by taking the pluriscalar nature of the governance arrangements into account; the unpacking of the TALIS ensemble required examining the internal relations between the numerous organisations involved in the programme across sites and scales. The Chapter showed that soft legalisation helps constituting the TALIS ensemble.

In a sense, it is somewhat tautological to ask whether TALIS would have been possible without soft legalisation because the programme is in itself an instrument of soft legalisation. The more interesting question concerns the relationship between competitive comparison and soft legalisation. On the basis of the analysis, I would argue that the latter provides a necessary condition for the former; in explaining the patterned outcomes of the TALIS ensemble as indications of competitive comparison, the notion of soft legalisation is indispensable. Whilst TALIS revolves around soft legalisation, I argue that in explaining the programme, competitive comparison is the underlying mechanism. The implication is that soft legalisation is subordinated competitive comparison; in explaining TALIS as a distinctive programme, soft legalisation has been adapted to the ideas of competitive comparison, rather than the other way around. In other words, we might say that soft legalisation provides a political-institutional mechanism in the domain of the actual, reflected and driven by the underlying idea of competitive comparison.

While Chapter 5 showed that the OECD and the EU were intent on developing and applying indicators to guide teacher policy, this Chapter has highlighted that the TALIS programme was borne out of soft governance arrangements in the OECD, and secondarily in the EU. Moreover, the synchronic account allows us to tease out several issues which indicate (contextual) contingent and necessary conditions in the triggering of competitive comparison.

In terms of the construction of hierarchical spaces, the national government authorities trusted the OECD as an agency capable of constructing such spaces - though the national

government authorities in Australia and Finland were critical of league tables ranking countries (AusDfET; FinBoard). In this sense, it is contradictory that these two countries opted for the TALIS-PISA link, as especially the Finnish state authorities preferred the two programmes to remain separate (FinBoard). However, the point to be noted is that state authorities endorse international comparative research and the implication that some systems are allocated higher status than others.

Concerning temporal rhythm, one of the soft legalisation attributes of the TALIS programme is that its design as a cycle of surveys serves to control uncertainty and unpredictability. In this respect, the triggering of the mechanism of competitive comparison is constrained by two conditions. First, the research cycle takes longer than the policy cycle (AusDfET; FinResMan). This means, as pointed out by Pawson (2002a, p.160; 2002b, p.340), that research has little substantial influence on policy formation because political priorities often change. A full cycle of 'policy-into-research-into-policy' thus appears illusory, even in Finland which with an emphasis on educational planning stands out as a country with a relative long-term policy perspective (FinMinEdu). Second, data might be generated yet they are often not made sufficiently sense of. This issue was pointed out by the Research Manager in Finland:

"This is becoming a real problem, the gathering of too much data. We are concentrating too much on data gathering and we don't have enough resources for data analysis. This is true also with PISA especially because the cycle is only 3 years. Policy-makers think that we must have new data and that 3 years is a long period, but from our point of view it is quite short. This means that it is a real challenge to keep the balance and motivate the schools to participate."
(FinResMan)

In combination, the two conditions of research being longer than policy cycles and data generation without analysis would appear to lead to fragmented learning about education systems. However, this does not change the fact that indicators have descriptive as well as prescriptive dimensions. Thus, programmes like TALIS might be conducted regularly and over time it might come to set the agenda and the 'rules of the game' (cf. Dale 2005; Lukes 2005; Rutkowski 2008), but taking part in the programme is not likely to lead to much

learning and improvement. Therefore, we might anticipate a convergence in the *thinking* about teachers' work but preferences and priorities will continue to vary, and governments will continue to insist on doing things their own way in pursuing their preferences.

This had implications for the evaluative trajectories. The definitions and measurements of 'the good teacher' in TALIS are deemed so vague by the three government authorities that it impedes the triggering of competitive comparison. TALIS is rich in terms of descriptive information, but the policy lessons to be drawn are not clear. The analysis thereby further substantiates the argument by Rinne and Ozga (2013) that the complexity of findings in TALIS make them hard to translate into policy.

Altogether, these characteristics have implications for the potential of embedding competitive comparison across scales in national, regional, and global projects. Competitive comparison appears to be universally endorsed but the political and methodological issues related to aligning TALIS with PISA or other measures of student learning outcomes hinder the triggering of the mechanism. Moreover, in Australia, TALIS 2013 samples were not representative for states which would appear to be a major drawback for the relevance of results.

CHAPTER 7. THE WORKINGS OF THE MECHANISM: WHAT DOES TALIS DO?

7.0. Introduction

This chapter addresses the second research question concerning what TALIS does. Two aspects are singled out: the TALIS teacher questionnaires (TQ) and the main policy actors' uses of results. With regard to the former, the Chapter examines the development of TALIS teacher questionnaires for ISCED level 2 teachers in the main study over the two rounds. This is complemented with an account of national adaptations of TALIS 2013 TQ in Australia, England and Finland. It should be noted that I mainly address the TQ. The questionnaires for principals (PQ) are thus not considered in depth. There are two reasons for this choice: i) the primary focus on the teaching profession in this thesis; and ii) word limit regulations for this piece of work.

The analysis below should be read in the light of the previous analysis in Chapters 5 and 6. Throughout the chapter, the analysis of the questionnaires and uses of results are put in relation to the practical argumentation of the relevant policy actor. This allows us to identify contradictions, tensions, or perhaps indications of learning, in the outcomes of TALIS. However, unlike Chapters 5-6, this Chapter does not distinguish between diachronic and synchronic accounts. Rather than going into details with the *policy* recommendations generated with TALIS over time, the Chapter analyses and discusses the *political* implications of TALIS mainly focusing on the three comparative cases of Australia, England and Finland. In this respect, I argue that TALIS is ambiguous in terms of competitive comparison, but there are discernible 'effects' of the mechanism, related to the basic component of codification of knowledge.

7.1. The Construction of TALIS Questionnaires

With critical realist ontology, the TALIS questionnaires constitute surface phenomena shaped by structures, objects and underlying mechanisms. In this sense, we would expect competitive comparison and the modalities of power to work through the questionnaires.

In this section, I will show that the goal of the OECD to gain insights into 'teacher effectiveness' are compromised by the political embeddings of TALIS. As noted earlier, the

construction of TALIS questionnaires takes place on the basis of a priority-rating exercise, with country representatives invited to select policy themes and indicators. The objective of the priority-rating exercise was *“to narrow down the proposed content of the survey and to assist countries in deciding whether to participate in TALIS”* (OECD 2010, p.26).

For TALIS 2013, the priority-rating exercise consisted of three steps: i) rating of themes or ‘indicator domains’ across the 5 overall policy-relevant areas. In TALIS 2013, there were 20 themes or ‘indicator domains’ for countries to prioritise, 5 themes more than in TALIS 2008; ii) rating of theme indicators, with countries indicating which of 90 indicators associated with the most popular themes they considered most important to include; and iii) rating of repeat indicators where countries chose between 25 indicators from TALIS 2008 to be maintained in TALIS 2013 to permit analysis of change trends. The result was that 23 of the 25 indicators were repeated (OECD 2013, pp.9-13; OECD 2014b, pp.32-35).

However, the priority-rating exercise does not translate directly into the TALIS questionnaire. For example, aspects of lower-rated indicators were also included in TALIS 2008 *“where they provided important complementary analytical value to the main themes”*. Hence, aspects of “school climate” and “division of working time”, and a single item on “job satisfaction” were also included in TALIS 2008 questionnaires (OECD 2010, p.27).

For both TALIS 2008 and 2013, it was the responsibility of the Instrument Development Expert Group (IDEG), chaired by the international contractor IEA, to prepare the survey instruments and questionnaire contents for review by the TALIS BPC and the National Project Managers (NPMs). According to the OECD 2013 Technical Report, the primary role of the TALIS BPC *“was to advise on the political relevance of the questionnaire content and its adherence to the TALIS goals and on the applicability of the anticipated data in both national and cross-national contexts.”* In this respect, the TALIS BPC had final approval of the questionnaires used in the pilot, field trial and main survey (OECD 2014b, p.41).

When comparing the structure of the TQ in 2008 and 2013, they overall appear similar, reflecting the continuity of policy themes (see Table 26, based on OECD 2010, pp.259-274; OECD 2014b, pp.413-440).

	TALIS 2008	TALIS 2013
Estimated time	45 minutes	45-60 minutes
Number of questions	43	49
Sections	Background information: Q1-10 Professional development: Q11-20 Teacher appraisal and feedback: Q21-28 Teaching practices, beliefs and attitudes: Q29-33 Your teaching in a particular class at this school: Q34-43	Background Information: Q1-18 Teacher Professional Development: Q19-27 Feedback: Q28-31 Your Teaching in General: Q32-34 Your Teaching in Target Class: Q35-43 School Climate and Job Satisfaction: Q44-47 Teacher Mobility: Q48-49

Table 26. Structure of OECD standard teacher questionnaires

In line with the analysis on soft legalisation in Chapter 6, the former OECD Senior Analyst pointed out that the representatives from participating countries ultimately decide the contents of the survey instruments:

“The truth is that the governments decide what should be given space in the questionnaires. If OECD sees that governments haven’t raised a particular policy issue ... then the Secretariat will put that forward for countries’ consideration. But ultimately, it’s the governments that decide if they want to cover that.” (exOECDsenAnalyst).

However, this view contrasts with a Consultant of the TALIS 2013 International Consortium who emphasised the OECD's scope of agency as well as the ideological orientation of the organisation overall:

"The OECD is not agenda-free. They work with countries, and they make their priorities, and they work the priorities with the countries, and then they take them forward, based on those priorities. All their studies should follow a line. OECD is an organisation that promotes a free market economy, and that is their ultimate goal, and certainly in their educational work" (TALIS 2013cons)

This is an interesting argument considering the OECD Convention's suggestion that *"the further expansion of world trade is one of the most important factors favouring the economic development of countries and the improvement of international economic relations"* (OECD 1960; see Appendix B). We might see the two contrasting quotations above as reflecting the OECD's capacity for epistemological governance and the soft legalisation mandate given to the organisation by governments. Thus, while the government representatives have the final say in the TALIS BPC, the programme has been shaped by a trajectory that goes back to the indicators development of the INES Working Party in the early 2000s and policy reviews such as *"Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective Teachers"* (OECD 2005). Such earlier work set the agenda for the priority-rating exercises of TALIS and the questionnaires. Considering this trajectory and the US support for the creation of INES in the 1990s, we might say – with Panitch and Gindin (2012, p.8) - that the US influence is still evident in OECD programmes such as TALIS and PISA, by setting the parameters within which others determine their course of action (see also Gustafsson 2008).

In many ways, the survey instruments thus form the crux for infrastructural and epistemological governance within the context of TALIS. This implies that the practical argumentation of the OECD with regard to engaging with TALIS - with a distinct focus on 'teacher effectiveness' - is also relevant in this context (see Chapter 5). An important point in this respect is that the OECD due to its capacities in infrastructural and epistemological governance has an overview of their programmes, the data, and their implications to a much larger degree than national governments and other policy actors. Therefore, the

OECD is in a privileged position to set the agenda and define the rules of the game (cf. Lukes 2005):

“They [the OECD] are a powerful organisation, and when they want to have a conversation, they can have the conversation. They have the means, they have the conversation. When your members are the Ministers of Finance, you have the conversation that you want to have, and that spills over to education. So, if they want to have a conversation about teachers, and the PISA study couldn’t have that conversation, so now they can have it with the TALIS study. It depends on how they start to use the data to have that conversation. It seems that they haven’t been using the TALIS data yet to the extent that they probably could.” (TALIS2013cons)

To get at the ideas underpinning the survey instruments, the conceptual frameworks for TALIS 2008 and 2013 are important resources. However, according to a Consultant in the TALIS 2013 Consortium, the framework for TALIS 2008 was not very elaborate, mainly consisting of meeting notes from two INES networks. This called for a more developed framework for TALIS 2013 (OECD 2013, p.5). In this respect, it was a challenge that the first round had been concluded and that the new framework was expected to build on that experience by drawing on a range of experts to conceptualise the areas in the survey. Moreover, the 2013 framework had to take several rounds of feedback and requests from participating countries into account. Overall, the process of developing the framework took more than a year before it was finally approved in the TALIS BPC (TALIS 2013cons):

“I wouldn’t say that there were competing agendas, but one of the things is that every country gets to provide feedback. Every country has a different way of conceptualizing something, so you have to appease every country, you have to appease the experts, you have to appease the OECD, and you have to appease, this time, the IEA. Less the IEA, more the OECD and countries, because it’s their study. There are a lot of players. Whenever you have that many players, it becomes a difficult process.” (TALIS2013cons)

Importantly, the conceptual framework pointed out that since *“TALIS does not connect directly with student outcomes, teacher quality and its relationship to student performance cannot be judged”* (OECD 2013, p.14). At the same time, the conceptual framework for

TALIS 2013 pointed out that the concept of “*effective teaching and learning conditions*” underpinning TALIS 2013 is simultaneously broad and context dependent:

“In the case of TALIS, effective teaching and learning environments are environments that contribute to positive student learning. The factors, practices, and conditions identified by participants in the priority-rating exercise, such as teacher appraisal and feedback systems, represent the elements that participants agree contribute to positive student learning. TALIS is meant to gather information on specific aspects of the teaching and learning environment that research suggests and country representatives believe contribute to positive student learning. Of course, “effective” teaching and learning may include many other factors that cannot be examined through TALIS or any self-report instrument.” (OECD 2013, p.16)

Again, we recognise the balancing act that the OECD must negotiate; allowing governments to have a say and agree on the factors that contribute to student learning while showing leadership in terms of epistemological governance.

On this basis, we should note Robertson’s (2012a) critique of the TALIS 2008 survey instruments – which is related to the quotation of the Consultant above. Robertson (2012a) conceives of the TALIS survey instruments as particular kinds of ‘pedagogic devices’ and argues that the more general shift toward ‘learning as (individual) development’ is evident in the emphasis on various kinds of learning: ongoing professional learning, feedback, and self reflection. Moreover, she points out that the construction of survey instruments concerning teacher beliefs reflects a bias towards constructivism which is appealing for the OECD’s pedagogical project because it fits with the ontology of neoliberalism and liberalism’s concern with the individual. Interestingly, the preference for constructivist teacher beliefs and pedagogy appeared to have been reinforced in TALIS 2013 when the indices were reduced to merely include a single index on constructivist beliefs (OECD 2014a, p.217; compare OECD 2009, p.269).

Turning to the management and implementation of TALIS 2013 nationally, this involved the translation and adaptation of questionnaires. The standard OECD questionnaires were prepared in ‘International English’ (OECD 2010, pp.259-274; OECD 2014b, pp.413-440). This

was primarily undertaken by the National Project Managers and discussed in the respective Steering Groups (cf. Chapter 6). All translations and adaptations had to go through a vetting process, and it should be stressed that the scope for changes in terms of the contents were limited. Only a few questions in the OECD standard questionnaire could thus be added or replaced. Still, the adaptations reflect contextual conditions related to the mechanism of competitive comparison.

Two examples might be given to highlight the ways that system features are reflected in the national adaptations. The first concerns the distinction between teacher education and teacher training, where the adaptations from especially Finland and England indicate the various institutional features of teacher education/training in those countries (see Table 27. For Finland, the Table refers to the Swedish language version of the Finnish questionnaire. “Utbildningsprogram för lärare” in Swedish translates into “education programme for teachers”). In particular, the apparently minor consideration of Teach First in the English questionnaire reflects sweeping changes in teacher training provision in the country (Whitty 2014).

OECD standard teacher questionnaire	Q11. Did you complete a <teacher education or training programme>?
Australia	Q12. Did you complete a teacher education or training programme?
Finland	Q11. Har du genomfört utbildningsprogram för lärare?
England	Q11. Have you completed a teacher training programme? Please mark one choice. Select ‘Yes’ if you are currently on a Teach First programme.

Table 27. Wording in OECD questionnaire and national adaptations

The second example concerns questions related to the public or private management and funding sources of schools (PQ 10-11). In England and Finland, the OECD standard questionnaire in this respect was found inadequate or irrelevant. In Finland, there are only very few private schools, and the questions were therefore deemed not relevant (FinMinEdu).

As the teacher questionnaires acknowledge in their instructions, they might not always consider the sites in which they are filled in:

“Being an international survey, it is possible that some questions do not fit very well within your national context. In these cases, please answer as best as you can” (OECD, 2010, pp.246, 259; OECD 2014b, pp.393, 414)

Especially in Finland the researchers found the translation and adaptation challenging. According to the Finnish research manager, such adaptations are associated with the issue whether *“the international studies are harmonizing systems or if they are respecting the cultural differences.”* He elaborated:

“The methodology of TALIS was special, compared to PISA and other studies. The most challenging and difficult part was the translation of the questionnaires. In some cases it was almost impossible to find phrases in Finnish language equal to concepts in the original language. It shows that there are so many differences between countries in how teachers and their work are organized, and how their in-service training is organized. It has an impact on the reliability of the data ... If some phenomena don’t exist in your country, and you ask teachers about their reactions to that phenomena, then it’s not very reliable.” (FinResMan)

In particular, the NPC had to find compromises on questions concerning appraisal, evaluation and reward systems for teachers, *“because these kind of practices are very rare in Finland”* (FinResMan). In addition, the Officer from the teacher union OAJ pointed out that the questions on working hours and school leadership were misleading because they neglected the more informal kind of Finnish school management (FinUnion). The term of professional development also proved challenging. In Finland, the term traditionally used would be more related to ‘in-service training’. According to the Finnish researchers, terms like professional development are becoming more influential, with an emphasis on a more individualised view of teachers’ learning:

“Professional development was one of the terms that we had some difficulties to translate because we didn’t use that term when we started. Today, we are familiar with it and we have found a quite nice translation. We were speaking about in-service training and referring to the structures of how teachers’

professional development were organised. Professional development is much more process-oriented and more individual". (FinResMan)

The *TALIS 2013 User Guide* (OECD, 2014e, pp.235-343) documents most national adaptations related to context-sensitive wording and changes in categories (see Appendix Z). The vast majority of the adaptation concern for example categories of subjects and institutional types. However, other adaptations were made, including the addition of questions coined in the national Steering Groups and NPCs (see Table 28).

Australia	England	Finland
Question and rows added on aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander origins Destinations for travel abroad for professional purposes or during teacher education/training	Replacement of questions on teacher mobility Extra questions on job satisfaction and family circumstances Rows added on subject knowledge and material sanctions for poor performance	Rows added in questions on barriers to professional development, evaluation of student competences, and working environment Extra final question gave the opportunity to provide feedback to NPC
50 questions	51 questions	50 questions

Table 28. Main national adaptations in TALIS 2013 Teacher Questionnaires

In Australia, the adaptations were relatively minor though clearly indicating context-specific issues. In Finland, we see that the most notable adaptations concern barriers to professional development and evaluation of student competences. The former was directly related to the practical argumentation of the Finnish state authorities, but the second adaptation is more puzzling considering that evaluation of students is standardised to a very little degree in Finland (Silander and Välijärvi 2013; Simola 2005; Varjo *et al.* 2013).

Likewise, the adaptations in the English TQ reflects contentious issues: Teacher unions and the EU. The DfE Steering Group thus took the initiative to replace a question in the OECD standard questionnaire with a new one on job satisfaction. This was done to encourage the

teacher unions to endorse the survey when they would meet in the Advisory Group (EngNPCsen).

In the light of the relationship to the DfE's relationship toward EU involvement in education (cf. Chapter 6), it is interesting that the national adaptation in England to the TALIS 2013 questionnaire for teachers also resulted in the replacement of questions on teacher mobility. These had originally been suggested by the EC, and IDEG recommended European countries to include one or two of such questions at the end of the teacher questionnaire (OECD 2014b, p.54). Yet, unlike in questionnaires in Finland and other European countries (as well as some from beyond Europe, like Australia), they were not included in England.

7.2. The Uses of TALIS Results by The OECD and The EU

This section will highlight the ways that TALIS results are used by the OECD and EU. I will not go into details with the policy recommendations issued by the OECD and the EC over the two cycles, though I would like to note that for both organisations they are increasing in number and becoming clearer (compare OECD 2009a with 2014a, and EC2010a and 2014a). Rather, to underline the amount of activity going on I will situate the use of results in the publication and event 'circuits' of the OECD and the EU.

In the case of the OECD, the annual flagship publication "Education at a Glance" has since 2009 included data from TALIS in Chapter D "The learning environment and organisation of schools" (see for example OECD 2009b, pp.357-443). More recently, TALIS data started feeding into the new "OECD Education Policy Outlook" series (OECD 2015d) the first edition of which was issued in 2015. This series follows in the footsteps of long-standing OECD publications like the "OECD Economic Outlook" and the "OECD Employment Outlook".

Moreover, TALIS results are central to the annual International Summits of the Teaching Profession. The summits have been held since 2011 and are convened by OECD, Education International and government authorities of the host country. The summits bring sixteen official delegations of ministers of education and union leaders to the same table, resulting in country commitments and follow up on goals of varying substance. OECD prepares the background reports for these summits in which TALIS data are prominent (see for example

Schleicher 2015, 2016). We should note that these summits are framed by what we might label a 'PISA regime' because invitations are thus nominally only extended to "*high-performing and rapidly improving countries and regions*" as measured by student performance on PISA (Asia Society 2011, 2015).

OECD also take part in events hosted by private sector companies, such as the one described in the very beginning of this thesis (Education Fast Forward 2014). While such events provide a lever for the OECD to further a global conversation on teacher quality, the constitution of the panel of 'global education experts' also reminds us that new markets and business opportunities are being created with the thickening of the global education policy field (Ball 2012; Robertson *et al.* 2012).

A particularly interesting output is *A Teachers' Guide to TALIS 2013* (OECD 2014c). This 28 page-guide was produced in English, French, and Spanish, and indicates that the OECD seeks to target teachers and school leaders directly with recommendations concerning how TALIS data can be used to have greater impact in classrooms. The OECD Analyst told that the guide is part of a broader OECD strategy to raise awareness about TALIS and OECD activities to achieve 'buy-in' from school professionals. The recent launch of the "OECD PISA-Based Test for Schools" might also be understood as an indication of this strategy (Lewis *et al.* 2016; Rutkowski 2015).

In the case of the EU, TALIS data now feed into the Europe 2020 strategy. The "stronger economic governance" of Europe 2020 should be understood against the background of the poor evaluation of the Lisbon Strategy which suffered from random implementation and weak ownership at national level (EC 2010d; Pépin 2011). Under Europe 2020, a 'thematic approach' is combined with country reporting, centred on integrated guidelines as in the Lisbon Strategy post-2005 (see Appendix Y).

Specifically with regard to education, the joint report in 2012 on the implementation of ET2020 (CoEU and EC 2012, p.8) called for increasing the contribution of ET2020 to Europe 2020 by incorporating the former more fully into the European Semester, the EU calendar for economic policy coordination. The European Semester involves a cycle of Annual Growth

Survey, Country-specific Recommendations, National Reform Programmes, and – in the area of education - an annual “Education and Training Monitor” issued by the Commission setting out progress on the ET 2020 benchmarks and core indicators, including the Europe 2020 Headline Target on education and training, to help inform the debate at Council level. This is complemented with EC Communications and the DG EAC Working Groups where TALIS results are also discussed (EACschools; ETUCErep). The governance framework has later been dubbed the ‘Joint Assessment Framework’ (JAF) and forms the monitoring tool of the Europe 2020 strategy, incorporating ET2020 and the assessment of education systems in Europe. JAF was introduced by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion in 2010 and subsequently adopted by DG EAC to standardise the monitoring of benchmarks and indicators (EC 2017; EC/Joint Research Centre 2014).

We should note that TALIS 2013 data were also used for secondary analysis by the ‘research unit on lifelong learning’ (CRELL) at the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre. The unit was established with the Council Conclusions in 2005 (CoEU 2005) to significantly increase the EC’s capacity in indicators development and research. In 2015, CRELL issued a report using data from TALIS 2013, PISA 2012 and TIMSS/PIRLS examining relationships between teacher practices and student achievement (EC/Joint Research Centre 2015). The report was later summarised in an EU Analytical and Policy Note prepared by DG EAC (EC 2015b).

The stronger governance in the EU during the 2010s is also reflected in the practical argumentation of the three texts (CoEU 2005, EC 2010a; EC 2014a). The EU Analytical and Policy Note (EC 2014a) is thus by far the most specific with regard to recommendations to member states. The text includes “*Country Profiles*” with summaries of TALIS 2013 findings, selected to highlight positive and negative aspects of education systems (see Table 29, based on EC 2014a, pp.31,34).

Moreover, the text constructs hierarchical spaces of EU teacher policy, with column chart ‘country rankings’ presenting high- and low achievers fluctuating around an EU average. We should note that the EU average is weighted; EU averages presented in the Note correspond

to the average of the 19 EU member states taking part in TALIS, weighted by the teacher population in each state (EC 2014a, p.9). A weighted EU average represents the European teacher workforce as one entity, rather than 19 distinctive workforces. It is remarkable that the scope of the Note is confined to participating EU Member States, suggesting external comparison is deemed less relevant than internal peer pressure.

	England	Finland
Positives	Teacher appraisal and feedback – highest share in EU Formal induction rate - highest in EU Participation in continuous professional development Relative high teacher status in society Sense of self-efficacy Use of ICT	Teacher status in society - highest in EU Very low teacher shortage
Negatives	Shortage of qualified staff	Formal induction rate is low Participation in continuous professional development is low Formal teacher appraisal and feedback is low The use of ICT is the lowest in EU Low sense of self-efficacy

Table 29. TALIS findings and EC country profiles for England and Finland

7.3. Uses of TALIS 2013 Results in Australia, England and Finland

With the flurry of activities internationally, it is remarkable how little attention and impact TALIS 2013 has sparked nationally. In Australia and England, TALIS results have only been used to relatively little extent. In Finland, the results appear to have had somewhat more impact on the political discourses in education due to the codification of knowledge implied in TALIS. In this section, I argue that these distinctive outcome patterns of TALIS can be explained by the contextual conditions in the three countries with regard to the current state of competitive comparison.

First, the national TALIS 2013 reports indicate that there are differences in the nature of the ‘global eye’ adopted in Australia, England and Finland (see Table 30). The Finnish national report for the TALIS 2013 main study (Taajamo *et al.* 2014) adopts the geographical neighbours Sweden, Estonia, Denmark and Norway as reference group in the comparison

with Finnish findings. In the English national report (Micklewright *et al.* 2014, pp.30, 204-205), findings for England are compared with groups of ‘high performers’ and ‘low performers’, as defined by PISA results and secondarily TIMSS and PIAAC results. This mode of comparison was conceived by the IOE research team and strongly endorsed by the DfE (EngDfE; EngNPCres). Finally, the reference groups of PISA Best Countries and the Asian group in the Australian report (Freeman *et al.* 2014, p.7) were conceived at the DfET. According to the researchers, this way of reporting TALIS results indicate the emphasis in the Australian political context on being among the top performers in PISA (AusNPC2).

These reference groups of comparison reflect strategic positioning and thus the varied emphasis on competitive comparison in the three countries. Hence, they should be understood in relation to the practical argumentation of the government authorities for taking part in TALIS 2013 (cf. Chapter 5).

Australia	England	Finland
1. ‘OECD average’ based on 23 OECD countries and sub-national entities	Eight “low performers”: Abu Dhabi, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Romania, and Serbia.	Sweden, Estonia, Denmark and Norway
2. Four Asian countries: Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore.	Nine “high performers”: Japan, Korea, Singapore, Finland, Estonia, The Netherlands, Flanders (Belgium), Alberta (Canada) and Australia.	
3. ‘PISA-Best countries’: Canada(Alberta), Estonia, Finland, Belgium (Flanders), Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Poland and Singapore.		

Table 30. Reference groups in national TALIS 2013 reports

Based on the empirical inquiry, TALIS remains a low-profile programme in Australia with little direct impact on policy. Australia-based interviewees in this respect contrasted the impact of TALIS with PISA and reports issued by McKinsey (Barber and Mourshed 2007; Mourshed *et al.* 2010) and the Grattan Institute (Jensen and Reichl 2011) (exAEU; AusUnion; AITSLexec; AusMan). While the AEU is using TALIS results in their campaigning against long working hours and large class sizes, TALIS was deemed ‘not even a blip on the radar’ in

terms of media coverage (exAEU). Moreover, a senior officer from one of the Australian state teacher unions told that they had never used TALIS results (AusUnion).

Yet, there are important nuances to this picture that remind us that TALIS might become more influential in the future in Australia. In this respect, it appears that state-representative samples could potentially raise the profile of TALIS across the country. The DfET Civil Servant told that future participation in TALIS 2018 had been debated in the Committee concerned with data and evidence during 2015. In this respect, the senior Department officials from the various jurisdictions expressed their support for prioritising TALIS as a data source – among numerous other potential data sources - also for the next round in 2018. At the same time, the officials in the Committee agreed that the sample is too small; having a sample size that is nationally representative but not state-representative was deemed of limited value to the States and Territories. Therefore, if the OECD and increased costs allow, TALIS 2018 will be conducted with state-representative samples in Australia. Furthermore, the interest in States and Territories for the TALIS programme is indicated by the fact that they agreed to share some of the costs for taking part in TALIS 2018; Australian Government paid the costs for taking part in the two first rounds of the survey programme (AusDfET; interview conducted late 2015).

In England, the launch of the TALIS 2013 results sparked some media attention. The national TALIS report on England (Micklewright *et al.* 2014) was issued on the same day, June 25th 2014, as the OECD main report (OECD 2014a), and the DfE, IOE and the OECD held a joint press briefing where the main newspapers and specialist education newspapers were present. However, it was mainly the OECD main report and not the national English report that received coverage (EngNPCres). It is remarkable in this respect that the DfE at a late stage decided not to issue any press release, a fact that appears related to that the DfE attempted to maintain a low profile on statements about teachers because NUT and NASUWT had warned of teacher strikes in May-June 2014.

Subsequently, the main outcome of TALIS 2013 in England was a high-profiled 'big policy' championed by Secretary of State of Education Nicky Morgan and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg who together launched the Teacher Workload Challenge in October 2014:

"... the big area that TALIS had the most impact on is the Teachers Workload Challenge. Because teachers recorded quite a high number of average hours of work in each week, and that was the catalyst for our teachers group to then bring the teacher unions together, as part of a programme of talks, and decide with them how we should tackle workload." (EngDfE)

Subsequently, the Workload Challenge encouraged teachers to submit proposals about how to reduce their workload (Morgan 2014). The government response in February 2015 highlighted that the government had simplified school requirements and cut 75% of the guidance to schools and teachers (DfE 2015; Morgan and Clegg, 2015). This point is particularly interesting. Prompted by my question whether the DfE had used or disseminated the OECD "Teachers' Guide to TALIS 2013" to schools, the DfE Officer pointed out that while she had given some copies at events, the DfE was not meant to disseminate such guidance:

"What's a little bit different I think and has become very different through this Parliament is that whereas previously the Department's role would have been quite ... how do you say ... quite involved in kind of communicating to teachers what we think they ought to be doing, putting frameworks together, kind of saying, we are putting these policies in place and you have to work within this framework. What we really moved away from is all of that, towards a kind of really more autonomous system for teachers which means that teachers and their headteachers are the ones that should be making lots of decisions and deciding what to look at, deciding how to organise what they do and structure it. Part of that is that Department of Education officials are no longer allowed to send lots of communications to teachers and to schools directly. Whereas before, I think we would have sent an email to all teachers with that Teachers Guide, or some kind of document that says, here is some interesting information from TALIS, have a think about it. We don't do that anymore." (EngDfE)

This 'hands-off' strategy is in line with the DfE White Paper from 2010 which points out that the aim in terms of school improvement is to support the school system to become more

self-improving because *“the attempt to secure automatic compliance with central government initiatives reduces the capacity of the school system to improve itself”* (DfE 2010, p.13). In this light, the establishment of the Education Endowment Foundation (EEF) by Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove in 2011 is remarkable as an indication of the emphasis on competitive comparison in English school policy. The on-line EEF Teaching & Learning Toolkit and Early Years Toolkit, predominantly based on research from the US and UK (there are not any references to OECD research), address a range of topics covering teaching styles, curriculum, and organisational issues. Each topic is summarised in terms of its average impact on learning (measured as ‘additional months of progress’); strength of the evidence; and their costs (Education Endowment Foundation 2016).

Finland seems considerably more ‘eager to comply’ (cf. Rinne *et al.* 2004) with the agenda-setting in the OECD and the EC. In Finland, the national TALIS 2013 report singles out the issues of relatively low participation levels among teachers in induction, mentoring, and professional development as particular areas of concern. These foci correspond with the OECD “Country Note” on Finland (included in Taajamo *et al.* 2014) as well as the EU Analytical and Policy Note (EC 2014a). On this basis, the national report calls for long-term operation models involving partnerships between higher education institutions and schools to build a continuum supporting professional development of teachers (Taajamo *et al.*, 2014, p.8). We recognise the idea of professional development as a continuum from the practical argumentation of the Finnish state authorities for taking part in TALIS 2013 as well as in EU political discourse (Cf. Chapter 5).

7.4. Chapter Summary and Discussion

This chapter highlighted the political embeddings of the construction of TQ in TALIS, subject to the preferences of governments in terms of their beliefs on ‘teacher effectiveness’ as well as the OECD’s bias towards constructivism. Moreover, the analysis showed that the adaptations in England and Finland reflected contentious issues in those countries. With regard to the uses of results, there is a remarkable discrepancy between the flurry of activities of the OECD and the EU related to TALIS, and the little impact – especially in Australia and England – of the survey. However, the distinctive groups of comparison in the

national TALIS 2013 reports indicate the extent to which the mechanism of competitive comparison is currently structuring those contexts.

In explaining the outcome patterns of TALIS, we need to consider the contextual conditions for the mechanism of competitive comparison. I argue that we do not see any impact in England and Australia in terms of the mechanism because it is already structuring those contexts to a relatively high degree. Furthermore, it was confirmed that the lack of state-representative samples renders the survey less relevant in Australia. However, in Finland we find several indications that the codification of knowledge associated with TALIS challenges established educational notions - on for example informal management and how to count working hours - and introduces more formal and individualised approaches to induction, mentoring, professional development, teacher feedback and appraisal. This is a crucial point related to the codification of knowledge as a basic component of competitive comparison and the paradigm of knowledge-based economy. In this light, the TALIS outcome patterns in Finland reflect that some conditions for competitive comparison are being put in place.

Finally, with a similar focus on the contextual conditions, we can explain the vast range of activities by the OECD and the EU - especially the EC – concerning TALIS as efforts to ‘scale up’ the mechanism of competitive comparison to the global, or European, level.

PART III

CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS

8.0. Introduction

In this thesis I unpacked the TALIS ensemble to explain the outcomes of the programme. My knowledge interest was to examine what drives the increasing political interest in teachers globally. With critical realism as meta-theory, I adopted the language of mechanisms, outcomes, and contextual conditions, as well as a range of substantive theories that could help me test hypotheses formulated on the basis of the existing research evidence. In this respect, the empirical material proved very rich and it challenged many of the hypotheses.

The thesis has highlighted that the TALIS ensemble constitutes a unity of multiple determinations. In unpacking the TALIS ensemble, I demonstrated that it is made up of a wide range of policy actors who all have capacities of agency in pursuing their goals. At the same time, their autonomy is relative and subject to constraints and structuring. In this respect, the thesis identified the paradigm of the 'knowledge-based economy' and soft legalisation as the major factors in the structuring of the TALIS ensemble.

Based on the analysis of this thesis, the TALIS programme appears to have gone through a tentative phase of consolidation. Especially the interviews with the professionals engaging with TALIS in the three comparative cases of Australia, England and Finland reflect that the OECD, in its coordination of the programme, has to take a range of preferences and interests into account. Reconciling these is not a straightforward process and not one that the OECD can fully control, though the organisation - due to its capacities in epistemological and infrastructural governance - can nevertheless influence it. The OECD is in fact expected to do so by governments – the analysis is clear on this point - and there were calls from the government authorities in Australia and England for the OECD to be bolder and more 'politically savvy', while the officials from Finland thought that the OECD had promised more than it could deliver in TALIS 2013. In these and other policy actors' contestations, the much higher profiled PISA programme is always present, explicitly or implicitly. Though TALIS is a separate programme, the aspiration from the outset to relate TALIS to 'teacher effectiveness', where effectiveness translates into raising student learning outcomes, means

that PISA is always a circumstantial ‘fact’ in the political bargaining processes associated with TALIS.

This brings us to the mechanism of competitive comparison. I argue that the observable effects associated with TALIS in the empirical domain can be explained as the product of the underlying mechanism of competitive comparison in the domain of the real. In this way, the outcome patterns of TALIS show that the operation of the same mechanism can produce different results depending upon the conditions. TALIS was from the outset conceived by the OECD as a policy tool underpinned by competitive comparison, but the results of the operation of this mechanism in various contextual conditions suggest that the discernible ‘effects’ of the programme are limited. My explanation for this absence of observable indications of competitive comparison in the domain of the empirical are associated with, partly, the nature of the TALIS programme as a survey, and partly, the contextual conditions.

In relation to the TALIS survey design and conceptual framework, the analysis showed that the OECD’s aspiration - that TALIS results should provide insights into ‘teacher effectiveness’ - are not realised in a ‘politically savvy’ manner in terms of what policies governments should pursue to increase student learning outcomes. This argument and the analysis conducted in this thesis substantiate Rinne and Ozga’s (2013) suggestion that the complexity of findings hinder their translation into policy recommendations. In particular, the modalities of hierarchical spaces and evaluative trajectory (and therefore also the embedding of competitive comparison across scales) are not triggered with the TALIS programme. Especially in England, the government authorities missed the golden standard of student learning outcomes to guide their reading of TALIS results. Due to the absence of this standard, the rankings and policy guidance of how to improve teaching lost relevance and thus had limited capacity to stir media attention.

Second, the outcome patterns of TALIS, and the muted impact of the programme in Australia and England, can be explained by taking the contexts of those countries into account. In these two contexts, the mechanism of competitive comparison has already been

triggered in distinctive ways, and TALIS did not further the workings of the mechanism. In Finland, the workings of competitive comparison were subtle and related to the codification of knowledge – and hence semiosis - with regard to teachers' work. With this explanation, I imply that the codification of knowledge is an imperative for putting into place the conditions for competitive comparison to work.

The importance of codification of knowledge stands out in explaining TALIS, suggesting the necessary condition of the knowledge-based economy paradigm for competitive comparison to be triggered. This is highlighted in the efforts by the OECD, and perhaps even more even so in those of the EU. Through the development and application of indicators, the Education and Training Work Programmes of the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 have thus sought to put the conditions into place that enable competitive comparison. This thesis has also shown that the OECD is a very important partner for the EU in the project of European region-building, which in the field of education is subject to increasingly 'hard' governance frameworks, and where the EC is leading the way in schools and teacher policy. In this respect, it is a remarkable indication of the EC's commitment to trigger competitive comparison that the EC is exploring on its own the potential 'synergies' between TALIS and PISA. This is arguably based on a mandate from the Member States, yet the analysis shows that the English DfE found the sovereignty costs of EC and EU engagement in education too high – an important finding considering 'Brexit' and the UK government's decision in 2016 to leave the EU.

In terms of explaining the engagement of teacher unions, the notion of codification of knowledge is also crucial. One important finding of this study is that none of the unions opposed codification as a principle. Rather, they contested the potential bias of such codification, and in particular how research evidence was used by decision-makers and media in ways that could undermine the interests of teachers and their organisations. In this sense, teacher unions have a more critical approach toward the knowledge-based economy paradigm because they recognise that research projects have political implications. In line with the hypothesis, distributional conflict between employers and employees was thus found to be central to explaining the outcome patterns of TALIS in so far as it was

imperative for the functioning of the programme to get ‘teachers on board’. Yet, their influence on TALIS has been limited in terms of the shaping of the programme. I argue that the strong and concerted engagement of TUAC in TALIS should be understood in the context of the thickening of the global educational policy field, and especially the launch of PISA. In this way, the strategy of pursuing institutional power resources provides an important condition in explaining what made TALIS possible, but not for what has made the programme what it is, or what the programme does. In the global educational policy field, like in many national contexts, teacher unions continue to face tough choices as they are compelled to react to agenda-setting and ‘rules of the game’ that are defined elsewhere.

This argument implies that earlier strategies of teacher unions (cf. Robertson 2000) to advance their professional status and autonomy, based upon claims that their expertise required high levels of complex and *tacit* pedagogical knowledge, are not deemed viable anymore. Now, the ‘battle of ideas’ appears to be centred around the shaping and collection of research evidence to support the practical argumentation that teacher unions want to put forward. By engaging proactively in the global education debate on ‘what works’, teacher unions find themselves in a situation where their previous focus on distributional conflict shifts towards technocratic disagreement over optimal coordination and efficiency (cf. Korpi 2006; Pontusson 2005; Streeck 2010, 2016). It should be stressed in this respect that there appear to be instances of ‘a positive-sum mode’ in the TALIS programme, with mutual benefits for the OECD, governments, the EC, BIAC, and unions and teachers. This is indicated by the emphasis in TALIS on teachers’ status, job satisfaction and teacher self-efficacy. Moreover, we saw that TALIS 2013 results in England were adopted to moderate teachers’ long working hours, a phenomenon we might understand as a crisis tendency resulting from the intense pressure on teachers in that system to perform.

Based on trans- and counterfactual retroductive questioning I am now in a position to address the three research questions and explain the relations between mechanisms and necessary and contingent conditions in a succinct and clear manner.

8.1. What Made TALIS Possible?

The mechanism of competitive comparison made TALIS possible. This underlying mechanism in the domain of the real explains the outcomes of the programme, as observed in the domain of the empirical and the patterned tendencies attributed to the domain of the actual through analysis. The idea of ‘teacher effectiveness’ underpinning the conceptual framework of the programme is the primary indication of the mechanism, however vaguely executed it was in the first two rounds of TALIS.

A necessary condition for triggering competitive comparison is the paradigm of knowledge-based economy which stipulates that the codification and sharing of knowledge is and should be the main driver for economic growth. This implies that the practical argumentation of the main policy actors in the field mainly conceive of education in economic terms, putting the sector and the teaching professions centre stage in the perpetual search for solutions to the contradictions and core problems of capitalism - accumulation, social order and cohesion, and legitimation.

Soft legalisation provides another necessary condition for competitive comparison in the global educational policy field. National governments are not willing to support programmes that they believe encroach on national sovereignty in teacher and schools policy, whether related to the OECD or the EU.

The strategy of teacher unions to maintain or enhance their institutional power resources is a contingent condition in relation to the triggering of competitive comparison. For TALIS, teacher unions sought to enhance their institutional power resources as a response to the unprecedented triggering of competitive comparison on an international scale, primarily indicated with the global trenchancy of PISA on education policy.

8.2. What Does TALIS Do?

Through indicator development and their application through survey instruments, TALIS advances the codification of knowledge related to teachers’ work. This codification is an integral component of competitive comparison and the particular modality of power associated with the definition of evaluative trajectories. This codification has descriptive and

prescriptive dimensions, as is apparent in Finland where previously dominant notions about schools and teachers are challenged by the categories and terminologies included in TALIS.

The uses of TALIS results depend on contingent contextual conditions. In educational contexts already profoundly shaped by competitive comparison, such as Australia and England, TALIS has raised little attention. In Finland, results were mainly used to pursue existing policy priorities. In OECD and the EC, TALIS results have sparked more activity, indicating their efforts to 'scale up' competitive comparison.

In this respect, the hypothesis was confirmed that competitive comparison is more pronounced in the practical argumentation of government authorities in Australia and England, than in Finland. In particular, the evaluative trajectory was less focused on the relationship between quality teaching and student learning outcomes in Finland than in England and Australia.

Accordingly, the analysis reveals that due to the ambiguities of the TALIS results in terms of the links between teachers' work and student performance, government authorities in England and Australia were critical about the uses of TALIS. In Australia, this was reinforced by the fact that samples were not representative at state-level. This was in line with the hypotheses. However, their status as relatively larger countries did not make them more concerned about delegation to the OECD than Finland. Rather, they called for clearer guidance about what to do in teacher policy to increase student learning outcomes. At the same time - and corresponding with the hypothesis - authorities in England were very critical of EC engagement in TALIS, unlike Finland.

Finally, the analysis also confirmed that due to its stronger institutional power resources the Finnish teacher union OAJ was much more engaged in TALIS 2013, including on the use of results as compared with the main teacher unions in Australia and England.

8.3. What Does TALIS Mean Theoretically?

First of all, the outcome patterns of TALIS highlight the need for a pluri-scalar conception of global education governance. The analysis showed that pluri-scalar governance cannot be

understood as a zero-sum game of give and take. Rather, we might theorise about the emergent powers of the TALIS ensemble, in line with the stratified ontology of critical realism. As a unity of multiple determinations, these powers cannot be reduced to those of their constituents. I would argue that an increasingly global infrastructure of educational indicators constitutes the remarkable outcome of these emergent powers - an infrastructure that complements the work undertaken by the 'structured oligopoly' of the OECD, Eurostat and UNESCO (cf. Rutkowski 2007 and Chapter 3) for more than 50 years and that will be furthered with the SDG in the coming decades. In this respect, we should note the increasing number of joint cooperation arrangements between the main transnational policy actors. For example, OECD has in the past decade signed such agreements with the EC (EC 2012c, 2013c), the ILO (ILO and OECD 2011), the World Bank (OECD 2006b) and continues to work together with UNESCO (OECD 2017e).

With their descriptive and prescriptive dimensions, this infrastructure of educational indicators is likely to further a convergence over time in the thinking about preferences and priorities with regard to teachers' work. In other words, the indicators might come to set the agenda as well as define the 'rules of the game' in education and policy formation (cf. Lukes 2005).

This leads us to another important question which concerns the internal relations between semiosis and the material and extra-semiotic. Certainly, this thesis confirms that ideas can cause events and produce change. I would argue that the TALIS programme represents yet another example of 'problem-solving theory' centred round policy-relevant empirical generalisation for the objective of efficiency maximisation in education systems (Cox 1996, pp.88-89; Dale 2005). This implies that meaning-making, in the production and analysis of data, comes to disregard those material and extra-semiotic features not captured in the modelling.

With the thickening of the global educational policy field, it would appear to be a paradox that the methodological nationalism is still so strong in programmes such as TALIS. Yet, we might understand the continued use of the crude yet powerful representation that

countries *are* and *ought to be* competing against each other in a global education race as a particular attempt to square the circle in terms of the core problems of capitalism. In this sense, the TALIS programme constitutes yet another attempt to ensure social order by realigning educators (and by implication students and their parents) for the higher purpose of economic growth, legitimated by the paradigm of the knowledge-based economy.

Another point that requires consideration is the implications for knowledge production and those undertaking it. The epistemic community of professionals (Haas 1992; Kallo 2009) with the necessary analytic competences to work with the data is not very large. The Consultant in the TALIS 2013 International Consortium suggested that the global hubs for competencies in educational statistics include relatively few organisations, such as IEA, ACER, Educational Testing Service in the US, Pearson, Cambridge Education Group, and Cito in the Netherlands (TALIS2013cons). During my research, researchers in Australia and England, along with the EI Senior Consultant, pointed to the low academic status of taking part in such international comparative education research. In particular, they pointed out that university-based researchers tend to have little interest, or capacity, in programmes like TALIS and the communication-focused ‘translation research’ that it involves. These reasons might have to do with little incentive due to the strong pressure for publishing in peer-reviewed journals (EngNPCres), or a lack of capabilities in ‘translation research’ targeting policy-makers, the public or indeed teachers (AITSLexec). According to the EI Senior Consultant, the absence of major academic figures and institutions in supporting international surveys leaves the field open for private companies which, due to their nature as profitmaking companies, might “*squeeze out the legitimate voice of the public sector and the academic community*” (Elconsult).

In the pursuit of my knowledge interest and the research questions, I also found the research agenda of CCPEE to be helpful. It has become increasingly apparent for me that CCPEE constitutes an expansive agenda that might be adapted to very different research designs in terms of scales, concepts and empirical data. For this thesis, the notion of ‘education ensemble’ encapsulates the epistemic gains which might be realised with CCPEE in terms of insights into the workings of pluri-scalar governance. In addition, critical

discourse analysis as conceived by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) provides a nuanced approach to making sense of political discourse. I would argue that the analysis of practical argumentation complements CCPEE, and in capturing the basic premise-conclusion structures of the main policy actors in the TALIS ensemble, it has served the project well. However, during this project I have come to realise that the analysis of practical argumentation might have benefitted from including fewer texts in the empirical material. This brings us to the limitations of the study.

8.4. Limitations of The Study

There are advantages and disadvantages to the approach taken and choices made in any research project. Mine is no exception. I have attempted to capture the TALIS programme, if not in its entirety, then at least as an object of pluri-scalar governance constituted by the efforts of numerous organisations to make it happen. In this way, I have considered the ‘sexy’ as well as the ‘routine base’ in the cultural circuit of capitalism, to paraphrase Thrift (2005). The field trips to particular sites and countries resulted in an amount of material which has been both too large and too rich to consider in detail in this single project but that certainly deserve further exploration. The fact that not all of this material can be reported and reflected upon in this thesis, does not represent so much a limitation of this study as much as the necessary limitations imposed by the thesis frame itself on any ambitious intellectual study.

Reflexivity is epitomised by the very ability to break away from a frame of reference and reflect on what the researcher and the particular research design are *not* capable of addressing, that is, the limitations. For this thesis, I have found it a challenge to take the level of detail in the empirical material into account while seeking also to put forward arguments at a high level of abstraction. Hence, in the pursuit of addressing the research questions, this thesis could not discuss any of the sites in depth. While the OECD, and to some extent the EC, was given particular attention, the thesis could have focused entirely on each of these, and in fact any of the policy actors. However, my knowledge interest was the substantial and internal relations of the ‘TALIS ensemble’, and I hope the thesis has made an convincing case for examining the *particular* through the *relational* as a means for

understanding and explaining the outcomes of pluri-scalar governance. Still, there are many nuances that might be addressed in the future.

In retrospect, too, the analysis of practical argumentation may have been more detailed in terms of the relation between the different components constituting the argumentation. In particular, the analysis of values – which very often remain implicit - could have been more emphasised. Such more detailed critical discourse analysis could have strengthened the explanatory critique of the main policy actors' argumentation. However, due to the number of organisations in the TALIS ensemble, I had to make decisions in the interests of the overall focus of the project, the coherence of the arguments in addressing the research questions, and the nature of the evidence at hand. Ongoing work might fill these gaps, and further contribute to the knowledge base around pluri-scalar governance projects such as TALIS.

More importantly, noting these limitations is intended to highlight the fact that *all* social science research is partial and perspectival, and subject to subjectivity and positionality as well as practical (and perhaps strategic) constraints. The knowledge claims, or more precisely, practically-adequate truths, put forward in this thesis are thus fallible, located in time and space. With the arrow of time, new light will be shed on the underlying mechanisms driving the global educational policy field. Yet, engaging directly with some of the individuals and organisations involved in TALIS 2008 and 2013 offers unique insights that would otherwise have been lost over time.

8.5. Taking Stock: The Ongoing Story of The TALIS Programme

A main impetus for this project has been Michael Polanyi's thoughts on tacit knowledge and that "*we can know more than we can tell*" (Polanyi 1967, p.4). It is a paradox to recognise yourself in this phrase. Yet, for me it captures the promise of learning as well as the humility that ought to accompany all attempts to reduce lived experience to various symbols, types of categories and sets of abstractions.

This thesis started out with a sketch of my impressions from a webinar event on TALIS 2013 results that intrigued and provoked me, exactly because of the very assumption that it is

meaningful to conduct a conversation on the teaching profession globally. Furthermore, the casual references to Shakespeare, Uber, the crisis of the school as an institution, etc., made clear that such political discourses are bound to reflect and promote certain outlooks on education, economy, policy, and culture, illustrating that power is embedded *in* political discourses, and that some of such discourses are blissfully ignorant (perhaps consciously) of the complexity of learning and teachers' work as well as the diversity of settings in which these activities take place.

This thesis is the most exhaustive and nuanced account of the TALIS programme undertaken so far. By explicitly combining empirical inquiry with theoretical reflection, the thesis has identified and explained what drives the global educational policy field and its observable manifestations in a range of different locations - and in doing so the thesis makes an original and significant contribution to the field of comparative education research. With its commitment to causal analysis - and hence *explanation* - on the basis of a 'fat' critical realist stratified ontology, the thesis has ventured far beyond the 'flat' descriptors associated with the notion of 'governing by numbers' and world culture theory.

It is in this light that the title of this thesis such be understood. There are three senses to the term 'work in progress' that is included in the title.

First, by describing and explaining the astonishing amount of work that have been invested into indicator development on teachers' work internationally in the past 10-15 years, the thesis has sought to highlight the *becoming* of TALIS as a distinctive, politically constructed and open-ended work in progress, in its own right, and as part of broader efforts into indicator development as the dominant contemporary form of generating 'policy knowledge' about education, teaching and learning. TALIS is an ongoing story, and considering the findings of this thesis on the mechanism of competitive comparison, recent developments are intriguing, to say the least. At the time of writing (June 2017), preparations for TALIS 2018 were well underway, with 47 political entities signed up, and introducing two additional international options: i) a sample of pre-primary school

educators; and ii) a 'video study', centred on classroom observations of teaching practices to advance research on teaching effectiveness.

Second, with its focus on teacher policy and the causal groups involved in shaping the policy area, the thesis has also showed that the labour of teachers is evolving over time and strategically represented in particular ways in terms of the profession's position among other professions, including their role and status in society. In this sense, teachers' labour is also 'work in progress', like those of other professions.

Third, and on a more personal note, this thesis represents the outcome of a journey, and as such forms a distinctive contribution to the field of comparative education research, itself a work in progress in the ongoing efforts to capture and explain dynamics at work in the perpetual transformation of social reality.

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APPENDICES

A. OECD member countries and partners

20 countries signed the OECD Convention on 14 December 1960. Since then, 14 countries have become members of the Organisation.

Current member countries of the Organisation and the dates on which they deposited their instruments of ratification (by order of date during year):

1961	Canada, USA, United Kingdom, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, France, Ireland, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Netherlands, Luxembourg
1962	Italy
1964	Japan
1969	Finland
1971	Australia
1973	New Zealand
1994	Mexico
1995	Czech Republic
1996	Hungary, Poland, Korea
2000	Slovak Republic
2010	Chile, Slovenia, Israel, Estonia
2016	Latvia

The OECD and the European Commission

In a Supplementary Protocol to the Convention on the OECD of 14 December 1960, the signatory countries agreed that the European Commission should take part in the work of the OECD.

European Commission representatives work alongside Members in the preparation of texts and participate in discussions on the OECD's work programme and strategies, and are involved in the work of the entire Organisation and its different bodies.

The European Commission's participation thus goes well beyond that of an observer, but it does not have the right to vote on decisions or recommendations presented before Council for adoption.

Key partners

Russia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Africa

Key partners contribute to the OECD's work in a sustained and comprehensive manner. A central element of the programme is the promotion of direct and active participation of these countries in the work of the OECD. The actual mix and the sequencing of the elements are determined by mutual interest.

Source: www.oecd.org

B. OECD Convention (excerpts)

The GOVERNMENTS ...

CONSIDERING that economic strength and prosperity are essential for the attainment of the purposes of the United Nations, the preservation of individual liberty and the increase of general well-being;

BELIEVING that they can further these aims most effectively by strengthening the tradition of co-operation which has evolved among them;

...

CONVINCED that broader co-operation will make a vital contribution to peaceful and harmonious relations among the peoples of the world;

RECOGNISING the increasing interdependence of their economies;

DETERMINED by consultation and co-operation to use more effectively their capacities and potentialities so as to promote the highest sustainable growth of their economies and improve the economic and social well-being of their peoples;

BELIEVING that the economically more advanced nations should co-operate in assisting to the best of their ability the countries in process of economic development;

RECOGNISING that the further expansion of world trade is one of the most important factors favouring the economic development of countries and the improvement of international economic relations;

...

Article 1

The aims of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter called the "Organisation") shall be to promote policies designed:

- a. to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;
- b. to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic development; and
- c. to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.

...

Article 5

In order to achieve its aims, the Organisation may:

- a. take decisions which, except as otherwise provided, shall be binding on all the Members;
- b. make recommendations to Members; and
- c. enter into agreements with Members, non-member States and international organisations.

(Appendix B continued)

Article 6

1. Unless the Organisation otherwise agrees unanimously for special cases, decisions shall be taken and recommendations shall be made by mutual agreement of all the Members.
2. Each Member shall have one vote. If a Member abstains from voting on a decision or recommendation, such abstention shall not invalidate the decision or recommendation, which shall be applicable to the other Members but not to the abstaining Member.
3. No decision shall be binding on any Member until it has complied with the requirements of its own constitutional procedures. The other Members may agree that such a decision shall apply provisionally to them.

Article 7

A Council composed of all the Members shall be the body from which all acts of the Organisation derive. The Council may meet in sessions of Ministers or of Permanent Representatives.

...

Article 13

Representation in the Organisation of the European Communities established by the Treaties of Paris and Rome of 18th April, 1951, and 25th March, 1957, shall be as defined in Supplementary Protocol No. 1 to this Convention.

...

Article 17

Any Contracting Party may terminate the application of this Convention to itself by giving twelve months' notice to that effect to the depositary Government.

Source: OECD 1960

C. Works prepared during PhD project

Book chapters

- Sorensen, T.B. 2017. "Teachers and the global educational policy field." In *The Global Educational Policy Environment in the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Gated, Regulated and Governed*, edited by T.D. Jules, 59-84. Emerald.
- Sorensen, T.B. [forthcoming]. "An explanatory critique of industrial relations in global education governance." In *[Anthology on critical cultural political economy of education]*, edited by S.L. Robertson, R. Dale, and J. Komljenovic. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Sorensen, T.B., & Robertson, S.L. [forthcoming]. "Reframing Teachers' Work for Global Competitiveness: New Global Hierarchies in the Governing of Education." In *Handbook of Global Education Reform*, edited by K.J. Saltman & A.J. Means. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Sorensen, T.B., & Robertson, S.L. [forthcoming]. "The OECD program TALIS and Framing, Measuring and Selling Quality Teacher™." In *Routledge International Handbook of Teacher Quality And Policy*, edited by M. Akiba, & G.K. LeTendre. Routledge.

Conference and seminar papers

- "*The de-nationalisation of teacher policy In England and Finland*". European Conference on Educational Research (ECER), Porto, 1-5 September 2014
- "*The engagement of international teacher unions in the OECD programme TALIS: A conversation between critical cultural political economy and historical institutionalism*". Comparative and International Education Society (CIES), Washington DC, 8-13 March 2015
- "*Teachers, states, OECD: Does TALIS hijack social dialogue?*" Work-In-Progress seminar, Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol, 28 April 2015
- "*Teachers on the global policy agenda: The practical argumentation of the OECD, the European Commission and Education International*". Education, Society and Culture XVII conference, University of Helsinki, 1 June 2015
- (with Angeline M. Barrett) "*System level indicators for an education SDG: Exploring possibilities for the teachers target*". Symposium "Measuring" What We Care About: Balancing the Politics and Promise of a Sustainable Post-2015 Education Agenda. 13th International Conference on Education and Development (UKFIET), Oxford, 15-17 September 2015
- "*Why are teachers on the global policy agenda? The practical argumentation of the OECD, the European Commission, teacher unions and business*". Faculty of Education and Social Work, University of Sydney, 1 December 2015
- "*Dimensions of acceptability: England in the OECD TALIS programme*". Work-In-Progress seminar, Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol, 29 February 2016
- "*The state in the global educational policy field: Finland, England and the OECD TALIS programme*". Nordic Educational Research Association conference, Helsinki, 9-11 March 2016
- "*The state in the global educational policy field: Finland, England and the OECD TALIS programme*". Education, Culture and Society Forum, Laboratory for Education and Society, KU Leuven, 18 March 2016
- "*The uses of international comparative data for political objectives: the OECD TALIS programme and initial teacher education reform in England and Finland*". Universities in the Knowledge Economy (UNIKE) conference, Danish School of Education, Aarhus University, Copenhagen, 15-17 June 2016
- "*Teacher appraisal and feedback: The practical argumentation of the European Commission, the OECD, and the World Bank*". Symposium "Global Perspectives on Market-Based Teacher Accountability Policies". European Conference on Educational Research (ECER), Dublin, 23 – 26 August 2016

Commissioned reports

Barrett, A.M., and T.B. Sorensen. 2015. *Indicators for All?: Monitoring Quality and Equity for a Broad and Bold Post-2015 Global Education Agenda*. New York: Open Society Foundations.

Sorensen, T.B. 2016. *Value-added measurement or modelling (VAM)*. Education International Discussion Paper. Accessed on 21 February 2017. http://download.ei-ie.org/Docs/WebDepot/2016_EI_VAM_EN_final_Web.pdf

PhD progression report

Sorensen, T.B. 2014. *The political construction of TALIS 2013: The denationalisation of teacher policy?* (PhD progression report, submitted 10 July 2014).

D. Empirical material: Documents

These are the texts used as primary empirical material. Note that the empirical material also consists of interview data (see subsequent appendix).

OECD

- *Outline of OECD International Survey of Teachers, Teaching and Learning* (OECD 2006a)
- *Creating Effective Teaching and Learning Environments: First Results from TALIS* (OECD 2009a)
- *TALIS 2008 Technical Report* (OECD 2010)
- *Teaching and Learning International Survey TALIS 2013 Conceptual framework* (OECD 2013)
- *TALIS 2013 Results: An international perspective on teaching and learning* (OECD 2014a).
- *TALIS 2013 Technical Report* (OECD 2014b).
- *A Teachers' Guide to TALIS 2013* (OECD 2014c)
- OECD standard teacher questionnaires for TALIS 2008 and TALIS 2013

European Union

- *Council Conclusions on new indicators in education and training* (CoEU 2005).
- *Teachers' Professional Development: Europe in international comparison. An analysis of teachers' professional development based on the OECD's Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS)*. (EC 2010a)
- *The Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS) 2013: Main findings from the survey and implications for education and training policies in Europe* (EC 2014a).

Education International

- *Education International Guide to PISA 2006* (EI 2007)

Australia

- *Australian teachers and the learning environment: An analysis of teacher response to TALIS 2013: Final Report*. (Freeman et al. 2014).
- National adaptation of teacher questionnaire TALIS 2013 in Australia

England

- *The Importance of Teaching. The Schools White Paper 2010*. (DfE 2010)
- *Teachers in England's Secondary Schools: Evidence from TALIS 2013* (Micklewright et al. 2014).
- National adaptation of teacher questionnaire TALIS 2013 in England

Finland

- *Opetuksen ja oppimisen kansainvälinen tutkimus TALIS 2013. Yläkoulun ensituloksia*. Opetus- ja kulttuuriministeriön julkaisuja 2014:15. Opetus- ja kulttuuriministeriö. (Taajamo et al. 2014)
- National adaptation of teacher questionnaire TALIS 2013 in Finland

E. Empirical material: Realist interviews

Realist, theory-laden interviews, all of them fully transcribed, and most of them conducted face-to-face unless otherwise indicated (*). The code is used for references in the thesis

Interviewee	Date	Code
OECD and affiliated		
1. Analyst	5 Dec 2014	OECDanalyst
2. Former Senior analyst *	23 Feb 2015	exOECDSenAnalyst
3. Long-term OECD member country rep in TALIS BPC *	15 Jan 2015	BPCmember
4. Consultant in TALIS 2013 Consortium *	12 May 2015	TALIS2013cons
5. Former OECD Senior Executive	23 Nov 2015	exOECDexec
European Commission (EC), DG Education and Culture		
1. Former Policy Officer, analysis	23 Sep 2014	exEAC
2. Policy Officer, analysis	11 Sep 2014	EACanalysis
3. Policy Officer, schools	15 Oct 2014	EACschools
4. Policy Officer, OECD coordination (<i>exploratory interview</i>)	24 July 2014	EACcoord
TUAC/Education International and ETUCE		
1. Official, Education International	24 Sep 2014	Eloff
2. Senior consultant, Education International	26 Jan 2015	Elconsult
3. Former senior official, ETUCE	18 Nov 2014	ETUCEoff
4. ETUCE representative in DG EAC working groups	20 Nov 2014	ETUCErep
BIAC		
1. Senior manager, Microsoft Partners in Learning *	11 Sep 2015	MicPart
Australia		
1. Civil Servant, Australian Government Department of Education and Training	18 Nov 2015	AusDfET
2. ACER researchers 1 and 2 with TALIS in portfolio	3 Dec 2015	AusNPC1 AusNPC2
3. AITSL senior executive	25 Nov 2015	AITSLexec
4. Manager, National Agency	27 Nov 2015	AusMan
5. Former AEU Federal President	12 Nov 2015	exAEU
6. Australian teacher union senior officer*	2 Dec 2015	AusUnion
England		
1. DfE Official with TALIS in portfolio	27 Feb 2015	EngDfE
2. Institute of Education member of National Project Centre	29 Jan 2015	EngNPCres
3. TALIS 2013 Senior National Project Centre member	29 April 2015	EngNPCsen
4. TALIS 2013 National Project Centre member	25 Feb 2015	EngNPCmem
5. Senior NUT officer *	27 Jan 2015	EngUnion
Finland		
1. Ministry of Education and Culture Senior Official	27 May 2015	FinMinEdu
2. National Board of Education Official	29 May 2015	FinBoard
3. OAJ special advisor	29 May 2015	FinUnion
4. Senior academic	29 May 2015	FinAcademic
5. Researcher from University of Jyväskylä working with TALIS	2 June 2015	FinNPCres
6. Senior researcher and manager from Finnish Institute for Educational Research	2 June 2015	FinResMan

F. Exploratory interviews

Exploratory interviews, not transcribed, conducted face-to-face unless otherwise indicated (*)

Interviewee and expertise	Date
Academic, education policy, former OECD employee *	15 April 2014
Academic, social statistics	21 May 2014
Academic, teaching profession, union policy *	12 June 2014
Academic, teaching and learning, social justice, former Pearson engagement *	17 June 2014
Academic, teaching profession, social justice	18 June 2014
Former UK teacher union senior executive *	1 July 2014

G. Interview guides for realist interviews (excerpts)

Theme 1. The background for OECD engagement with teacher policy

- a. The teaching profession has been on the OECD agenda since the 1960s. However, OECD work in the area gained momentum in the beginning of the 2000s, with INES and NESLI work on statistical indicators focusing on teachers. In addition, the OECD-coordinated review 2002-2004, *"Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective Teachers"* was important in putting teachers and teaching on the policy agenda internationally.
- b. Central for the interest in teachers is the quality debate which goes back to the 1980s. PISA has helped to intensify the debate, with an emphasis on quality as assessed by student performance. Accordingly, the debate on teachers has been fuelled by the finding that the quality of teaching is the single most important 'in-school factor' for student performance.
- c. Over the two rounds of TALIS conducted so far, OECD work has increasingly given priority to the 'voice' of the teaching profession and reflected in the emphasis on 'teacher self-efficacy'.
- d. The first two rounds of TALIS might be understood as a phase of consolidation. Future rounds are likely to address more controversial issues such as performance-related pay for teachers.

Theme 2. TALIS as part of OECD governance structures and relationships between main organisations involved in TALIS

- a. The governance structures of TALIS differ somewhat from those of PISA. PISA being a Part 1 programme and TALIS a Part 2 programme, their modes of funding and decision-making differ. For some years, it has been a priority to 'upgrade' TALIS to Part 1 programme, so that it reports directly to the OECD Council rather than the Education Policy Committee.
- b. It is continuously discussed in various OECD fora whether TALIS and PISA could and should become more integrated. However, there has so far been a strong will among participating countries (and teacher unions) to treat TALIS and PISA as separate programmes with their distinctive identities.
- c. TALIS is a major research exercise but it is also a political construction. There's a scope for politics in the negotiations on the design of TALIS.

...

Excerpt from interview guide with former OECD senior analyst

Theme 1. The engagement of EI and the TUAC Working Group in TALIS

- a. The major teacher policy review 2002-2004, *Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective Teachers* coordinated by the OECD, was important in putting the teaching profession on the policy agenda internationally.
- b. EI found it particularly problematic that the main OECD report from that policy review, *Teachers Matter*, discussed pros and cons of performance-based pay for teachers. On this basis, EI has since sought to influence the process and outcome of international cooperation on educational issues, rather than observing and criticizing such processes and products as an outsider.
- c. The working relationship between teacher unions and the OECD have developed constructively during the last decade. The peak so far was the work surrounding TALIS 2013 where EI was engaged in all stages through the TUAC working group.
- d. However, the influence of the TUAC Working Group and EI on the direction of TALIS should not be overestimated. OECD remains an intergovernmental organisation where governments have more influence in OECD bodies like the TALIS Board of Participating Countries than permanent observers like TUAC.
- e. Yet, teacher unions interpret it as victories that the earlier OECD propensity for advocating performance-based pay for teachers is nearly absent today, and that TALIS puts strong emphasis on teachers' voice, the societal value of teaching, and teacher self-efficacy.
- f. TALIS serves as an extension of PISA. It is continuously discussed whether and how the two programmes could become more integrated. There has so far been a strong will among participating countries to treat TALIS and PISA as separate programmes. EI and the TUAC Working Group support this separation.

...

Excerpt from interview guide with Education International Senior Consultant

Theme 1. Policy context for TALIS 2013 in Finland

- a. The background for Finnish participation in TALIS 2013 is closely linked to PISA, and the success of Finnish students in that assessment programme. This also explains why the Finnish government chose to include the international option of a TALIS-PISA link.
- b. OAJ is ambivalent towards OECD and programmes such as PISA and TALIS. On the one hand, PISA has proved enormously useful as a lever for OAJ in promoting teachers' interests in Finland, and the comparative data from TALIS 2013 are useful for OAJ in negotiations with municipalities and government as well as for OAJ's public campaigning. Yet, international cooperation in OECD and European Commission is a challenge for teacher unions (including OAJ) and their democratic mandate to represent and negotiate on behalf of their members.
- c. For the same reasons, OAJ is sceptical towards initiatives such as the Global Education Industry Summit (organised by OECD, European Commission and the Finnish government, taking place in Helsinki, 19-20th October 2015). The discussion of how to promote industry and private sector involvement in (school) education is very controversial in Finland.
- d. As a distinctively national teacher union, OAJ is faced with a double challenge, due to decentralization to the local level in Finland since the 1990s, and the more recent intensification of international cooperation on education policy in OECD and the European Commission.

Theme 2. Organisations and cooperation involved in TALIS 2013 in Finland

- a. ...
 - b. The TALIS 2013 national steering group was deeply involved in: i) the adaptations of the questionnaires to the Finnish context; ii) commenting on draft versions of the national TALIS 2013 report for Finland; iii) discussing which TALIS 2013 findings to highlight in the report and associated policy recommendations.
 - c. OAJ is regularly communicating with the global teacher union Education International which represented teachers' interests in the TALIS 2013 Board of Participating Countries.
- ...

Excerpt from interview guide with OAJ officer

Theme 1. Policy context for TALIS in Australia

...

Theme 2. The implementation of TALIS in Australia

- a. ...
- b. For each of the two TALIS rounds, the National TALIS Centre in Australia has consisted of the federal Department of Education (changing names since 2008) and ACER. There has not been any national steering group or advisory group for the implementation of TALIS in Australia.
- c. TALIS is implemented in participating countries according to strict guidelines from the international TALIS consortium – just as it is the case for other international large-scale programmes in education. Every adaptation needs to be accounted for and approved by the international consortium.
- d. The standard TALIS questionnaires are reviewed on national level and adapted if necessary, according to strict procedures set by the international TALIS consortium. In addition, participating countries are given the possibility to add a few survey questions to the standard questionnaire. In Australia, a question for teachers was added in TALIS 2013 concerning destinations for professional mobility (question no. 50).
- e. There is no legal requirement for teachers to take part in international programmes like TALIS.
- f. Meeting response rates in survey programmes is a challenge in many countries, and also in Australia. The Australian TALIS reports describe some of the measures taken to improve response rates. Government schools have lower response rates than Catholic and independent schools (this is only shown in the TALIS 2008 report – was this also the case in TALIS 2013?).
- g. The Australian TALIS 2013 report goes into more detail than the TALIS 2008 report.
- h. ACER received comments on draft reports of TALIS 2008 and 2013 from federal authorities. However, overall ACER enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in the preparation of reports for both rounds of TALIS.
- i. TALIS needs to develop in order to stay relevant for OECD countries. Video studies are one of the new international options in TALIS.

Excerpt from interview guide with researchers of National TALIS 2013 Centre in Australia

H. Letter to interviewees, w/ statement of voluntary informed consent

Bristol, [date]

Dear XX,

I would like to ask you if you are willing to be interviewed as part of my PhD project.

The title of the PhD project is "*The construction of TALIS 2013: The de-nationalisation of teacher policy?*" It is concerned with the international and national governance of the teaching profession, particularly focusing on the OECD programme TALIS.

In case you choose to contribute, the interview would be exploratory, in the sense that it is meant to build my background knowledge and hence sharpen the research focus. The interview would take 30-40 minutes and I would like to record it.

I am aware that participating in an interview might raise some issues for you. Therefore, I should mention that the project follows the ethical guidelines of the British Educational Research Association (BERA) and the Data Protection Act of the United Kingdom. It has also been ethically approved by the University of Bristol's Graduate School of Education.

This means that if you decide to take part:

- I will transcribe the interview and send it to you for approval.
- You are granted the right to withdraw your contribution from the project at any time. You do not have to state a reason for doing this.
- All data will be treated confidentially and stored on devices secured by personal passwords. Any prints will be kept in a locked filing cabinet.
- Your anonymity is ensured. Only I and my two supervisors will know the names of interviewees. In the research outcomes, such as the PhD thesis, conference presentations and journal articles, your name will never be mentioned - unless you would like it to be. When quoting or referring to your statements, this would be done with general references to your post, the name of the organisation in which you are working, or the nature of this organisation.
- You will also be given pre-publication access. So, you can comment upon the parts of the research outcomes that draw on the interviews conducted with you. In case you disagree with particular analytical points, it would be noted in the research outcome that the interviewee do not support this interpretation of data.
- You will receive an electronic copy of the completed PhD thesis if you wish.
- For the purpose of transparency, you will be asked to fill in the form of informed consent attached to this letter. This statement must be signed before any interview takes place. You and I will both keep a copy of the signed document.

Enclosed with this letter are further information about the research project, me and the form for informed consent.

If you have any questions or comments, please don't hesitate to get in touch.

Best regards,

Tore Bernt Sørensen
Doctoral Researcher
Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol
Email: t.b.sorensen@bristol.ac.uk
Mobile phone: +44 (0) 78 24 113 120

About the PhD project

Project supervisors

Susan Robertson, Professor of Education (Sociology), Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol. Email: s.l.robertson@bristol.ac.uk

Roger Dale, Professor of Education, Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol. Email: R.Dale@bristol.ac.uk

The project

The project “*The construction of TALIS 2013: The de-nationalisation of teacher policy?*” focuses on contemporary trends in the global educational policy field. The project began in early 2013 and is scheduled to be completed in early 2016. It is supported financially by the University of Bristol with a three years scholarship.

The main research questions concern: i) the ways the OECD programme Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS) involve new modes of governance including intergovernmental organisations, national authorities, teacher unions, private-public partnerships and private enterprises, and ii) the implications for the teaching profession on a global scale and in selected countries such as England and Finland. A key point to be discussed is the extent to which the conditions for teachers’ work are subject to de-nationalisation.

These topical issues will be addressed on the basis of extensive literature reviews of the relevant academic literature, and an empirical material consisting of policy documents and qualitative research interviews. Altogether, approximately 30-35 individuals will be interviewed as part of the study.

The interviewees will belong to one of four types of organisations: i) public policy bodies (as official or policy-maker); ii) teacher unions and professional associations; iii) public private partnerships or private enterprises; or iv) universities or research centres. Some interviewees might have experience from more than one of these categories during their career.

Priorities for the selection of interviewees are: i) first-hand engagement with TALIS through work in one of the main organisations involved in the OECD programme; ii) work experience from one of the main organisations involved in TALIS; and/or iii) research expertise in TALIS and the organisations involved. Potential participants will be selected on the basis of desk research, news and literature on TALIS, supervisors’ knowledge, and snow-balling, that is, recommendations from other interviewees.

Two types of interviews will be undertaken in the project:

1. 'Exploratory' – these interviews serve the purpose of building background knowledge about the research topics, by collecting information and opinions about the relevant issues at stake as perceived by individuals who have engaged with TALIS or the organisations involved from various perspectives.

2. 'Realist theory-laden': These interviews will take the form of a conversation between the interviewee and researcher with the researchers' assumptions and hypotheses constituting a starting point. Moreover, these interviews are also meant to gather additional information about processes related to the construction of TALIS.

About me

I have a background as a teacher of young migrants and refugees in Copenhagen and Odense, Denmark.

In 2004-2009, I worked as a teacher trainer and R&D assistant engaged with teachers' professional development at University College Capital in Copenhagen.

In 2012, I worked in the European Commission's DG Education and Culture in Brussels, first as stagiaire/trainee, later in an interimaire/temporary post.

In terms of educational qualifications, I graduated as a teacher in 2000 from the teacher college in Aarhus, Denmark.

In 2011, I completed a MA in Educational Sociology at the Danish School of Education, Aarhus University.

I began the PhD programme in the Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol, in 2013.

Statement of voluntary informed consent

(This statement complies with the requirements of the British Educational Research Association's Ethical Guidelines of 2011 and the Data Protection Act of United Kingdom)
I confirm that I understand the nature of the research project "*The construction of TALIS 2013: The de-nationalisation of teacher policy?*", conducted in the period 2013-2016 by Tore Bernt Sørensen, Doctoral Researcher from the Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol, United Kingdom.

In particular:

- I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research project and have received satisfactory answers.
- I know that a request is made at the beginning of the interview for it to be recorded, and that the interview data will be stored in a secure manner, protected electronically by passwords, or in a locked cabinet filing if printed.
- I am aware that I will receive a transcription of the interview for approval.
- The interview will be treated as non-attributable to the highest possible degree - unless I indicate otherwise.
- I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time by advising the researcher of this decision in writing.
- I understand that I am given pre-publication access and the opportunity to comment on research outcomes directly referring to interview data. While I do not have veto rights with regard to the analysis, the researcher must state in the final research outcomes if I disagree with his interpretation.
- I understand that this project has been ethically approved by the University of Bristol's Graduate School of Education.

I therefore agree to be interviewed by Tore Bernt Sørensen and give permission to the interview data being referred to and quoted (respecting my anonymity, see point 4 above) in the outcomes of Mr. Sørensen's research, such as the PhD thesis, journal articles and conference presentations.

Place and Date:

Full name:

Organisation:

Signature:

I. GSoE Ethics form submission

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Gsoe Ethics Mailbox <gsoe-ethics@bristol.ac.uk>
to me ▾

24/04/2014 ☆

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Thank you for submitting your **Ethics form**. You have completed the **GSOE Ethics** procedures. If you have any questions or queries please write directly to the **GSOE Ethics** Co-ordinators Wan (Wan.Yee@bristol.ac.uk) or Frances (Frances.Giampapa@Bristol.ac.uk) Please remember to keep an open discussion with your supervisor.

Gsoe
gsoe-ethics@bristol.ac.uk

+

✉

J. A note on incommensurability

While critical realism provides the overarching theoretical framework, or “meta-theory”, a range of concepts from various disciplines and theoretical literatures are sought integrated into this framework to address the research objectives and questions in a specific manner. This raises the issue of incommensurability concerning whether selected research paradigms, literatures and theories are compatible in terms of ontological and epistemological positions, concepts and methods (Kuhn 1970).

In general, I agree with Sayer (2010, p.73) that the dichotomization of “two cultures” (Snow 1998) and discontinuities associated with scientific paradigm shifts (Kuhn 1970) should not be exaggerated so that it appears that paradigms are internally to be ruled by total conformity, and externally by total incompatibility between paradigms.

In the process of preparing this PhD thesis, I have been struck by the overlaps between a range of scholars who with different words argue for their positions concerning the nature of the world and knowledge. Early on I decided that this project should primarily draw on critical realism, and when reading various literatures related to philosophy of science, education, sociology, political economy, political science, and geography, I found that there were affinities across these literatures in terms of ontology, epistemology and methodological positions. There has been a distinctive element of snow-balling in this process whereby the references of one scholar would lead to others (Andrew Sayer, Roy Bhaskar, Bob Jessop, Colin Hay, Susan Robertson, Roger Dale, Ray Pawson, Norman Fairclough, Tony Lawson, etc.). These scholars explicitly address and to various extent endorse critical realism as a guiding philosophy of science. Other links were constructed when I stumbled over scholars that would put things in similar yet different ways (Michael Polanyi, Ilya Prigogine, Nigel Thrift, Steven Lukes, Raewyn Connell, David Coates, Karl Popper, Wolfgang Streeck, Michael Billig, etc.), with the odd reference to the first set of literature, with the references between John Searle (2006, 2010), Steven Lukes (2005), Isabela and Norman Fairclough (2012), and Tony Lawson (2009) standing out. In particular, I would argue that the critical realist stratified ontology is commensurable with John Searle’s views on social reality (2010) and Ilya Prigogine’s (1987, 2000) complexity theory.

Based on my readings of these scholars working within and across various disciplines, I would argue that they endorse similar ontological and epistemological positions albeit some might formulate themselves in different ways and with varying emphasis on particular aspects. Arguing for the common stances of these scholars goes beyond a merely intellectual exercise, as each of them add illuminating points and perspectives that help in clarifying and qualifying the arguments of this thesis and indeed the theory-laden construction of the very object of research. The scholars I have relied on all appear to subscribe to the particular realist ontological position; that the world and its ways are at the same time open-ended and complex, yet structured; that processes and relations are contingent but not random; and that the future is uncertain and cannot be reduced to be fluctuating around equilibrium. Within this frame of mind, the processes and outcomes of the OECD TALIS programme are thus conditioned but not determined by social structures that are enabling as well as constraining. Just as TALIS was launched at one point in time, it is likely to disappear at some point in the future, like the organisation of OECD, and indeed any other organisation, is. Yet, exactly how and why this will happen, is impossible to establish as a fact, although we might theorise about it on the basis of relevant evidence from other cases.

As pointed out above, scholars are bound to put emphasis on various aspects of the philosophy of science guiding their inquiry. Some go deep into ontology and epistemology, others do not which makes them susceptible to critique. However, some of the latter offer insights into, for example, methodology. Thrift (2005), for example, offers a very succinct summary of his research orientation in the form of “four methodological rules” for analysing contemporary capitalism as “*a project that is permanently ‘under construction’*”:

1. Adopting a ‘backward gaze’ on our current era without aspiring to wrap everything up but recognising unresolved issues and differences of interpretation.
2. Most historical events have contingency built into them. Capitalism could have, and has, developed in a number of different ways. The contingent development of capitalism is the cumulative result of events that at the time seemed to have little significance.

3. Capitalism is performative, engaged in perpetual experiment as an unfinished project, and highly adaptive as a constantly mutating formation. The whole point of capitalism is precisely its ability to change its practices constantly.
4. Look for routines as well as the sexy; capitalism can only be performative due to its 'routine base' constituted by the innumerable means of producing stable repetition (Thrift 2005, pp.2-3)

Though they do not address ontology and epistemology explicitly, I find that these simple rules resonate remarkably well with critical realism and complexity theory. Together, they carve out a social ontology of capitalism (rule 2, 3, 4), an epistemology of fallible truth claims based on retrospective inquiry (rule 1) and methodological rules for gaining knowledge (rule 1 and 4).

K. A note on researcher positionality

Danermark *et al.* (2002, p.79) point out that intensive research calls for high levels of reflexivity as the fundamental precondition for the thought operations involved, such as reasoning, analysis, theorising, abstraction, interpretation and drawing conclusions. While extensive research certainly also calls for reflexivity, it is arguably different due to the nature of thought operations involved.

One important difference needs to be fleshed out, concerning reflexivity in the particular sense of researcher positionality, including the conditions for research and how the social context surrounding the researcher, and her or his lived experience, affects conceptions, perceptions and practices throughout the research process. With its conception of social reality as an open system, intensive research prompts (the need for) such reflections. Extensive research, on the other hand, seeks to model social reality as a closed system that can be examined in an objective manner by the researcher, that is, externally. The positionality of the researcher thus appear like a less pertinent issue.

There is an intriguing, and stimulating, tension at play here. Intensive research, as presented by Sayer (2000, 2010), aspires to explain the workings of mechanisms in social reality in an objective manner. Yet, the preference for ethnographic methods clearly indicates the position that you cannot separate the research from the researcher, thereby raising the need for reflexivity. More precisely, intensive research recognises that the researcher has a place and a voice in the open system of social reality and also requires the researcher to overcome her or his positionality and be detached. I endorse this dualism because I believe that it captures the predicament of researchers as human beings, and reminds us that humility and caution are positive attributes in the field of knowledge production. Reflexivity is epitomised by the very ability to break away from a frame of reference and reflect on what the researcher and the particular research design are *not* capable of addressing, that is, the limitations.

This thesis does not refer to my positionality in a running commentary, although I believe that I am aware of at least some of my prejudices and blind spots of ignorance. At this point,

I should point out that part of my fascination with comparative education research is that I find it to be a catalyst for reflexivity. In this project, I have had the opportunity to focus on the three different education systems of Australia, England and Finland, all of them differently related to the global educational policy field. Born in the 1970s and attending a public *folkeskole* in Denmark and going on to enjoy free high school and higher education in a *Bildung*-orientated environment with a low degree of standardised curriculum and assessment, and little explicit incentives to compete with classmates, the Finnish education system *appears* close to my own mostly positive experiences as a student and, later, teacher and teacher trainer. *Instinctively*, the biased laissez-faire of the more liberal and market-orientated models in England and Australia provokes – and intrigues – me. As a former teacher educated in a child-centred, “progressive” pedagogical tradition, OECD and European Commission big picture-activities in education *at first glance* strike me as curiously anaemic and functionalist hubris. Yet, not least the empirical inquiry forming part of this PhD project have offered me the privilege to “*explore the limitations of my intuitions*”, as Tony Lawson (2009, p.109) puts it. I hope that the analysis and arguments put forward in the thesis reflects that fact.

In terms of reflexivity, bias and criteria for assessing the validity of the truth claims put forward, the watchword is corroboration. In other words, research outcomes concern social reality, and the arguments underpinning truth claims must be of a nature that render the researcher’s place in that reality irrelevant. The explanatory power of arguments and truth claims hinges on their ability to stand alone and be subjected to corroboration. In this respect, I endorse Cox’s (1981, p.128) argument that sophisticated theory or research are not merely expressions of a perspective or standpoint. Research is bound to contain such an initial perspective which requires explication, but “[T]he more sophisticated a theory is, the more it reflects upon and transcends its own perspective”.

There is a delicate balance to thread. On the one hand, the interpretive “I”, the researcher subject, must be present in the research text to avoid the common pitfall of “trivial construction” whereby the researcher’s own positionality and the social context surrounding the researcher is neglected in the construction, analysis, and discussion of the

object of study (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009, pp.269-278). On the other, it amounts to hubris and second order positivism that researchers should be able to fully grasp their subject positions and how they affect the research process and outcomes. None of us are able to locate from where one speaks, or in other words, to objectify the objectifying subject, because social and academic biases are also unconscious and do not exist in a positive form. Bias cannot be simply excavated (Knafo 2016).

In his critique of positivism, Pierre Bourdieu pioneered the idea of turning the tools of sociology onto oneself in order to apply the same grid of social analysis to the object and subject of scholarship, building on a long tradition of seeking to understand from where one speaks, grasp subjective biases, and make the specificity of viewpoints explicit. In a powerful critique, Knafo (2016) argues that Bourdieu and the reflexive orientation that he pioneered largely overestimated the researcher's ability to grasp his own subject position through reflexive means. In particular, two points are relevant to highlight here.

First, the overemphasis on subjective biases tends to reduce reflexivity to an ethical strategy which is laudable in its own right. However, ethics alone does not tell us much about how to conduct research in a robust manner. Second, reflexive agendas such as the one proposed by Bourdieu tends to place the onus on ontology, that is, on being, rather than address the epistemological issue of reification which initially motivated the turn to reflexivity.

Therefore, being reflexive and controlling for bias should start with the recognition that we cannot simply come clean and cast out biases by making them explicit. Rather, we must assume that epistemological biases applies to us all and develop corrective lenses to compensate for them. In other words, we cannot *dispense* entirely with biases, but we should *control* for them, and this control of bias should not be tailored to one's specific circumstances or location. On this basis, Knafo suggests that reflexivity can be incorporated into a phenomenological methodology that goes beyond the ethical strategy by turning the concern with particularism, related to a specific subject, into a more general concern with the nature of subjectivity and the epistemological problem it poses for knowledge creation (Knafo 2016).

L. PISA rank order positions for three case countries

PISA	Partici- pants	From OECD		Australia		United Kingdom		Finland	
				All	OECD	All	OECD	All	OECD
2000	32	28	Reading (MF)	3-9	3-9	5-9	5-9	1	1
			Math	4-9	4-9	6-10	6-10	4-7	4-7
			Science	4-8	4-8	3-7	3-7	3-4	3-4
2003	41	30	Reading	3-6	3-5	-	-	1	1
			Math (MF)	9-12	7-9	-	-	1-4	1-3
			Science	5-10	4-7	-	-	1-3	1-2
			Problem solving	5-10	4-7	-	-	1-4	1-3
2006	56	30	Reading	6-9	5-7	14-22	11-16	2	2
			Math	10-14	6-9	22-27	16-21	1-4	1-2
			Science (MF)	5-10	4-7	12-18	8-12	1	1
2009	65	33	Reading (MF)	8-10	5-7	19-27	15-22	2-4	1-2
			Math	13-17	7-11	23-31	17-25	4-7	1-3
			Science	7-11	4-8	14-19	9-13	2-3	1
2012	65	34	Reading	12-18	8-12	20-26	14-19	6-10	3-5
			Math (MF)	17-21	11-14	23-31	16-23	10-15	4-9
			Science	11-18	7-11	16-22	10-15	4-6	1-3

Notes:

Country means lie within this range of rank order positions with 95 percent likelihood.

For PISA 2003, response rate for the UK was too low to ensure comparability.

For PISA 2012, the scores for the region of England was not significantly different from the UK scores.

Sources: OECD PISA reports

M. Trade unions

Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC)

TUAC operates through a secretariat, based in Paris, with 5 policy staff and 3 administrative staff.

The Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) to the OECD is an interface for trade unions with the OECD. It is an international trade union organisation which has consultative status with the OECD and its various committees.

59 national organisations in 31 OECD member countries are affiliated. They together represent 66 million workers. These finance TUAC activities, decide priorities and policy and elect the TUAC officers.

TUAC, along with ITUC and the Global Union Federations, is a member of the Council of Global Unions and also coordinates union input to the G8 process. The large majority of TUAC affiliates' are also affiliated to the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Most European affiliates also belong to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). TUAC works closely with these international trade union organisations as well as with the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

TUAC's day-to-day work consists of meeting with experts in the OECD Secretariat and with officials from member governments in OECD Committees to carry out policy advocacy on behalf of trade unions on the one hand, and briefing TUAC's affiliates on the work of the OECD, co-ordinating policy statements and evaluating the outcomes of OECD document and meetings, on the other. This two-way process gives the trade union movement access to the intergovernmental policy debate, whilst providing OECD policy-makers with the opportunity to engage in dialogue with social partners.

The nuts and bolts of OECD policy-making work take place in specialised committees or working groups, in which experts from the secretariat and member governments discuss policy issues.

Working Groups exist on Economic Policy, on Global Trade and Investment, and on Education, Training and Labour Market Policy. The Working Groups prepare TUAC positions for both the Plenary Session and for consultations with the OECD. They are open to all affiliates, the international organisations and TUAC "partner" organisations in Central and Eastern Europe.

Source: www.tuac.org

(Appendix M continued)

Educational International (EI)

Based in Brussels, EI is the global union for teachers. It is the world's largest federation of unions, representing thirty million education employees in about four hundred organisations in 170 countries and territories. A World Congress composed of delegates meets every three years.

EI was formed in 1993 when the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP) and International Federation of Free Teachers' Unions (IFFTU) merged. Merger was first proposed in 1985, with talks becoming serious in 1988. Merger was strongly advocated by American Federation of Teachers' (AFT) president Albert Shanker. Shanker was elected EI's founding president.

The collapse of Soviet bloc communist helped to remove political differences between WCOTP and IFFTU. The rivalry between those two organizations can be traced to the significant reorganization of the international trade union movement in the wake of the second world war.

EI priorities:

- EI promotes the principle that quality education, funded publicly, should be available to every student in every country.
- EI promotes and represents the interests of teachers and other education employees on the international level.
- EI assists the development of independent democratic organisations to represent teachers and other education employees and builds solidarity and cooperation between them.
- EI advocates for equity in society. It combats racism and xenophobia. It challenges discrimination on the grounds of gender, sexual orientation, socio-economic status, and racial or ethnic origin or characteristics.
- EI works with other global federations of unions and other kindred organisations to promote and achieve solidarity.

Five priorities guiding the work in the current Congress period.

- Protect (public) education systems, teachers, other education employees, students and children against the negative effects of the debt and economic crises and the implementation of detrimental market mechanisms
- Promote the status of the teaching profession, improve professional standards and terms and working conditions, and counter de-professionalisation trends
- Confront attacks on education unions and their members, particularly with respect to freedom of association, collective bargaining rights and professional freedoms
- Challenge the erosion of democratic and social values, and address gender inequality, racial intolerance and xenophobia through the promotion of human rights, equality and trade union rights for sustainable societies
- Strengthen and mobilise EI and its member organisations in the light of the above challenges and priorities

Through the Council of Global Unions, in keeping with the general principles in the EI Constitution, EI works closely with:

- International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)
- Global Union Federations (GUF)
- Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC)

Source: www.ei-ie.org

(Appendix M continued)

European Trade Union Committee for Education (ETUCE)

Established in 1977 and based in Brussels, ETUCE is the teachers' social partner at European level and a defender of teachers' interests to the European Commission.

In November 2010 a new European Structure was adopted. ETUCE became an integrated part of EI. ETUCE is now the EI Regional Structure in Europe.

Following the new structure, ETUCE represents 132 teachers' unions in 45 countries (27 from the EU countries and 18 from EFTA, candidate and non-EU countries). In total numbers, ETUCE represents 11 million members all over Europe.

ETUCE is composed of national trade unions of teachers and other staff in general education - early childhood education, primary education, secondary education, vocational education and training as well as higher education and research. ETUCE is also a European Trade Union Federation of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).

The aims of the ETUCE are:

- To promote and implement the aims of Education International (EI) in the European Region
- To advise the EI Executive Board on policies and activities to be undertaken by EI in the European Region, including the development of responses to proposals and policies which emanate from other international bodies such as OECD or UNESCO
- To develop and maintain positive relationships with organizations in Europe which have similar aims and objectives, including ETUC and PERC/ITUC
- To determine and promote policies in relation to the Council of Europe, and any such other European inter-governmental body, which addresses issues of concern to education unions
- To promote the development of strong independent and democratic education unions throughout the European Region
- To determine and promote policies in relation to European Union (EU) and EFTA matters
- To represent member organizations in EU consultative structures and at EU meetings
- To respond to proposals, policies and decisions of the EU affecting the members of education unions in Europe
- To develop and implement projects and programs designed to further the interests of education unions in the European Region and, especially, in the EU/EFTA countries
- To be the social partner for education workers in the EU Social Dialogue process
- To be the industry federation representing the education unions in the ETUC structures

Source: etuce.homestead.com

European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)

Created in 1973, ETUC currently comprises 85 national trade union confederations in 36 countries, plus 10 European trade union federations. The ETUC aims to make Social Europe a key priority in European policy. The ETUC is working for a Europe with a strong social dimension, which focuses on workers' interests and well-being. It promotes the European social model that enabled Europe to become a prosperous, competitive region.

Source: www.etuc.org

(Appendix M continued)

The Council of Global Unions (CGU)

Based on Brussels, CGU was founded in 2007.

Global Unions are international trade union organisations working together with a shared commitment to the ideals and principles of the trade union movement. They share a common determination to organize, to defend human rights and labour standards everywhere, and to promote the growth of trade unions for the benefit of all working men and women and their families.

The creation of CGU was based on a consensus agreement. CGU was not created as an organisation, but rather as a tool for structured cooperation and coordination. As of 2012, all GUF's, ITUC and TUAC are CGU members.

The CGU was intended to encourage and develop closer co-operation among Global Unions, including EI, in order to build a more favourable, enabling environment for organising and collective bargaining. Although its work has policy implications, it was not established primarily to make policy. That is the responsibility of its members.

Although the process is coordinated by the ITUC and TUAC rather than the CGU secretariat, many statements, including to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund or the G20 are developed jointly and issued in the name of "Global Unions". Discussions of political/economic issues and trade union efforts to influence government policies play an important role in CGU meetings.

Source: www.global-unions.org

The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)

ITUC has headquarters in Brussels. Founded in 2006.

ITUC represents 170 million workers. The ITUC's primary mission is the promotion and defence of workers' rights and interests, through international cooperation between trade unions, global campaigning and advocacy within the major global institutions. Its main areas of activity include: trade union and human rights; economy, society and the workplace; equality and non-discrimination; and international solidarity.

The ITUC adheres to the principles of trade union democracy and independence. It is governed by four-yearly world congresses, a General Council and an Executive Bureau. The ITUC regional organisations are the Asia-Pacific Regional Organisation (ITUC-AP), the African Regional Organisation (ITUC-AF) and the American Regional Organisation (TUCA). It cooperates with ETUC, including through the Pan-European Regional Council. The ITUC has close relations with the Global Union Federations and the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC). It works closely with the ILO and with several other UN Specialised Agencies.

Source: www.ituc-csi.org/about-us?lang=en

N. EI affiliates in Australia, England and Finland

Australia

Australian Education Union (AEU) <http://www.aeufederal.org.au>

Independent Education Union of Australia (IEU) <http://www.ieu.org.au>

England

National Union of Teachers (NUT-UK) <http://www.teachers.org.uk>

Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL) <http://www.atl.org.uk>

NASUWT - The Teachers' Union (NASUWT) <http://www.teachersunion.org.uk>

Finland

Opetusalan Ammattijärjestö (OAJ) <http://www.oaj.fi>

O. Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC)

The BIAC Secretariat is based in Paris.

BIAC was founded in 1962 and has since been officially recognised as being representative of the OECD business community.

Chair: Phil O'Reilly (New Zealand, Chief Executive Officer of BusinessNZ)

BIAC is an independent international business association devoted to advising government policymakers at OECD and related fora on the many diversified issues of globalisation and the world economy. BIAC promotes the interests of business by engaging, understanding and advising policy makers on a broad range of issues with the overarching objectives of:

- Positively influencing the direction of OECD policy initiatives;
- Ensuring business and industry needs are adequately addressed in OECD policy decision instruments (policy advocacy), which influence national legislation;
- Providing members with timely information on OECD policies and their implications for business and industry.

BIAC includes 38 policy groups, which cover the major aspects of OECD work most relevant to business. One of these policy groups is the Education Committee.

Chair: Charles Fadel, Founder & Chairman, Curriculum Redesign (United States).

Three Vice-Chairs, including Marita Aho, Senior Adviser, Confederation of Finnish Industries EK (Finland).

BIAC members participate in meetings, global forums and consultations with OECD leadership, government delegates, committees and working groups.

BIAC advocates consensus industry views so to ensure that the resulting policy instruments and guidance assist, not hinder, private sector capacity to generate growth and prosperity.

Source: <http://www.biac.org/>

P. Orders of country rankings in TALIS 2008 main report

Overview of column charts in report ranking countries (OECD 2009a)

	Issue/problem	Order of rankings	Page
Chapter 2. A profile of the teacher population and the schools in which they work			
1	Gender and age of teachers	<i>Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage aged 50 or higher</i>	27
2	Job experience of teachers	<i>Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of teachers who have worked for 20 years or longer</i>	30
3	Percentage of teachers in schools where the principal reported the following as pre-requisites or high priorities for admittance to school	<i>Countries are ranked in descending order of importance attributed by school principals to residence in a particular area</i>	35
4	School autonomy factors	<i>Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of teachers whose principal reported considerable responsibility held at the school for selecting teachers for hire</i>	37
5	Percentage of teachers whose school principal reported that the following teacher behaviours hindered the provision of instruction in their school a lot or to some extent	<i>Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of teachers whose school principal reported a lack of pedagogical preparation as a factor hindering instruction"</i>	39
Chapter 3. The professional development of teachers			
6	Percentage of teachers who undertook some professional development in the previous 18 months	Countries are ranked in descending order of percentage of teachers having had some professional development in the 18 months prior to the survey	52
7	Days of professional development taken - Interquartile range	Countries are ranked in descending order of the median number of days of professional development taken. The interquartile range is the range of days within which the middle 50% of teachers fall	54
8	Percentage of teachers who wanted more development than they received in the previous 18 months	Countries are ranked in descending order of percentage of teachers wanting more development than they received	59
9	Index of professional development need	Countries are ranked in descending order of index of professional development need	62
10	Types of support received for professional development	Countries are ranked in descending order of percentage of teachers having paid none of the cost of professional development	65
11	Average days of development taken by teachers according to personal payment level	Countries are ranked in descending order of percentage of teachers having paid all of the cost of development they took	67
12	Percentage of teachers in schools with no formal induction or mentoring programmes	Countries are ranked in descending order of percentage of teachers in schools that do not have a formal induction programme	71
Chapter 4. Teaching practices, teachers' beliefs and attitudes			
13	Country profiles of beliefs about the nature of teaching and learning	Countries are ranked by the strength of preference among teachers in each country between direct transmission beliefs about teaching and constructivist beliefs about teaching	95
14	Country profiles of classroom teaching practices	Countries are ranked by the relative frequency with which they engage in structuring teaching practices, student-oriented teaching practices and enhanced activities	98

15	Country profiles for co-operation among staff	<i>Countries are ranked in ascending order of the degree to which teachers engage in exchange and co-ordination for teaching more than professional collaboration</i>	102
16	Distribution of time spent in the classroom during an average lesson	<i>Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of actual teaching and learning time</i>	104
Chapter 5. School Evaluation, Teacher Appraisal and Feedback and the Impact on Schools and Teachers			
17	Criteria of school evaluations	Countries are ranked in descending order of the importance of student test scores in school evaluations	145
18	Teachers who received no appraisal or feedback and teachers in schools that had no school evaluation in the previous five years	Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of teachers who have received no appraisal or feedback	150
19	Criteria for teacher appraisal and feedback	Countries are ranked in descending order of the importance of student test scores in teacher appraisal and feedback	153
20	Impact of teacher appraisal and feedback	Countries are ranked in descending order of changes in teachers' opportunities for professional development activities	156
21	Impact of teacher appraisal and feedback upon teaching	Countries are ranked in descending order of changes in the emphasis placed by teachers on improving student test scores in their teaching	160
Chapter 6. Leading to Learn: School Leadership and Management Styles			
	<i>No country rankings</i>		
Chapter 7. Key Factors in Developing Effective Learning Environments: Classroom Disciplinary Climate and Teachers' Self-Efficacy			
	<i>No country rankings</i>		

Q. Orders of country rankings in TALIS 2013 main report

Overview of column charts in report ranking countries participating in TALIS (OECD 2014a)

	Issue/problem	Order of rankings	Page
Chapter 2. Teachers and their schools			
1	Gender and age distribution of teachers	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of teachers aged 49 or younger	33
2	Teachers' feelings of preparedness for teaching	Countries are ranked in ascending order, based on the percentage of teachers who feel "not at all prepared" or "somewhat prepared" for the content of the subject(s) being taught	36
3	Work experience of teachers	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the average years of working experience as a teacher in total	39
4	Distribution of experienced teachers in more and less challenging schools	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the difference in the proportion of experienced teachers who work in more challenging schools and those who do not	41
5	Teacher training mismatch and teacher resource allocation	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the sum of teachers teaching "reading, writing and literature", "mathematics" and "science" without having received formal education or training for these respective subjects	44
Chapter 3. The importance of school leadership			
6	Principals' working time	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of time principals spend on administrative and leadership tasks and meetings	58
7	Principals' participation in a school development plan	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of principals who used student performance and student evaluation results (including national/international assessments) to develop the school's educational goals and programmes	62
8	Gender and age distribution of principals	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of principals who are under 40 years old	66
9	Elements not included in principals' formal education	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of principals for whom instructional leadership training or course were not included in their formal education	69
10	Principals' formal education, including leadership training	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of principals who received a strong leadership training in formal education	70
11	Work experience of principals	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the years of working experience as a principal	72
12	Principal job satisfaction	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of principals who "agree" or "strongly agree" that all in all, they are satisfied with their job	78
Chapter 4. Developing and supporting teachers			
13	Access to formal and informal induction programmes or activities	Countries are ranked in ascending order, based on the cumulative percentage of teachers whose school principal reports access to formal induction programmes for all new teachers to the school and for only teachers new to teaching	89
14	New teachers' access to and participation in formal induction programmes	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the gap between access to and participation in induction programmes	93
15	Predicted effect of formal induction programme participation on acting as a mentor	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the predicted effect of participating in any induction programme on the probability of acting as a mentor	96
16	Professional development	Countries are ranked in ascending order, based on the 25th	103

	recently undertaken by teachers, by intensity of participation in courses and workshops	percentile of number of reported days of participation among teachers who participated in courses/workshops	
17	Predicted effect of formal induction programme participation on professional development participation	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the predicted effect of having participated in any induction programme on the reported number of professional development activities	105
18	Professional development participation by level of personal cost and support	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of teachers who report paying for none of the professional development activities undertaken	107
Chapter 5. Improving teaching using appraisal and feedback			
19	Teachers who never received formal appraisal	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of lower secondary education teachers whose school principal reports that their teachers were never formally appraised by other teachers	124
20	Outcomes of formal teacher appraisal – development plan and mentoring	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of teachers who work in schools whose principal reports that a development or training plan is developed for each teacher “sometimes”, “most of the time” or “always” after formal teacher appraisal	126
21	Sources for teachers’ feedback	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of teachers who report not having received any feedback	129
22	Methods for teachers’ feedback	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of teachers who report not receiving any feedback	133
23	Outcomes of teacher feedback	Countries are ranked in descending order, based on the percentage of teachers who report a “moderate” or “large” positive change in their teaching practices after they received feedback on their work at their school	138
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R. EU Lisbon Strategy

Strategic goal

“to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”

Overall strategy

- preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by better policies for the information society and R&D, as well as by stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and innovation and by completing the internal market;
- modernising the European social model, investing in people and combating social exclusion;
- sustaining the healthy economic outlook and favourable growth prospects by applying an appropriate macro-economic policy mix.

Source: European Council 2000

EU benchmarks for 2010 in education

1. By 2010, an EU average rate of no more than 10 % early school leavers should be achieved.
2. The total number of graduates in mathematics, science and technology in the European Union should increase by at least 15 % by 2010 while at the same time the level of gender imbalance should decrease.
3. By 2010, at least 85 % of 22 year olds in the European Union should have completed upper secondary education.
4. By 2010, the percentage of low-achieving 15 years old in reading literacy in the European Union should have decreased by at least 20% compared to the year 2000
5. By 2010, the European Union average level of participation in Lifelong Learning, should be at least 12.5% of the adult working age population (25-64 age group).

Source: CoEU 2003

S. Objectives for the EU ET2010 Work Programme

Strategic objective 1: Improving the quality and effectiveness of education and training systems in the EU

- Objective 1.1. Improving education and training for teachers and trainers
- Objective 1.2. Developing skills for the knowledge society
- Objective 1.3. Ensuring access to ICT for everyone
- Objective 1.4. Increasing the recruitment to scientific and technical studies
- Objective 1.5. Making the best use of resources

Strategic objective 2. Facilitating the access of all to education and training systems

- Objective 2.1. Open learning environment
- Objective 2.2. Making learning more attractive
- Objective 2.3. Supporting active citizenship, equal opportunities and social cohesion

Strategic objective 3. Opening-up education and training systems to the wider world.

- Objective 3.1. Strengthening the links with working life and research, and society at large
- Objective 3.2. Developing the spirit of enterprise
- Objective 3.3. Improving foreign language learning
- Objective 3.4. Increasing mobility and exchange
- Objective 3.5. Strengthening European co-operation

Sources: CoEU 2001, 2002

T. Europe 2020: Priorities, targets, benchmarks and guidelines

3 mutually reinforcing priorities:

- Smart growth: developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation.
- Sustainable growth: promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy.
- Inclusive growth: fostering a high-employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion.

Headline targets for the EU in 2020

1. Employment: 75% of the 20-64 year-olds to be employed
2. R&D/innovation: 3% of the EU's GDP (public and private combined) to be invested in R&D/innovation
3. Climate change/energy: Greenhouse gas emissions 20% (or even 30% if the conditions are right) lower than 1990; 20% of energy from renewables; 20% increase in energy efficiency
4. Education: Reducing school drop-out rates below 10%; at least 40% of 30-34-year-olds completing third level education
5. Poverty / social exclusion: At least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion

EU benchmarks for 2020 in education

1. At least 95% of children (from 4 to compulsory school age) should participate in early childhood education
2. Fewer than 15% of 15-year-olds should be under-skilled in reading, mathematics and science
3. The rate of early leavers from education and training aged 18-24 should be below 10%
4. At least 40% of people aged 30-34 should have completed some form of higher education
5. At least 15% of adults should participate in lifelong learning
6. At least 20% of higher education graduates and 6% of 18-34 year-olds with an initial vocational qualification should have spent some time studying or training abroad
7. The share of employed graduates (aged 20-34 with at least upper secondary education attainment and having left education 1-3 years ago) should be at least 82%.

Source: EC 2010b; European Council 2010

Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines

1. Ensuring the quality and the sustainability of public finances
2. Addressing macroeconomic imbalances
3. Reducing imbalances in the euro area
4. Optimising support for R&D and innovation, strengthening the knowledge triangle and unleashing the potential of the digital economy
5. Improving resource efficiency and reducing greenhouse gases emissions
6. Improving the business and consumer environment and modernising the industrial base
7. Increasing labour market participation and reducing structural unemployment
8. Developing a skilled workforce responding to labour market needs, promoting job quality and lifelong learning
9. Improving the performance of education and training systems at all levels and increasing participation in tertiary education
10. Promoting social inclusion and combating poverty

Source: EC 2010d

U. ET2020: Strategic objectives and priority areas during first cycle 2009-2011

Strategic objective 1: Making lifelong learning and mobility a reality

- Lifelong learning strategies
- European Qualifications Framework
- Expanding learning mobility

Strategic objective 2: Improving the quality and efficiency of education and training

- Language learning
- Professional development of teachers and trainers (Focus on the quality of initial education and early career support for new teachers and on raising the quality of continuing professional development opportunities for teachers, trainers and other educational staff (e.g. those involved in leadership or guidance activities))
- Governance and funding (... promote evidence-based policy and practice)
- Basic skills in reading, mathematics and science
- 'New Skills for New Jobs'

Strategic objective 3: Promoting equity, social cohesion and active citizenship

- Early leavers from education and training
- Pre-primary education
- Migrants
- Learners with special needs

Strategic objective 4: Enhancing innovation and creativity, including entrepreneurship, at all levels of education and training

- Transversal key competences
- Innovation-friendly institutions
- Partnership

Source: CoEU 2009

V. The European Semester and Country-Specific Recommendations

The European Semester is the EU's calendar for economic policy coordination.

The Commission has been given a mandate by Member States to check whether they take action on reform commitments they have made at EU level. The country-specific recommendations related to economic policy are based on Article 121 of the EU Treaty and those on employment policy on the basis of Article 148.

Country-specific recommendations offer tailored advice to Member States on how to boost growth and jobs, while maintaining sound public finances. They are based on the general priorities identified in the Commission's Annual Growth Survey, published in November, and the National Reform Programmes submitted by Member States.

Recommendations are published every spring, following months of analysis by the Commission, focusing on what can realistically be achieved in 12-18 months in line with the Europe 2020 strategy.

The recommendations are discussed by EU leaders and ministers in June and formally adopted by EU finance ministers in July.

Source: EC 2015a

W. Categories and areas of European Union competence

Union exclusive competence: only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in the area, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.

Areas: (a) customs union; (b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market; (c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro; (d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; (e) common commercial policy. *(based on Article 3)*

Shared competence between the Union and the Member States: The Union shares competence with member states in specific areas. The Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence.

Areas: (a) internal market; (b) social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty; (c) *economic, social and territorial cohesion*; (d) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources; (e) environment; (f) consumer protection; (g) transport; (h) trans-European networks; (i) energy; (j) area of freedom, security and justice; (k) common safety concerns in public health matters.

Union competence to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of Member states: In certain areas and under the conditions laid down in the Treaties, the Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States, without thereby superseding their competence in these areas.

Legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the basis of the provisions of the Treaties relating to these areas shall not entail *harmonisation of Member States' laws or regulations*.

Areas: (a) protection and improvement of human health; (b) industry; (c) culture; (d) tourism; **(e) education, vocational training, youth and sport**; (f) civil protection; (g) administrative cooperation.

On economic and employment policies: The Member States shall coordinate their economic and employment policies within arrangements as determined by this Treaty, which the Union shall have competence to provide.

1. The Member States shall coordinate their economic policies within the Union. To this end, the Council shall adopt measures, in particular broad guidelines for these policies.
2. The Union shall take measures to ensure coordination of the employment policies of the Member States, in particular by defining guidelines for these policies.
3. The Union may take initiatives to ensure coordination of Member States' social policies

(based on “*Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*”, Articles 2–6)

Source: EU 2016

X. Article 165 in the EU Treaty on the area of education – excerpt

1. The Union shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.

...

2. Union action shall be aimed at:
 - developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States,
 - encouraging mobility of students and teachers, by encouraging inter alia, the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study,
 - promoting cooperation between educational establishments,
 - developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the education systems of the Member States

...

Source: EU 2016

Y. Principal instruments of the renewed Lisbon strategy from 2005

- **Integrated Guidelines:** adopted by the Council in 2005 and updated in 2008, provided multi-annual general guidance and policy orientations. The twenty-four guidelines laid the foundations for the National Reform Programmes, outlining the key macro-economic, micro-economic and labour market reform priorities for the EU as a whole.
- **National Reform Programmes:** prepared by Member States for a three year cycle, indicating what instruments they would use to realise their economic policy objectives. NRPs were followed by annual updates called Implementation Reports.
- **Country-specific Recommendations:** adopted annually by the Council, for the first time in 2007, on the basis of Commission recommendations and assessment of Member States' progress towards achieving the objectives set out in their National Reform Programmes .of recommendation. The instrument is based on the Treaty (articles 99(2) and 128(4), later revised)
- **The Commission's Annual Progress Report:** an assessment of progress made with the implementation of the Strategy accompanied by policy proposals for the European Council.
- **The Open Method of Coordination:** an intergovernmental method of "soft coordination" by which Member States are evaluated by one another, with the Commission's role being one of surveillance.

Source: EC 2010c, p.18

Z. Adaptations in national TALIS 2013 Teacher Questionnaires

The overview on the following pages is based on *TALIS 2013 User Guide* (OECD, 2014e, pp.235-343), complemented by my comparison of the OECD TALIS 2013 teacher standard questionnaire and the adapted questionnaires from Australia, England and Finland.

Code D: Appropriate for comparison - national data are included in the international database.

Code X: Not internationally comparable - national data are not included in the international database

Code Z: My comparison of national TQ and OECD TQ

Question number Q refers to OECD TALIS 2013 standard questionnaire

Australia

Q	Code	Adaptation
3	Z	Question added: Do you identify as being of aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander origin?
4	D	Phrasing changed in nationally defined categories
10	D	Nationally defined categories: 1 = Secondary education / post-secondary, non-tertiary education or less (e.g. Year 10 or Year 12 exit qualification) or below 2 = First stage of tertiary education not leading to an advanced research qualification including programmes that are generally more practical/technical/occupation specific (e.g. Vocational Training Certificate, TAFE, Trade Certificate) 3 = Undergraduate Diploma 4 = Bachelor Degree 5 = Graduate Diploma/Graduate Certificate 6 = Master's Degree 7 = Doctorate
14	D	Nationally defined categories: 1 = In secondary education/post-secondary, non-tertiary education or less OR Voc. Training Certificate, TAFE, Trade Certificate 2 = In undergraduate Diploma, Bachelor Degree, Grad Diploma/ Certificate, Master's Degree or Doctorate 3 = In subject specialisation as part of teacher training 4 = At the in-service or professional development stage
14(g)	D	Nationally defined dimensions distinguishing between 1 = Technology and 2 = ICT and/or Computer Studies
15(g)	D	Nationally defined dimensions distinguishing between 1 = Technology and 2 = ICT and/or Computer Studies
22(k)	Z	Row added: Teaching Islander or Torres Strait Islander students
26(k)	Z	Row added: Teaching Islander or Torres Strait Islander students
28	D	Question instruction changed: "External individuals or bodies' as used below refer to, for example, inspectors or other persons from outside the school." " <i>municipality representatives</i> " deleted.
37	D	Nationally defined categories changed with distinction between 7 = Technology and 8 = Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and/or Computer Studies
47	X	Question not administered: "How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning your personal attitudes?"
48	D	Nationally defined categories: 1 = No 2 = Yes, as a student as part of my teacher education

		3 = Yes, as a teacher in a regional or national programme 4 = Yes, as a teacher as arranged by my school or school district 5 = Yes, as a teacher by my own initiative
48 (c)	X	Dimension "Yes, as a teacher in an EU programme (e.g. Comenius)" not administered
	Z	Q50. "If yes to Question 48, to which country/countries did you travel abroad for professional purposes in your career as a teacher or during your teacher education/training?" (Choices: New Zealand, India, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Other (please specify))

England

Q	Code	Adaptation
4	D	Term added in nationally defined categories
5	D	Term changed in stem of question: "How many years' experience do you have?"
10	D	Nationally defined categories: 1 = GCE A levels or below, or equivalent 2 = HNC, HND, NVQ at level 4+, Foundation Degree or equivalent 3 = Bachelor's Degree 4 = Master's Degree 5 = Doctorate
11	D	Question instruction added: Please mark one choice. Select 'Yes' if you are currently on a Teach First programme.
12	D	Term changed in stem of question: "Were the following elements included in your formal education or teacher training?"
14	D	Dimension instruction changed: Reading and writing (and literature) in English, or English as a second language (for non-native speakers); language studies, public speaking, literature
14	D	Stem of the question changed: Were any of the subjects listed below included in your formal education or teacher training? Nationally defined categories: 1 = In A levels or Foundation degree or equivalent 2 = In Bachelor's degree or higher 3 = In Subject specialisation as part of your teacher training 4 = At the in-service or professional development stage
14(d)	D	Term: Humanities/social studies
14(e)	D	Term: Dimension instruction changed: Languages other than English
14(f)	D	Term: Classical Greek and/or Latin
14(g)	D	Dimension instruction changed: Including information technology, computer studies, construction/surveying, electronics, graphics and design, keyboard skills, word processing, workshop technology/design technology
15(d)	D	Term: Humanities/social studies
15(f)	D	Term: Classical Greek and/or Latin
15(a)	D	Term: Nationally defined dimensions: 1 = Reading, writing and literature 2 = English as a Second Language

16	D	Term: Question instruction changed: A 'complete' calendar week is one that was not shortened by breaks, public holidays, sick leave etc. Also include tasks that took place during weekends, evenings and other out of class hours. Round to the nearest whole hour.
17	D	Term: Question instruction changed: Please only count actual face to face teaching time. Time spent on preparation, marking, etc. will be recorded in Question 18.
20	D	Term: Question instruction changed: This question refers to mentoring by or for teachers at your school. It does not refer to students in teacher education programmes who are practising as teachers at school.
24(a)	D	Term: I received scheduled time off for activities that took place during regular working hours at this school
26	Z	Row added <i>"o) Mentoring/coaching peers"</i>
28	D	Term "headteacher" for "principal" in Nationally defined categories.
28(d)	D	Term "review" for "analysis"
30	Z	Row added <i>"o) The type of professional development you undertake"</i>
31	Z	Row added <i>"i) If a teacher is found to be a poor performer, he/she would experience material sanctions such as withheld annual increases in pay".</i>
32	Z	Two rows added: <i>"e. My role includes having a secure knowledge of my subject and curriculum areas and imparting this knowledge to pupils effectively";</i> <i>"f. My role includes keeping up to date with developments in my subject or specialism."</i>
33	D	Phrasing: Stem of question changed: On average how often do you participate in the following activities in this school?
35(a)	D	Term: Students whose first language is not English
35	D	Term: 'Socioeconomically disadvantaged homes' refers to homes with children eligible for Free School Meals
35(e)	D	Term: Students from socioeconomically disadvantaged homes (eligible for Free School Meals)
37	D	Term: Nationally defined categories/Category instruction changed: 1 = Reading, writing and literature Includes reading and writing (and literature) in English, or English as a second language (for non-native speakers); language studies, public speaking, literature 2 = Mathematics 3 = Science 4 = Humanities/social studies 5 = Modern foreign languages Includes languages other than English 6 = Classical Greek and/or Latin 7 = Technology Includes information technology, computer studies, construction/surveying, electronics, graphics and design, keyboard skills, word processing, workshop technology/design technology 8 = Arts 9 = Physical education 10 = Religion and/or ethics 11 = Practical and vocational skills 12 = Other
43(d)	D	Term: Mark or grade

47	Z	Original question replaced with Q47 “We’d like to understand the factors that influence how you feel about your job. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” with 15 rows. a) Teaching in this school is generally very good. b) The students I teach are generally well behaved. c) The school has an effective school management team. d) The school management team give clear vision and direction. e) I do not have the autonomy I need to do a good job as a teacher. f) Teachers are underpaid compared to other qualified professionals with similar levels of responsibility. g) My own pay is fair given my performance. h) My workload is unmanageable. i) The accountability system (Ofsted, league tables, etc.) does not add significantly to the pressure of the job. j) Parents are supportive of my role as their children’s teacher. k) The accountability system does not add significantly to my workload. l) I have scope to progress as a classroom teacher. m) I have scope to progress into a leadership team role. n) I have scope to progress to a higher pay level. o) I have the opportunity to help all my students realise their potential.
48-49	Z	Original questions on teacher mobility replaced by “Additional background information” Q48-51: Q48. Are you living with someone as a couple (whether married or not)? (2 choices) Q49. Which of the following is the main activity that your partner has been doing for the last 7 days? (3 choices) Q50. What is the highest level of formal education that your partner has completed? (5 choices) Q51. Are you (or your spouse/partner if you live with him or her) the parent or guardian of any children living with you? (2 choices)
	D	Term changed in instructions for section on Professional Development
	D	Phrasing changed in instructions for section on Teaching Practices

Finland

Q	Code	Adaptation	Adaptation - English backtranslation
7	D	Yläkoulun	Term: Lower secondary education
8	D	Työskentelet yläkoulun opettajana	Term: Work as a lower secondary education teacher
10	D	Nationally defined categories: 1 = Alempi kuin ammatillinen opistoasteen tutkinto 2 = Ammatillinen opistoasteen tutkinto 3 = Alempi korkeakoulututkinto tai ylempi korkeakoulututkinto 4 = Licensiaatin tai tohtorin tutkinto	Nationally defined categories: 1 = Below higher vocational degree 2 = Higher vocational degree 3 = Lower degree at the university or polytechnic (3 years) or higher degree at the university or polytechnic (5 years) 4 = Doctorate programmes: licentiate or doctor
11	D	Opettajan koulutusohjelman	Term: Teacher education programme
12(d)	Z	Row added: Bedömning av elevers kunskaper i det/de ämne(n) jag undervisar	Evaluation of student competences in the subject(s) I teach (my translation)
13(d)	Z	Row added: Bedömning av elevers kunskaper i det/de ämne(n) jag undervisar	Evaluation of student competences in the subject(s) I teach (my translation)
14	D	Nationally defined categories:	Nationally defined categories:

		<p>1 = Erikoisammattitutkinto tai ammatillinen opistoasteen tutkinto</p> <p>2 = Alempi korkeakoulututkinto tai ylempi korkeakoulututkinto tai enemmän</p> <p>3 = Aineenopettajaopinnot osana opettajankoulutusta</p> <p>4 = Täydennys- tai jatkokoulutus</p>	<p>1 = Special vocational degree or higher vocational degree</p> <p>2 = Lower degree at the university or polytechnic (3 years) or higher degree at the university or polytechnic (5 years) or above subject specialisation</p> <p>3 = Subject specialisation as part of the teacher training</p> <p>4 = At the in-service or professional development stage</p>
14 (c)	D	<p>Luonnontieteet (ei sisällä maantiedettä)</p> <p>Dimension instruction changed:</p> <p>Fysiikka, kemia, biologia, ihmisen biologia, ympäristötieteet, maatalous/puutarhanhoito/metsätalous</p>	<p>Science (not included geography)</p> <p>Dimension instruction changed:</p> <p>Physics, chemistry, biology, human biology, environmental science, agriculture/horticulture/forestry</p>
14 (d)	D	<p>Nationally defined dimensions:</p> <p>1 = Maantiede</p> <p>2 = Yhteiskunnalliset aineet</p> <p>Dimension instruction changed:</p> <p>Yhteiskuntatieteet, aikalaistutkimus, taloustiede, ympäristötutkimus, historia, humanistiset aineet, lakiopinnot, kansalaistaito, yhteiskuntaoppi, etiikka, filosofia</p>	<p>National dimensions recoded for international comparability:</p> <p>1 = Geography / Social studies</p> <p>Dimension instruction changed:</p> <p>Social studies, community studies, contemporary studies, economics, environmental studies, history, humanities, legal studies, studies of the own country, social sciences, ethical thinking, philosophy</p>
15(c)	D	Luonnontieteet (pl. maantieto)	Science (not included geography)
15(d)	D	<p>Nationally defined dimensions:</p> <p>1 = Maantiede</p> <p>2 = Yhteiskunnalliset aineet</p>	<p>National dimensions recoded for international comparability:</p> <p>1 = Geography / Social studies</p>
27(h)	Z	<p>Personals utbildnings- och utvecklingsplan på min skola förbättrar inte möjligheter för mig att systematiskt delta i utvecklingen av mitt professionella kunnande eller arbetspraktikprogram</p>	<p>The staff's education and development plan on my school does not improve my possibilities for systematically taking part in the development of my professional competences or work practice programme</p> <p>(my translation)</p>
35(a)	D	Oppilaat, joiden äidinkieli on eri kuin tämän koulun opetuskieli	Term: Students whose mother tongue is different from the instruction language(s) of this school
37	D	<p>Nationally defined categories/Category instruction changed:</p> <p>1 = Lukeminen, kirjoittaminen ja kirjallisuus</p> <p>2 = Matematiikka</p> <p>3 = Luonnontieteet (ei sisällä maantietoa)</p> <p>Fysiikka, kemia, biologia, ihmisen biologia, ympäristötieteet, maatalous/puutarhanhoito/metsätalous</p> <p>4 = Maantieto</p> <p>5 = Yhteiskunnalliset aineet</p> <p>Yhteiskuntatieteet, aikalaistutkimus, taloustiede, ympäristötutkimus, historia, humanistiset aineet, lakiopinnot, kansalaistaito, yhteiskuntaoppi, etiikka, filosofia</p> <p>6 = Vieraat kielet</p>	<p>National categories recoded for international comparability/Category instruction changed:</p> <p>1 = Reading, writing and literature</p> <p>2 = Mathematics</p> <p>3 = Science (not included geography)</p> <p>Includes science, physics, physical science, chemistry, biology, human biology, environmental science, agriculture/horticulture/forestry</p> <p>4 = Geography / Social studies (Includes social studies, community studies, contemporary studies, economics, environmental studies, history, humanities, legal studies, studies of the own country, social sciences, ethical thinking, philosophy)</p> <p>5 = Modern foreign languages</p> <p>6 = Ancient Greek and/or Latin</p> <p>7 = Technology</p> <p>8 = Arts</p> <p>9 = Physical education</p>

		7 = Muinaiskreikka ja/tai latina 8 = Teknologia 9 = Taideaineet 10 = Liikunta 11 = Uskonto ja/tai elämäkatsomustieto 12 = Käytännön ja ammatilliset taidot 13 = Muu	10 = Religion and/or ethics 11 = Practical and vocational skills 12 = Other
43(d)	D	Arvosanan	Term: Mark
44(f)	Z	Row added: På denna skola fäster man vederbörlig uppmärksamhet vid arbetsmiljöarbetet.	This school attaches due attention to the work environment (my translation)
50	Z	Tilläggsfråga til enkäten: Här kan du ge feedback om enkäten (t.ex. om innehållet och genomförandet):	Additional survey question: Here you can provide feedback concerning the survey (e.g. about the content and the implementation):